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 Just Another Brother on the SCT?:1  What Justice Clarence 
Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity 
 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig*
  
 Justice Clarence Thomas has generated the attention that most Justices receive only 
after they have retired.  He has been boycotted by the National Bar Association, caricatured as 
a lawn jockey in Emerge Magazine, and protested by professors at an elite law school.  As  a 
general matter, Justice Thomas is viewed as a “non-race” man, a Justice with a jurisprudence 
that mirrors the Court’s most conservative white member, Justice Antonin Scalia—in other 
words, Justice Scalia in “blackface.”   
 
 This Article argues that, although Justice Thomas’s ideology differs from the 
liberalism that is more widely held by Blacks in the United States, such ideology is deeply 
grounded in black conservative thought, which has a “raced” history and foundation that are 
distinct from white conservatism. In so doing, this Article examines the development of black 
conservative thought in the United States; highlights pivotal experiences in Justice Thomas’s 
life that have shaped his racial identity; and explicates the development of Justice Thomas’s 
jurisprudence from a black, conservative perspective in cases concerning education and 
desegregation, affirmative action, and crime. 
                                                           
1 The title of this Article is inspired by the movie JUST ANOTHER GIRL ON THE I.R.T (Miramax Films 
1993).  The I.R.T. is a line of the New York City subway system.  The movie gives the female 
perspective of growing up in black urban America .  In many ways, it is the female version of John 
Singleton’s BOYZ N’ THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures 1991).  Thomas’s story is, in a sense, a black justice’s 
story. 
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Elmendorf, James Forman, Scott Gerber, Bill Hing, Emily Houh, Elizabeth Joh, Kevin Johnson, Evelyn 
Lewis, Al Lin, Deborah Malamud, Rob Mikos, Reginald Oh, Alex Romain, Jessica Silbey, Stephen 
Smith, David Stras, Madhavi Sunder, George Varghes, Marty West, and Sherman Willis for their helpful 
comments.  Dean Rex Perschbacher’s support has been generous and invaluable.  My assistants Torre 
Fogel, Addisah Sherwood, and Sarah Wells and the staff of the law library, in particular Erin Murphy 
and Aaron Dailey, provided valuable assistance.  Most importantly, I thank Jacob Willig-Onwuachi for 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Serving as a United States Supreme Court Justice is one of the 
most coveted and respected jobs in the nation.2   Nevertheless, as with any 
job in the public eye, Supreme Court Justices are often subject to 
criticisms by many persons, both within and outside of the legal 
profession.  Justice Clarence Thomas is no exception. 
From the very day that Thomas was nominated to sit on the Court, 
he has been a subject of great interest for many and has been critiqued and 
opposed by individuals from all walks of life.3  In particular, the Justice’s 
intellectual abilities and competence as a jurist have been repeatedly and 
continually challenged.4  For example, Justice Thomas has been rumored 
to select clerks from the best law schools, to lean “‘especially heavily on 
them,’” and to publish their draft opinions with “‘little embellishment.’”5  
Additionally, Justice Thomas has had his independence as a voter on the 
bench questioned, with the suggestion that he bases his votes on those of a 
colleague, Justice Antonin Scalia.6 Indeed, Justice Thomas has been 
referred to as “Scalia’s puppet,”7 “Scalia’s clone,”8 and even “Scalia’s 
                                                           
2  See WILLIAM D. BADER & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED AND 
EIGHT JUSTICES 1 (2004) (asserting that the United States Supreme Court “plays such an 
influential role in shaping legal thought and practice” that it warrants special study). 
3   Cf. SCOTT GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE 
THOMAS 3 (1999) (noting that between July of 1991 and December of 1997, “Justice 
Thomas was mentioned in 32,377 newspaper stories”). 
4  See GERBER, supra note 3, at 25 (asserting that “[t]he conventional wisdom about 
Justice Thomas’s first few years was that his opinions were shallow and poorly reasoned, 
he did little work, and he was a clone of conservative Justice Antonin Scalia with few 
ideas of his own”);  
5   See JOHN GREENYA, SILENT JUSTICE:  THE CLARENCE THOMAS STORY 167 
(2001) (detailing claims that, while on the D.C. Circuit, Thomas selected clerks from the 
best law schools and relied heavily on them and their writing). 
6 GREENYA, supra note 5, at 263 (quoting a commentator as stating, “Putting aside 
his political philosophy and his conservative credo, Justice Thomas doesn’t deserve to be 
on the Supreme Court.  He doesn’t have the intellect to be a member of the Court, and 
that’s the reason, in my opinion, that you see Thomas voting with Scalia so often.”).
7  See Stephen F. Smith, The Truth About Clarence Thomas and the Need for Black 
Leadership, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 513, 514 (1999–2000) (noting that Justice Thomas’s 
critics claim “that Justice Thomas is merely a puppet of Justice Antonin Scalia”); see, 
e.g., John Brummett, Glorifying Private Over Public, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Feb. 24, 2002, 
at 4D (stating that “William Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia are right-wing idealogues” but 
that “Justice Clarence Thomas is Scalia’s puppet”); Vincent T. Bugliosi, None Dare Call 
It Treason, NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 11 (referring to Justice Scalia as “the Court’s right-
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bitch.”9   
As a liberal black womanist,10 I initially ignored these comments 
about Justice Thomas.  Ironically, a biography of the late Justice 
Thurgood Marshall11—whose jurisprudence could not have been more 
different than Justice Thomas’s—would bring me to commit an act that I 
 
wing ideologue” and Justice Thomas as “his Pavlovian puppet . . . who doesn’t even try 
to create the impression that he’s thinking”); Paul P. DuPlessis, Opinion, California 
Letters Desk, June 1, 2001, at B16 (calling Antonin Scalia “the Supreme Court’s 
puppeteer” and Clarence Thomas “his puppet”).  But see GREENYA, supra note 5, at 13 
(referring to an instance in which one trial lawyer asserted, “‘[m]y theory is that Clarence 
Thomas is a ventriloquist, and that the puppet is Scalia”). 
8 See, e.g., Ann D. Wilson, Opinion, Supreme Court Ruling Bad Joke, PALM BEACH 
POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at 4E (referring to “Justice Antonin Scalia [and] his unqualified 
clone, Clarence Thomas”); Carl Rowan, Justice Thomas Will Never “Come Home,” CHI. 
SUN TIMES, July 4, 1993 (stating that there is “no reason even to hope that [Justice 
Thomas] will ever be anything other than a clone of the most conservative justice, 
Antonin Scalia”). 
9 GREENYA, supra note 5, at 12 (2001) (quotations omitted) (recounting a story in 
which Thomas was called “Scalia’s bitch”).   
10  The term “womanist” is a synonym for black feminist or feminist of color.  The 
American Heritage Dictionary now includes this new term in its volume, defining 
“womanist” as “[h]aving or expressing a belief in or respect for women and their talents 
and abilities beyond the boundaries of race and class.”  AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1978 (4th ed. 2000). 
I use the term “liberal” or “liberalism” to refer to political liberalism.  By “liberal,” 
I mean a person who actively believes that Government should support social reform 
within the system and favors the protection of civil liberties.  A “liberal” may support 
programs such as affirmative action or welfare, unions, and strong regulation of business. 
 11 Justice Thurgood Marshall, the great-grandson of a slave, became the first black 
Supreme Court Justice in 1967.  See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE 
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 47 (1979).  At the time of Marshall’s 
appointment, President Lyndon B. Johnson asserted that appointing Marshall on the 
Supreme Court was “the right thing to do, the right time to do it, the right man and the 
right place.”  See Kevin R. Johnson, On Appointment of a Latino/a to the Supreme Court, 
13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 3 (2002) (quotations omitted).   
 Along with his mentor Charles Hamilton Houston, the former Dean of Howard 
University School of Law (where Marshall graduated first in his class), Marshall 
developed a strategy for eliminating segregation in educational institutions.  In 1954, the 
efforts of Marshall and Houston resulted in the landmark decision in Brown v Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which declared state-mandated segregation of public 
schools unconstitutional.  By the time Marshall was appointed to the Supreme Court, he 
had won twenty-nine of the thirty-two cases he argued before the Court.  See Mark 
Tushnet, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, Lawyer Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. 
L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1992). 
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once thought was impossible:  defend Justice Thomas.12  The biography 
included a statement made by Archibald Cox,13 the man whom Marshall 
had replaced as Solicitor General: 
 
Marshall may not be very bright or hard-working but he 
deserves credit for picking the best law clerks in town.14
 
As Juan Williams made clear in his book Thurgood Marshall:  American 
Revolutionary, like Justice Thomas, many “[w]hite lawyers in the top law 
firms and law schools[,] had never been convinced that [Marshall] was a 
 
12  In fact, I was reluctant to write this Article because of the reactions I thought it 
would elicit.  Many of my friends think it blasphemous to suggest that something about 
the late Justice Marshall reminds me of Justice Thomas.  The late Justice himself once 
said scornfully of the nominee with comparably little litigation experience, “Think of 
them comparing him [Justice Thomas] with me. . . . They think he’s as good as I am.”  
JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 393–94 (1998) 
(detailing the life story of Thurgood Marshall the man, the attorney, and jurist).  As I 
worked on this article, I became more terrified of being called, much like Justice Thomas 
has been called, a traitor to my race.  See Randall Kennedy, “Sellout”: The Problem of 
Betrayal in African American History (manuscript at 15, on file with author) (maintaining 
that “the problem with blacks deploying a rhetoric that accuses other blacks of being 
enemies engaged in racial betrayal is that such attacks are too powerful, too intimidating, 
too silencing” and that it “causes black thinkers and policymakers to censor themselves 
out of fear of suffering racial excommunication”); also Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, Defining 
Ourselves for Ourselves, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 6-
10, on file with author) (same).  Justice Thomas has been heavily criticized by several 
prominent members of the black community.  For example, film director Spike Lee called 
the Justice a “‘handkerchief head, a chicken and biscuit-eating Uncle Tom.’”  Elwood 
Watson, Guess What Came to American Politics–Contemporary Black Conservatism, 29 
J. BLACK STUD. 73 (Sept. 1998) (quoting J. Thorton, The X Factor, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Jul. 15, 1991, at 17). 
13  Archibald Cox, a former law professor at Harvard, was also the first special 
prosecutor appointed to investigate Watergate.  Former President Richard Nixon ordered 
the solicitor general to fire Cox after he requested access to secret White House tapes as 
part of his investigation.  See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG supra note 11, at 287–88.   
14  WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 362 (quoting Richard Smith, Clerks of the Court, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1978, at A2).  At one point, the National Review magazine ran an 
article in which conservative Terry Eastland asked, “[O]f the 15 or so opinions [that] the 
court assigned to [Marshall] during the term, how many does he, not his clerks, actually 
write?”  Id. at 384 (quoting Terry Eastland, While Justice Sleeps, NAT’L REV., Apr. 21, 
1989, at 24–25). 
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strong legal mind,”15 despite the fact that Marshall had won twenty-nine 
of the thirty-two cases he argued before the Court.16   
Indeed, much like with Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia, some 
critics had openly wondered whether Justice Marshall was dependent on 
Justice Brennan in deciding how to vote in cases before the Supreme 
Court.17  In fact, as several authors have noted, Justice Marshall was 
privately referred to by law clerks as “Mr. Justice Brennan-Marshall.”18  
 
15  Id.  As Mark Tushnet of Georgetown University Law Center has noted: 
The April 21, 1989 cover of the conservative journal National Review 
captured a common view of Thurgood Marshall as a Supreme Court 
Justice: it showed him asleep on the bench. This view, that Marshall 
was a lazy Justice uninterested in the Court’s work, is rarely 
committed to print. In the journalistic book THE BRETHREN, authors 
Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong report an incident that presents 
this view. According to Woodward and Armstrong, Justice Lewis 
Powell expressed incredulity that, in a brief conversation, Marshall 
had seemed to indicate that he did not know the details in one part of 
Marshall’s important dissenting opinion in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez. They also report the “joke” told around 
the Supreme Court building that the only time Justice Marshall saw 
Justice Potter Stewart was in the hallways as Stewart arrived late and 
Marshall left early.  This view of Marshall is wrong and perhaps 
racist.  
Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren, 80 GEO. L.J. 2109, 2109 (1992) 
(emphasis added). 
16  See supra note 11 and accompanying text; Tushnet, supra note 11, at 1277 
(citing Andrew Rosenthal, Marshall Retires from High Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 
1991, at A1, A13) (asserting that Marshall was a great trial lawyer and appellate 
advocate).  Additionally, in their book THE BRETHREN, Robert Woodward and Scott 
Armstrong depicted Justice Marshall as a man who failed to pay attention to cases during 
oral arguments, did not do his work, regularly watched television in the middle of the 
day, heavily depended on his law clerks in preparing for cases and writing opinions, and 
was more admired for cracking dirty jokes during obscenity cases than for his legal skills. 
 WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 369 (citing WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN, 
supra note 11, at 197, 258, 429; see also Juan Williams, Thurgood Marshall–American 
Revolutionary, 25 ARK. L. REV. 443, 444 (2003) (discussing the importance of Marshall’s 
legal contributions). 
17 WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 402 (quoting Terry Eastland as saying “Justice 
Thurgood Marshall will be lucky to rank somewhere in the middle of the 105 Supreme 
Court Justices who have served the United States. . . .  [Justice Marshall consistently 
voted with Justice Brennan and] wrote few opinions of major significance, either for the 
Supreme Court or in dissent.”).   
18  See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG supra note 11, at 48; see also WILLIAMS, supra 
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Later, after Justice Marshall retired from the Court, one writer would 
assert, “Marshall worked well with Justice William J. Brennan Jr. . . .  But 
Brennan, a great justice by any standard, was the senior man in this 
partnership, and when they managed to forge liberal majorities, it was 
usually due to Brennan’s influence within the Supreme Court.  It bears 
noting that Marshall is retiring a year after Brennan did.”19  That same 
writer, Terry Eastland, would also declare that Marshall was “not an 
intellectual force.”20    
Thus, the question arises: what does it mean that the only two 
black Justices to sit on the Supreme Court, two Justices who could not be 
any more different,21 have routinely had their intellectual abilities and 
individualism questioned in the same way?22  Have both of these Justices 
 
note 12, at 402 (quoting Terry Eastland, Editorial, BALT. SUN, July 1, 1991, at A9); 
Smith, supra note 7, at 517. 
19    Terry Eastland, Editorial, BALT. SUN, July 1, 1991, at A9.  Even Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has challenged Justice Marshall’s legal thinking abilities, once stating “I think 
he [Justice Marshall will] be thought of as a great legal advocate, but I don’t think he 
would have been thought of as a great legal thinker.”  WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 402.  
20   Id. (quoting Terry Eastland, Editorial, BALT. SUN, July 1, 1991, at A9).  
Professor Stephen Smith of the University of Virginia School of Law has argued that 
high rates of agreement are commonplace on the Supreme Court.  For example, during 
the same term that Justices Thomas and Scalia agreed 93% of the time, President 
Clinton’s two appointees to the Court, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. 
Breyer, agreed 86% of the time.  Also, in Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s first term on the 
Court, he voted with Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 93% of the time.  As Professor 
Smith points out, however, Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy are not “dismissed as 
mere ‘followers’ of Justice Ginsburg and the Chief Justice, respectively, despite their 
similarly high rates of agreement.”  Smith, supra note 7, at 517; see also Scott P. Johnson 
& Robert M. Alexander, The Rehnquist Court and the Devolution of the Right to Privacy, 
105 W. VA. L. REV. 621 (2003) (reviewing privacy cases between 1986 and 2000 and 
finding in cases in which Justices Rehnquist and Scalia sat together, that they (in addition 
to Thomas) voted together 100% of the time, and that Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens also 
voted together 100%). 
21  See John Calmore, Airing Dirty Laundry: Disputes Among Privileged Blacks–
From Clarence Thomas to “The Law School Five,” 46 HOW. L. J. 175, 176 (2003) 
(noting that “Justice Thomas represents so stark a contrast to what Marshall did and was 
about”); Note, Lasting Stigma: Affirmative Action and Clarence Thomas’s Prisoners’ 
Rights Jurisprudence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1334–36 (1999) (concluding that Justice 
Thomas’s conservative jurisprudence is in part due to his attempts to distinguish himself 
from Justice Marshall). 
22  See David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 
1956–57 (1999) (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF 
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been targets of the age-old stereotype that Blacks23 are lazy and 
incompetent and cannot think for themselves?24  Or, more directly, to 
what extent is Justice Thomas a victim of this form of racism?25   
 
RACE IN AMERICA (1999) and discussing how the presumption of black incompetence 
worked to hurt Larry Mungin, the book’s protagonist, at his law firm); Donna Gill, 
Lawyers of Color: Encouraging Diversity, CHI. LAW., July 1992, WESTLAW (A black 
partner stated “[m]inorities don’t come in with [a] presumption of competence. . . . They 
come in having to prove themselves.”). 
23  Throughout this Article, I capitalize the word “Black” or “White” when used as a 
noun to describe a racialized group.  I do not, however, capitalize the word “black” or 
“white” when used as an adjective.  I prefer to use the term “Blacks” to the term “African 
Americans” because I find the term “Blacks” to be more inclusive.  Additionally, “[i]t is 
more convenient to invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white 
than say, between African-American and Northern European-American, which would be 
necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies.” Alex M. Johnson, 
Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action:  Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1073 (1992).  
24  See, e.g., PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK:  A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN 
AMERICA (1999) (describing the story of a black Harvard Law School graduate who sued 
his law firm for racial discrimination and how the majority opinion of the D.C. Circuit 
contained an underlying message that the young attorney was an  unqualified black 
lawyer carried along by affirmative action); see also SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM 
DEFERRED: THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF BLACK FREEDOM IN AMERICA 5 (1998) 
[hereinafter STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED] (noting that he “heard a white female 
professional at a racially mixed table call Clarence Thomas an incompetent beneficiary of 
affirmative action”); SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER 133 (1990) 
[hereinafter STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER] (“The accusation black Americans 
have always lived with is that they are inferior – inferior simply because they are black.  
And this accusation has been too uniform, too ingrained in cultural imagery, too enforced 
by law, custom, and every form of power not to have left a mark.”). 
25  Justice Thomas has argued the same.  See Tony Mauro, Clerks: Minority Ranks 
Rise, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 16, 2000, at 10.  As Journalist Tony Mauro reported, Justice 
Thomas proclaimed the following in response to a question concerning “criticism that he 
is a “clone” of Justice Antonin Scalia: ‘Because I am black, it is said automatically that 
Justice Scalia has to do my work for me. That goes with the turf. I understand that deal. It 
is interesting that I rarely see him, so he must have a chip in my brain and he controls me 
that way. But the fact is, no such cabal exists.’”  Mauro also wrote that Justice Thomas 
was later asked if he continues to write his own opinions and “deadpanned, ‘No, Justice 
Scalia does.’”  See Tony Mauro, supra at 10 (emphasis added). 
In an article, Mark Tushnet argues that racism affected perceptions of Marshall as 
being intellectually unfit for the court. See generally Tushnet, supra note 15.  For 
instance, in response to the argument about Marshall’s “overuse” of his clerks, Tushnet 
demonstrates that Marshall’s “practices were not wildly out of line with those of others 
on the Court.”  Id. at 2112. Specifically, Tushnet reported: 
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A review of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence reveals that there is no 
basis for the claim that Justice Thomas is a “Scalia clone” or “Scalia 
puppet” and supports the proposition that Justice Thomas has been 
unfairly subject to the stereotype of black incompetence.26 In fact, Justice 
Thomas has developed his own jurisprudence as a black conservative, 
directly and indirectly weaving his own “raced” ideologies into his 
opinions.27
In this Article, I draw on Justice Thomas’s opinions on the 
Supreme Court in areas concerning education and desegregation, 
affirmative action, and crime to argue that Justice Thomas’s 
 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist has written that he has his clerks “do 
the first draft of almost all cases” in his chambers, and that sometimes 
he leaves those drafts “relatively unchanged.” Laurence Tribe reported 
that “a number of opinions he worked on” as Justice Stewart’s law 
clerk “are really almost exactly as he drafted them,” including one of 
Justice Stewart’s most celebrated opinions.  Indeed, all of the Justices 
relied heavily on their law clerks, particularly for working out details; 
as Bernard Schwartz explained in his discussion of the Burger Court’s 
processes, “The Justices normally outline the way they want opinions 
drafted. But the drafting clerk is left with a great deal of discretion on 
the details of the opinion, particularly the specific reasoning and 
research supporting the decision. 
Id. at 2112; see also John B. Oakley, William W. Schwarzer: A Judge for All Seasons, 28 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1995) (describing how much federal judges rely on the 
help of their law clerks). 
26 See Martha S. West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 
607, 614 (1998) (describing the stereotype of black incompetence and recounting a story 
that demonstrates how “[i]f you have dark skin in this society . . . you may . . . discounted 
in meetings, or assumed to be less competent than a white person when you walk into a 
room for a job interview or to give a lecture”).  In fact, Senate Minority Leader Harry 
Reid recently expressed his strong opposition to the idea of Justice Thomas being 
appointed Chief Justice, claiming that the Justice is an “embarrassment,” that his 
“opinions are poorly written,” and that he has not “done a good job as a Supreme Court 
Justice.”  Zev Chafets, Slap at Thomas Stinks of Racism, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 8, 
2004, at 43.  At the same time, however, Senator Reid has asserted that Justice Scalia is 
suitable for the position because he “is one smart guy.”  Michael A. Fletcher, Reid Says 
He Could Back Scalia for Chief Justice: Comments anger Liberals and Thomas 
Supporters, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2004, at A04.   The seemingly obvious explanation of 
the senator’s strikingly different opinions of two justices with similar conservative views 
is the stereotype of black incompetence.  See Chafets, supra note, at 43. 
27  In this Article, I make no claim that Justice Thomas’s political views are immune 
from attack.  I challenge only those criticisms contending that Justice Thomas is Justice 
Scalia’s puppet and has no independent voice. 
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jurisprudence, while conservative, is, in certain important respects, 
distinct from that of his white, conservative counterparts and is 
intrinsically linked to his identity as a southern black man in the United 
States.28  Part I of this Article examines and describes the development of 
black conservative ideology in the United States and how such ideology is 
distinct from white conservative rhetoric and theory.  Part II of this Article 
provides an overview of Justice Thomas’s background, highlighting 
pivotal experiences during his childhood, education, and career that have 
shaped his racial identity and his views about how racial equality should 
be achieved within and through the law.  Part III of this Article examines 
and explains the development of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence as 
participating in America’s long history of black conservative thought 
(described in Part I) as seen in Supreme Court cases concerning education 
and desegregation, affirmative action, and crime.29  Finally, this Article 
concludes by exploring what the most commonly heard criticisms of 
Justice Thomas teach us about race and the impact of racial identity. 
 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY 
 
[T]here was an appearance within the conservative ranks that blacks 
were to be tolerated but not necessarily welcomed.  There appeared to 
be a presumption, albeit refutable, that blacks could not be 
conservative. . . .  Hence, in challenging either positions or emphases 
on policy matters, one had to be careful not to go so far as to lose 
one’s conservative credentials. . . .  Certainly, pluralism on these 
issues were not encouraged or invited—especially from blacks. . . .  
Dissent bore a price—one I gladly paid. 
    –Clarence Thomas30
 
28  Cf. Calmore, supra note 21, at 176 (noting that “our judiciary . . .  is [not] an 
impartial institution that stands independently against the tide of racial politics and 
ideology”); see also Johnson, supra note 11, at 7–14 (describing the potential beneficial 
impact of the appointment of a Latino/a to the Supreme Court). 
29   See Calmore, supra note 21, at 192 (“[Justice Thomas’s] jurisprudence . . . is 
deeply personal and his black identity and biography stand closely behind his Supreme 
Court votes and opinions.”). 
30  Clarence Thomas, No Room at the Inn: The Loneliness of the Black 
Conservative, in  BLACK AND RIGHT:  THE BOLD NEW VOICE OF BLACK CONSERVATIVES 
IN AMERICA 8 (1997); see also JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE:  THE 
SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS 52 (1994) (quoting Thomas as saying “‘I don’t fit in with 
whites and I don’t fit in with blacks’”); Robert C. Smith & Hanes Walton, Jr., U–Turn: 
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A. The History of Black Conservatism 
 
 Although black conservatives have only recently begun to gain 
widespread attention—especially since the appointment of Justice Thomas 
in 1991—Justice Thomas is only one of a long line of black individuals to 
espouse conservative ideas.31  Indeed, the development of black 
conservative thought32 has deep historical roots, reaching all the way back 
 
Martin Kilson and Black Conservatives, 62 TRANSITION 209–10 (1993) (highlighting 
how “many black traditional Republicans . . . worked hard to have [the Republican Party] 
deal with the plight of African Americans” and were excluded from conservative 
administrations); see also Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 566 
(2001) (arguing that it is important for law to address the exclusion of individuals who 
seek both to retain cultural membership and to pursue freedom from discrimination and 
repression within their cultural communities). 
31  See Randall Kennedy, Justice Thomas and Racial Loyalty, AM. LAW, Sept. 1998, 
at 91 (asserting that “Thomas’s thinking . . . [has] deep roots in Afro-American history 
and culture as reflected in the idea of such figures as Booker T. Washington, Kelly 
Miller, George Schuyler, Zora Neale Hurston, and Thomas Sowell”).  As a general 
matter, conservatives can be divided into three different groups:  (1) the anti-statist 
faction; (2) organic faction; and (3) the neoconservative faction.  The anti-statist faction 
of conservatism focuses on decreasing the role of the state in American politics.  As a 
general matter, this group of conservatives places a strong emphasis on the role of the 
individual in society and, in turn, demands a strict limit on government control and 
authority.  The organic faction of conservatism concentrates more on issues of morality 
and culture and is strongly influenced by religion.  Today, this group of conservatives is 
largely controlled by the “Religious Right.” The third faction of conservatism is the 
neoconservative group, into which many black conservatives fit.  The neoconservatives, 
many of whom were once liberals, oppose the expansion of government and social 
welfare programs (much like their counterparts).  KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & LINDA J. 
METCALF, AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES TODAY 151–152 (1993); Lewis A. Randolph, A 
Historical Analysis and Critique of Contemporary Black Conservatism, W. J. OF BLACK 
STUDIES, 150–51 (1995). 
This Article focuses on the anti-statist and neoconservative factions of 
conservatives and does not address the organic faction. 
32  Additionally, there are various strands of black conservative thought.  Peter 
Eisenstadt, Introduction, to BLACK CONSERVATISM:  ESSAYS IN INTELLECTUAL AND 
POLITICAL HISTORY xv (Peter Eisenstadt ed., 1999).  By discussing black conservative 
ideology as a whole, I do not mean to suggest that all black conservatives “think alike.”  
In fact, black conservatism is so rich and varied that it is difficult to define one particular 
ideology as black conservative thought.  As one author stated about black conservatism, 
“[a]ny generalization about black conservatism is subject to the following two 
limitations:  (1)  It will not be true of all black conservatives, [and] (2) it will be true of 
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to the late 1700s33 and developing from a past ideology centered around a 
gradualist approach to achieving equality that required a practical and 
strategic accommodation of Whites to today’s black empowerment and 
self-reliance themes.34  
 Although traces of black conservative thought can be found as far 
back as the 1700s, the most prominent historical figure among black 
conservatives is Booker T. Washington,35 who emerged as a leader of the 
 
many individuals who are not black conservatives.”  Id. at x. 
Common themes and ideas, however, have persisted throughout the history of black 
conservatism and pervade nearly every faction of black conservatism.  For the sake of 
simplicity, I have drawn together ideas from black conservatives (in particular, black 
neoconservatives) whose views on the issues of education/desegregation, affirmative 
action, and crime coincide with those expressed by Justice Thomas and refer to this 
collection of ideas as “black conservative thought” or “black conservative ideology.”  I 
am not, however, making any claims that all conservatives or all black conservatives (or 
all liberals or all black liberals) adhere to the principles described herein.  For the 
purposes of this Article, however, I have made generalizations about both conservatives 
and liberals, ethnic and non-ethnic. 
33   For example, Jupiter Hammon, a Long Island slave, is considered to be one of 
the first Blacks to express black conservative ideas, in particular those that related to 
Blacks’ proving their worthiness to Whites as a strategic move to gaining more rights.  
According to Hammon, “[f]ree blacks had a special responsibility to uphold moral 
standards, to avoid stealing and laziness, to prove themselves worthy of freedom, and to 
dispel canards about black incapacity for self-directed lives.”  Eisenstadt, supra note 32, 
at xv. 
34  To many Blacks and many Whites, today’s black conservative is viewed as an 
accommodationist, a person who is willing to “sell out his or her race” to gain acceptance 
from Whites.  See STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 164.   As 
Steele explains, “[T]his is the most constant charge against the black conservative––that 
he does not love his own people––an unpardonable sin that justifies his symbolic 
annihilation. . . [a]n Uncle Tom . . . whose failure to love his people makes him an 
accessory to their oppression. . . .   Thus black conservatives do not yet comprise a loyal 
opposition; they are, instead, classic dissenters. . . . [living] a life openly subversive to 
[their] own group and often impractical for [themselves] . . . .”  STEELE, A DREAM 
DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 7–8; see also Sunder, supra note 30, at 566 (“[Individuals 
are increasingly refusing to take their cultures lying down.  Rejecting old notions of 
imposed identity, more and more, individuals want reason, choice, and autonomy within 
their cultural communities.  They want cultural on their own terms.”). 
35  Booker T. Washington was born a slave in Hale’s Ford, Virginia in 1858 or 
1859.   See BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY 1 (1900).  After emancipation, 
Washington’s family was so poor that he was forced to work in salt furnaces and coal 
mines at the tender age of 9.  See BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, THE STORY OF MY LIFE AND 
WORK 48 (1900) [hereinafter “WASHINGTON, STORY”]; Donald B. Gibson, Strategies and 
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black community during the post-Reconstruction era.36  Specifically, 
Washington’s rise to prominence occurred in the late 1800s and early 
1900s, a period that was replete with violence against Blacks, including 
lynching, and consistent violations of the rights of Blacks as freed 
persons.37   
 As a response to the repeated attacks against black people during 
this period, Washington and certain other black men strategically formed 
coalitions with white conservative elites as a means of ensuring the safety 
of Blacks in the South.38  The ideology of Washington and these men was 
as follows:  “if [Blacks] play by [Whites’] rules, and prove [their] 
worthiness according to [those] standards, [Whites] will have no choice 
but to accommodate [Blacks].”39  In other words, acknowledging the 
strong and often violent resistance by Whites to efforts by Blacks to have 
their rights recognized, Washington and his followers developed a 
strategic, gradual approach to achieving racial equality that did not 
threaten to overturn the status quo too quickly.40  To Washington and his 
 
Revisions of Self-Representation in Booker T. Washington’s Autobiographies, 45 AMER. 
Q. 370, 374 (1993). When he was 16, Washington quit work to go to school.   To 
accomplish this task, Washington had to walk over 100 miles to attend the Hampton 
Institute in Virginia.  He paid his tuition and board there by working as the janitor.  See 
WASHINGTON, supra note, at 42-49.   
36  See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 825 (1991) 
(contending that Washington rejuvenated black nationalism during the post-
Reconstruction era); Book Note, Rethinking Self-Help, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1714 
(1991) (noting that Booker T. Washington rose to promise during the post-Reconstruction 
area by telling Blacks in the rural South to cast down their buckets). 
37 See Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1745, 1785 (1991) (asserting that Washington’s position “arose in the context of post-
emancipation violence against Blacks”); John Hope Franklin, Booker T. Washington, 
Revisited, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1991 (same). 
38   Randolph, supra note 31, at 153 (citing VAN C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF JIM CROW (1974) as explaining the emergence of black conservatism as the 
result of a white power structure that was unwilling to tolerate demands made by black 
leaders who did not accommodate white interests). 
 39  Eisenstadt, supra note 32, at xi;  see also Randolph, supra note 31, at 151 (noting 
that “Washington’s approach to improving racial relations was to accommodate White 
interests”). 
40  See Dickson D. Bruce, Jr., Booker T. Washington’s “The Man Farthest Down” 
and the Transformation of Race, 48 MISS. Q. 239, 240 (1995) (noting also that Paul 
Laurence Dunbar described Washington as “[w]earing ‘the mask’”).  According to 
Dickson Bruce, Jr., “Washington was a man who knew how to survive in a hostile white 
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followers, Blacks had a duty to focus on their own economic and moral 
advancement through self-help, rather than seek progress through legal 
and political changes that required the approval and cooperation of Whites 
because Whites would never accept Blacks until Blacks proved 
themselves worthy of such acceptance or, more so, because Whites may 
never accept Blacks at all.41
 Indeed, for Washington and other “representative men of the 
race,”42 this philosophy of accommodation, coupled with self-help, proved 
extremely successful in certain, selected instances.  Many southern 
Whites, who were extremely resistant to any radical change in the status 
of Blacks, found Washington’s views more palatable than those of other 
 
world, saying what he knew that the white world wanted to hear, trying, like the trickster 
John, to prevent that world from closing off what few possibilities there were for 
effective action and achievement. . . .  [Washington] . . . was a master at saying one thing 
and meaning another, using techniques of indirection to subvert white American racism 
even as he appeared to accommodate himself to the institutions of a racist society.”  Id.     
41 See August Meier, Negro Class Structure and Ideology in the Age of Booker T. 
Washington, 23 PHYLON 258, 258 (1962) (describing Washington’s philosophy as being 
that “[o]nce Negroes had proven their ability to help themselves, to acquire wealth and 
respectability, it was believed, prejudice and discrimination would wither away”).  Some 
have argued that Washington was not an accommodationist, but a realist who used 
trickery to help further progress among black people.   See generally Gibson, supra note 
35 (describing Washington’s autobiography UP FROM SLAVERY (1900) as deliberately 
addressing white desire regarding racial matters and “assuag[ing] guilt in assuring its 
white audience that blacks, in slavery and out, were utterly and entirely without 
‘bitterness’”).   
42  Randolph, supra note 31, at 152.  These men tended to be members of the black 
upper-class, some of whom “felt that their education and cultural upbringing, and not 
race, would secure for them first class citizenship rights” and some of whom felt that an 
accomodationist approach to resolving severe prejudices against Blacks “was far better 
than no approach” at all.  Randolph, supra note 31, at 152–53; see also GEORGE S. 
SCHUYLER, BLACK AND CONSERVATIVE 4 (1966) (“My folks boasted of having been free 
as far back as any them could or wanted to remember, and they haughtily looked down 
upon those who had been in servitude.  They neither cherished nor sang slave songs.”).  
Cf. WILLARD B. GATEWOOD, ARISTOCRATS OF COLOR 302 (1993); see Meier, supra note 
41, at 260 (stating that it was among the “upward mobile middle class [of Blacks during 
the 1920s] that the philosophy of racial progress through economic solidarity . . . and the 
philosophy of Booker T. Washington found their greatest support”).  Although many of 
Washington’s followers were from the black upper class, Washington’s philosophies, as 
opposed to W.E.B. DuBois’s, are often viewed as designed to help the average black 
man, and not just the Talented Tenth, as the most privileged Blacks were referred to by 
Dubois, who believed that it would be this tenth that would help to raise the race. 
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black leaders such as W.E.B. DuBois, and some even provided 
Washington with the social and financial support to institute the programs 
he saw as being most beneficial to Blacks.43  For example, with the 
assistance of white philanthropists, in 1881, Washington founded the 
Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute, which was created to train 
Blacks to work in agricultures fields and, in part, as teachers.44  
 Washington’s beliefs were viewed as too conciliatory by many 
Blacks, including W.E.B. DuBois,45 who lambasted Washington for not 
forcing the white South to correct its wrongs through “candid and honest 
criticism.”46  By 1911 and 1912, Washington’s power in the black 
community had waned, and black resistance to his “conservative” ideas 
had grown stronger.47   
 
43  See Franklin, supra note 37 (asserting that Whites were more comfortable with 
Washington’s approach because of its gradual nature); W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF 
BLACK FOLK 16 (1903), reprinted by Vintage Books in 1986 (“It startled the Nation to 
hear a Negro advocating such a programme after many decades of bitter complaint; it 
startled and won the applause of the South. . . .”). 
44  See WASHINGTON, STORY, supra note 35, at 79-82.  This institution is now 
known as Tuskegee University. 
45  W.E.B. DuBois, a native of Massachusetts, received his many degrees from Fisk 
University in Nashville, Tennessee, the University of Berlin in Germany, and Harvard 
University.   He was the first Black ever to receive his Ph.D in history from Harvard.  See 
Richard Delgado, Book Review, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African-American 
Fortunes—Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
369, 379 (2002).  DuBois, one of the founders of the NAACP, is famous for his prophetic 
statement, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line,” which 
continues to prove true in the twenty-first century. DUBOIS, supra note 43, at 16; Richard 
Delgado, supra note at 379 (quoting DuBois and noting that DuBois founded the 
NAACP in 1909); David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal 
Education in Shaping Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN . L. REV. 1981, 1999 
(1993) (describing how even today society cannot escape the reality of the problem of the 
color line); see also GLENN LOURY, ONE BY ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT 35 (1995) 
(describing the parallels between the debates of followers of Washington and DuBois to 
that of Justices Thomas and Marshall). 
46  See DUBOIS, supra note 43, at 47. 
47  See Bruce, supra note 40, at 245.  Some Blacks had criticized Washington prior 
to this time.  For example, in 1904, Jesse Max Barber, a former editor of the Voice of the 
Negro, satirized Washington when he wrote an article entitled “What Is A Good Negro?” 
 In response to this question, Barber wrote, “‘A good Negro’ is one who says that his race 
does not need the higher learning; that what they need is industrial education, pure and 
simple.  He stands up before his people and murders the truth and the Kings English in 
trying to enforce upon them the evils of a College Education and the beauties of the 
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 Despite this resistance, black conservatism endured past the post-
Reconstruction period and into the very beginnings of the Civil Rights 
Movement.  The most dominant black conservative in between these two 
important time periods (during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s) was George 
Schuyler,48 a journalist who asserted that the “American Negro . . . has 
been the outstanding example of American conservatism: adjustable, 
resourceful, adaptable, patient, restrained, and not given to gambling what 
advantages he has in quixotic adventures.”49  As Schuyler described in his 
book Black and Conservative, conservatism continued to thrive among 
many of the black elite, who “regarded [black Southern migrants] as 
illiterate, ill-bred, and amoral” and unlike the “old Northern Negro 
families [who] had the habits, traits, and outlook of the whites for whom 
they worked and whose prejudices they shared.”50   
 By the 1950s, however, black conservatism began to change.  As 
opposed to focusing on maintaining a gradual approach to seeking 
equality that was designed not to increase white resistance to black 
equality, blacks conservatives, like Schuyler, began to focus solely on 
principles of self-help and self-reliance by Blacks, not necessarily because 
they would least irritate or upset Whites, but instead because they 
believed that Whites would not act in the best interests of Blacks.  As 
Schuyler explained in his autobiography: 
 
Once we accept the fact that there is, and will always be a 
color caste system in the United States, and stop crying 
about it, we can concentrate on how best to survive and 
 
plow.”  Quoted in Louis R. Harlan, Booker T. Washington and the Voice of the Negro, 
1904–1907, 45 J. S. HISTORY 45, 50 (1979).   
48   See Ann Rayson, George Schuyler: Paradox Among “Assimilationist” Writers, 
12 BLACK AMER. LIT. F. 102, 104 (1978)  (“In his autobiography, Schuyler expresses the 
attitude of Booker T. Washington:  ‘My feeling was then, and it is stronger now . . . that 
Negroes have the best chance here in the United States if they will avail themselves of 
the numerous opportunities they have.”).  George Schuyler was born on February 25, 
1895 and was raised in Syracuse, New York.  Schuyler’s family was considered middle 
class within the class system among Blacks.  According to Schuyler, his “folks [were] 
free black citizens of New York State” since the early 1800s.  Oscar R. Williams, From 
Black Liberal to Black Conservative:  George Schuyler, 1923–1935, 21 AFRO-AMERS. IN 
N.Y. LIFE & HISTORY 59 (1997).  
49  SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 2 (emphasis added).   
50  Id. at 4. 
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prosper within that system.  This is not defeatism but 
realism.51
 
In the 1960s, the voice of black conservatives, as we traditionally 
conceive of them, became weaker in light of the strength and 
pervasiveness of the Black Power Movement.52  A few of these traditional 
black conservatives, like Schuyler, however, continued to express their 
views and denounced liberal black leaders for their “civil rights agitation,” 
which, to their minds, simply created more enemies of the race and 
resulted in no true gains for the people.53  Additionally, Schuyler rejected 
the philosophies of black nationalists,54 such as Malcolm X, who 
“opposed an integrationist understanding of racial progress”55 and whom 
today’s black conservatives proudly claim as one of their own.56
 
51  Id. at 122. 
52  Lewis A. Randolph, Black Neoconservatives in the United States, in RACE & 
POLITICS 150–51 (James Jennings ed. 1997) [hereinafter Randolph, Black 
Neoconservatives]. 
53  SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 342; see also Williams, supra note 48, at 59 (noting 
that “Schuyler openly professed his beliefs during a time when conservative ideology 
among African Americans did not have a widespread audience in mainstream America” 
and “was a pioneer of 20th century black conservative ideology”).  Cf. Mark Gavreau 
Judge, Justice To George Schuyler, POL. REV., Aug. 2000, at 41 (“Schuyler’s dogmatic 
conservatism ran in absolute contrast to philosophies expressed by virtually every major 
spokesperson of the civil rights movement.”).  Schuyler even went as far as to defend 
police tactics that were utilized in response to marches and sit-ins, noting that the “use of 
firehoses, tear gas, and dogs was cited with horror, as if these were not true and tried 
methods of mob control the world over.”  SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 346.  He also 
stated that he had “observed the police handling of the most recent Harlem riot and 
[thought] the police restraint was admirable in the face of harsh provocation.”  Id. at 346-
47.  Schuyler believed that the Civil Rights Movement was communist-inspired and that 
Communists were merely using Blacks to further their agenda.  See Williams, supra note 
48, at 59.  Schuyler also opposed the selection of Martin Luther King, Jr. for the Nobel 
Peace Prize.  See Rayson, supra note 48, at 102 (also noting that Schuyler’s 
“conservative views were so insistent that in 1964 he supported Barry Goldwater for 
President despite what most blacks regarded as a racist Republican Party platform”). 
54  See Spencer Overton, The Threat Diversity Poses to African Americans: A Black 
Nationalist Critique of Outsider Ideology, 37 HOW. L.J. 465, 478-85 (1994) (discussing 
the tenets of black nationalism). 
55  Peller, supra note 36, at 761. 
56  Juan Williams, A Question of Fairness, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1987, at 73 
[hereinafter “Williams, Fairness”].  Many black conservatives have adopted Malcolm X 
as a conservative today because of his philosophies were rooted in the principles of black 
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Despite Schuyler’s rejection of black nationalism, some black 
nationalists, including those belonging to the Nation of Islam, actually 
constituted a strong voice for black conservatism.57  Like Washington and 
Schuyler, the Nation of Islam promoted the ideals of self-reliance and 
self-determination and founded small black businesses and schools as a 
means toward developing a separate society for Blacks.58  Indeed, it is no 
surprise that Malcolm X, an adopted black conservative today, was once a 
member of the Nation of Islam.59
In fact, to black conservatives during this time period, such as 
Robert Woodson, who later worked at the National Urban League; the 
now accepted Malcolm X, a black nationalist; and the Nation of Islam, the 
welfare of Blacks rested in the hands of Blacks.60  As Malcolm X once 
expressed during a speech, a favorite of Justice Thomas’s: 
 
The American black man should be focusing his every 
 
self-reliance.  Cf. id. (quoting Clarence Thomas as saying “‘I don’t see how the civil-
rights people today can claim Malcolm X as one of their own. Where does he say black 
people should go begging to the Labor Department for jobs? He was hell on 
integrationists.  Where does he say you should sacrifice your institutions to be next to 
white people?’”).   
57  See Hayward Farrar, Radical Rhetoric, Conservative Reality: The Nation of 
Islam as an American Conservative Formation, in BLACK CONSERVATISM:  ESSAYS IN 
INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 109-29 (Peter Eisenstadt ed., 1999) (arguing 
that, although the Nation of Islam is largely perceived as radical, it “has actually been a 
conservative force in the black community”).  Farrar also argues that Marcus Garvey, 
who led the Back–To–Africa Movement, and his organization, the Universal Negro 
Improvement Association, was a precursor to the Nation.  See id. at 110 (asserting that 
Garvey preached that, by created black-controlled social, economic, and political 
structures, Blacks could achieve free themselves from white domination).  Like the 
Nation, Garvey was also heavily criticized by Schuyler.  See SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 
122-24. 
58 See Farrar, supra note 57, at 113-14, 127 (citing the Million March as an example 
of the Nation’s conservatism with its focus on self-help).  Of course, these are principles 
also adopted by black liberals, only liberals also recognize how institutionalized barriers 
make strict self-reliance difficult.  See Richard Delgado, Book Review, Enormous 
Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing About Race, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1547, 
1552-53 (1991) (noting that both black leftists and conservatives rely on principles of 
individual agency and volition but that black conservatives emphasize such principles 
more and that black liberals focus more on issues concerning social power and relations). 
59  See Farrar, supra note 57, at 115-16. 
60  SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 344.  George Schuyler continued to express black 
conservatism until he passed away in 1977.  See Williams, supra note 48, at 59; see also . 
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effort toward building his own businesses and decent 
homes for himself.  As other ethnic groups have done, let 
the black people, wherever possible, however possible, 
patronize their own kind, and start in those ways to build 
up the black race’s ability to do for itself.  That’s the only 
way the American black man is ever going to get respect.61 
  
In sum, to this new black conservative, it was Blacks alone, even in the 
face of enormous discrimination and without the assistance of Whites, 
who would control their own destiny.62  The issue for these conservatives 
was black empowerment and black-self reliance.63
 
B. Today’s Black Conservatives 
 
 Like their predecessors, today’s black conservatives, such as 
Justice Thomas, John McWhorter,64 Shelby Steele,65 Thomas Sowell,66 
 
61  Quoted in Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 73. 
62  See SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 352 (“There are forces in the world that want 
us to fail and conspire toward that failure, which means disunity and destruction.  We are 
here blessed with the right of mobility, the right of ownership, the privilege of privacy 
and development of personality, and the precious machinery of peaceful change.  These 
gifts and gains it is the purpose of the conservative to defend and extend, lest we perish in 
the fell clutch of collectivism.  These gifts and gains I have been trying in my small way 
to preserve.”). 
63  Reverend E.V. Hill, Black America Under the Reagan Administration, 34 POL. 
REV. 30, 34 (1985).  
64  John McWhorter, an associate professor of linguistics at the University of 
California-Berkeley, is a Manhattan Institute Senior Fellow in Public Policy.  He first 
gained national prominence four years ago with the publication of LOSING THE RACE: 
SELF–SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA (200)), in which he argued that black people’s 
attachment to victimhood was a much greater hindrance to black advancement than 
white racism.   See John McWhorter, available at http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/mcwhorter.htm. 
65  Shelby Steele, a graduate of Coe College in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Southern 
Illinois University, and the University of Utah, is a research fellow at the Hoover 
Institution.  At the Institute, Steele specializes in the study of race relations, 
multiculturalism, and affirmative action.  In 1990, he received the National Book 
Critic’s Circle Award for his book THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION 
OF RACE IN AMERICA.  See Shelby Steele, Research Fellow, available at http://www-
hoover.stanford.edu/bios/steele.html. 
66  Thomas Sowell, a graduate of Harvard University, Columbia University, and the 
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and J.C. Watts,67 emphasize the principles of black empowerment through 
self-reliance and self-help.68  Unlike their predecessors, however, today’s 
black conservatives hold an even more prominent presence in the media 
and among non-minority, American voters.69  During the 1980s, although 
Blacks remained overwhelmingly loyal to the “liberal” Democratic Party 
and to progressive ideologies, 70 the voice of the black conservative grew. 
 
University of Chicago, is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institute in Stanford, California.  
Prior to joining the Hoover Institute, Sowell was a professor at several institutions, 
including Brandeis University and Cornell University.  See Thomas Sowell, Rose and 
Milton Friedman Senior Fellow on Public Policy, available at http://www-
hoover.stanford.edu/bios/sowell.html. 
67  A former quarterback for the Oklahoma Sooners, Big Eight Champions in 1980 
and 1981, J.C. Watts was elected to the United States Congress from the fourth district of 
Oklahoma in 1994.  In 1998, he became the first Black to serve in the House Republican 
leadership when he was elected by his peers to serve as chairman of the Republican 
Conference, which was the fourth-ranking leadership position in the majority party in the 
United States House of Representatives, and a position once held by Dick Cheney, Jack 
Kemp, and Gerald Ford.  See The Honorable J.C. Watts, Jr., available at 
http://www.gopac.com/gopac_about_bios.htm; see generally J.C. WATTS, JR., WHAT 
COLOR IS A CONSERVATIVE? (2002). 
68  See, e.g., STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 161 (“But, 
while civil rights bills can be won [collectively], only the individual can achieve in 
school, master a salable skill, open a business, become an accountant or engineer.  
Despite our collective oppression, opportunities for development can finally be exploited 
only by individuals.”).  Again, slack liberals also emphasize these principles as well; 
however, also recognizing that racism is also institutionalized, they contend that such 
institutional factors may also prevented persons who have worked hard and persevered 
through hard times.  See Delgado, supra note 58, at 1548-49 (describing how critiques of 
black liberals and conservatives converge on civil rights issues by “all finding serious 
fault with (a) the racial status quo; and (b) the current system of civil rights laws and 
policies by which that status quo is maintained and (sometimes) permitted to evolve”). 
69 Willie Richardson & Gwen Richardson, Black Conservatives: The Undercounted, 
in BLACK AND RIGHT:  THE BOLD NEW VOICE OF BLACK CONSERVATIVES IN AMERICA 
44–45 (1997) (asserting that a larger portion of Blacks no longer align themselves with 
liberal politicians and policies and the black conservative voice is becoming more 
prominent). 
70  See Edward Ashbee, The Republican Party and the African-American Vote Since 
1964, in BLACK CONSERVATISM 233 (1999) (noting that the “black electorate has proved 
the Democratic Party’s most loyal constituency”).  Although many Blacks hold 
conservative positions on issues such as abortion, Blacks have generally voted with the 
“liberal” political party, which today is the Democratic Party.  See, e.g., Kennedy, supra 
note 31, at 91 (acknowledging that many Blacks are socially conservative on issues of 
abortion and crime). 
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 Due to a variety of factors, including matters such as the emergence of 
the black middle and upper middle class, more Blacks began to identify 
with conservative values and openly join the Republican Party.71
 Still, many individuals in the black community remained and 
continue to remain skeptical about the politics of black conservatives.72  
In contrast to liberal ideology, which is centered on the belief that 
government should play an active role in addressing the imbalances in 
power, wealth, and privilege among Whites and minorities, anti-statist 
conservative ideology involves a strong resistance to governmental 
interference in domestic policy affairs, interference which, to the minds of 
many Blacks, is what facilitated minority advancement in society.73  Thus, 
as one author has noted, “a black critic speaking with the backing of the 
political and intellectual right bears a difficult burden of showing that he 
is not a tool of forces hostile to his own people.”74
 This task is daunting, given widely held perceptions among black 
liberals and other liberals that black conservatives are mere pawns of the 
Republican Party.75  A careful review of literature authored by many of 
today’s black conservatives, however, lays some foundation for 
addressing this challenge.  In particular, books and articles from self-
identified black conservatives, such as McWhorter and Steele, expose 
several significant differences between the most dominant themes of 
“black conservative ideology” and “white conservative ideology,” which 
in turn helps to disprove the idea that black conservatives are the “tools” 
 
71 See Randolph, Black Neoconservatives, supra note 52, at 152–53.  Some authors 
have asserted that more than 30% of Blacks identify themselves as “conservative.”  See, 
e.g., EARL OFARI HUTCHINSON, THE CRISIS IN BLACK AND BLACK 10 (1997); see also 
Richardson & Richardson, supra note 69, at 43. 
72  See Bridgeman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 8, on file with the author) 
(asserting that “‘authentic blackness’ has an anti-conservative political bent”). 
73 See Joan Biskupic, Thomas Caught Up in Conflict; Jurist’s Court Rulings, Life 
Experience Are at Odds, Many Blacks Say, WASH. POST, June 7, 1996, at A20 (noting 
that Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law School has described the Supreme Court as 
“the ultimate place that black people had been able to go to to vindicate their rights”) 
74   Hill, supra note 63, at 28 (quotations omitted); see also Peter Beinart, Wedded, 
NEW REPUB., Apr. 5, 2004, at 8 (noting “black suspicion of the Republican Party”); 
Smith & Walton, Jr., supra note 30, at 215 (arguing that black conservatives are clients of 
the Republican Party). 
75  See Kennedy, supra note 12 (manuscript at 28, on file with author) (describing 
how Justice Thomas has been viewed as a pawn because of his substantive positions on 
issues of race). 
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of their white counterparts. 
 
1. Core Principles of Black Conservative Thought 
 
 Although both black and white conservatives share many basic 
philosophies of conservatism, such as the belief in less involvement by the 
federal government in economic and social welfare matters, a greater 
emphasis on individual responsibility, and more authority and control 
within local and state governments, they diverge in important respects on 
the basis and reasoning for their positions on particular issues, such as 
affirmative action.76  The core principles of black conservative thought 
consist of two key concepts:  (1) an emphasis on the departure from black 
“victimology”;77 (2) the promotion of self-reliance and the elimination of 
dependency by Blacks on Whites or the government, which is believed to 
go to the heart of what black conservatives view as the problems 
underlying unemployment, crime, and poverty in the black community.78
 To many black conservatives, such as Shelby Steele, the low status 
of Blacks in the United States is the result of a system of black 
 
76  DOLBEARE & METCALF, supra note 31, at 151–61; see also STEELE, A DREAM 
DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 8 (“The liberal–conservative axis is a bit different for blacks 
than for Americans generally.  Under his American identity a black Republican is 
conservative, but under his racial identity he may be quite liberal . . . . But the ‘new’ 
black conservatives––the ones who recently become so controversial––may even be 
liberal by their American identity but are definitely conservative by the terms of their 
group identity.  It is their dissent from the explanation of black group authority that 
brings them the ‘black conservative’ imprimatur.  Without this dissent, we may have a 
black Republican but not a ‘black conservative,’ as the term has come to be used.”).   
77  See MCWHORTER, supra note 64, at xi (defining the cult of victimology as “a 
keystone of cultural blackness to treat victimhood not as a problem to be solved but as an 
identity to be nurtured”); STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 10 (“[A] black 
conservative is a black who dissents from the victimization explanation of black fate 
when it is offered as a totalism–when it is made the main theme of group politics.”); 
WATTS, supra note 67, at 35 (asserting that Jesse Jackson’s phrase “‘I am somebody’ has 
become ‘I am somebody’s victim’” and that Watts rejects this “fashionable ‘cult of 
victimology’”); see also STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at ix 
(noting that Blacks have been taught to be “seen primarily as racial victims”). 
78  See Hill, supra note 63, at 29 (quoting Clarence Thomas as saying “the key to 
black progress must come from within the black community”).  But see Randolph, Black 
Neoconservatives, supra note 52, at 154 (arguing that the “Black neoconservative call for 
self-reliance is inconsistent with their extensive dependency on funding from White 
conservative sources”). 
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dependency on the white establishment and a lack of self-reliance and 
empowerment.  According to today’s black conservatives, these two 
factors, combined with black victimology (meaning the perception of 
Blacks as victims only), keep Blacks in a subordinate position because it 
leaves Blacks in “the odd and self-defeating position in which taking 
responsibility for bettering [themselves] feels like a surrender to white 
power.”79  
 Additionally, contrary to popular belief, black conservatives do 
not deny the existence of racism and its effects on Blacks, but instead 
refuse to focus their energies on past and current injustices to the race.  To 
their minds, they are not accommodationists or sell-outs, but realists.  For 
example, as George Schuyler explained in his biography,  
 
A black person learns very early that his color is a 
disadvantage in a world of white folk. . . . . I learned very 
early in life that I was colored but from the beginning this 
fact did not distress, restrain, or overburden me.  One takes 
things as they are, lives with them, and tries to turn them 
to one’s advantage or seeks another locale where the 
opportunities are more favorable.  This was the 
conservative viewpoint of my parents and family.  It has 
been mine through life.80
 
In support of this view that realism, self-help, and self-reliance are the 
best means for resolving issues of poverty, substandard education, lack of 
power, and devastating crime in the black community,81 black 
conservatives often point to the long history of Blacks who overcame 
obstacles to achieve their goals, even during the post-Reconstruction and 
Jim Crow eras.82   
 
79  See STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 15 (arguing that 
racial victimization cannot be the real problem if “[r]esidents feel less safe, drug 
trafficking is far worse, crimes by blacks against blacks are more frequent, housing 
remains substandard, and teenage pregnancy has skyrocketed” since the 1960s). 
80  SCHUYLER, supra note 42, at 2 (emphasis added). 
81  See Sherri Beth Smith, Contemporary Black Conservative Rhetoric: An Analysis 
of Strategies and Themes 3 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State 
University) (on file with the Pennsylvania State University Library). 
82  Eisenstadt, supra note 32, at xi.  See, e.g., JOHN MCWHORTER, AUTHENTICALLY 
BLACK 141 (2003) (describing several black public schools that regularly produced 
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 The final theme throughout black conservative thought is the 
belief that “the most effective [and] lasting changes” in society occur 
slowly, or its corollary, the belief that “quick fixes,” which black 
conservatives contend are too often supported by black and white liberals, 
serve as a temporary band-aid to the real and serious problems ailing 
Blacks.83  Indeed, what is most interesting about black conservative 
thought is that its central tenets are premised on a belief that white 
America has created an addiction for Blacks to victimology and 
dependency without any real concern for addressing the problems 
underlying black oppression.84  In other words, a key component to black 
conservative ideology is a certain “distrust” of Whites—even the 
conservative Whites with whom black conservatives work.   
 Furthermore, this “distrust” is only fueled by the isolation and 
exclusion that black conservatives can and do encounter in white 
conservative circles. As a general matter, many black conservatives 
acknowledge that the larger conservative community does not have the 
best interests of the black community in mind.  As Thomas explained 
himself in an article he wrote regarding the loneliness of a black 
conservative:  
 
 
Ph.D’s and other prominent figures between the late 1800s and 1950s); Telly Lovelace, 
No Need For A Government Handout, in BLACK AND RIGHT:  THE BOLD NEW VOICE OF 
BLACK CONSERVATIVES IN AMERICA 47 (1997) (noting the successes of Blacks during 
the antebellum period and thereafter); Thomas Sowell, Black Excellence: The Case of 
Dunbar High School, 35 PUB. INTEREST 3, 4 (Spring 1974). 
 83  Eisenstadt, supra note 32, at 83; see also Calmore, supra note 21, at 193 
(describing the principal tenets of black conservatism as including “touting a rugged 
American individualism, translating it into black personal responsibility and self help; 
viewing race as abstracted and disconnected from group identity; limiting rights holders 
to individuals rather than groups; endorsing race neutral laws and public policies; 
dissenting from ‘civil rights professionals;’ preaching ‘compassionate conservatism’ or 
‘tough love;’ favoring market-oriented reform (free markets and entrepreneurship) with 
little state regulation; discounting the operational significance of race and the importance 
of racism as one of black America’s most fundamental problems; emphasizing the need 
to reverse black moral decline, crime, poverty, and family dysfunction (welfare 
dependency); and opposing abortion”).
 84 Angela Katrina Lewis, African-American Conservatism: A Longitudinal and 
Comparative Study 4 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee) 
(on file with the University of Tennessee Library) (noting that black conservatives 
believe that government programs have caused the “deterioration of Black families” and 
have created “a sense of dependency among African-Americans”). 
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It often seemed that to be accepted within conservative 
ranks and to be treated with some degree of acceptance, a 
black was required to become a caricature of sorts, 
providing sideshows of anti-black quips and attacks.  But 
there was more–much more–to our concerns than merely 
attacking previous policies and so-called black leaders.  
The future, not the past, was to be influenced.  It is not 
surprising, with these attitudes, that there was a general 
refusal to listen to the opinions of black conservatives.  In 
fact, it often appeared that our white counterparts actually 
hid from our advice.  There was a general sense that we 
were being avoided and circumvented.  It seemed that 
those of us who had been identified as black conservatives 
were in a rather odd position.85  
 
Additionally, Justice Thomas proclaimed the following about the “well-
meaning” of white liberals, stating: 
 
“[I]t doesn’t matter that black and white Americans are 
unlikely to ever see each other as anything other but 
blacks and whites.  It doesn’t matter that a black man in 
America is only rarely judged on the basis of character 
rather than his color. . . .  For when you get right down to 
it . . . successful blacks don’t particularly like the kind of 
integration that whites have crafted for them in the past 
thirty years.  Increasing numbers of middle-class blacks 
see integration simple as window dressing; blacks may be 
present and visible, but only a few have any real power.86  
 
85   Thomas, supra note 30, at 9 (emphasis added).  In fact, Thomas has expressed 
frustration with certain decisions made during his tenure in the Reagan administration.  
For example, in describing the administration’s decision to support a tax exemption for 
Bob Jones University in 1982, Thomas explained, “I expressed grave concerns in a 
previously scheduled meeting that this would be the undoing of those of us in the 
administration who had hoped for an opportunity to expand the thinking of, and about, 
black Americans.  A fellow member of the administration said rather glibly that, in two 
days, the furor over Bob Jones would end.  I responded that we had sounded our death 
knell with that decision.  Unfortunately, I was more right than he was.”  Id. 
86 Quoted in Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 72; see also Stuart 
DeVeaux, Young, Black, and Republican, in BLACK AND RIGHT:  THE BOLD NEW VOICE 
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In essence, unlike their white conservative counterparts, many black 
conservatives do not believe that a colorblind society is, practically 
speaking, attainable.87  Rather, they believe that Blacks must learn to do 
for and rely on themselves alone, not only because they are black but also 
because Blacks cannot and should not expect Whites to act in their best 
interests.88    
 In fact, all of the previously described concepts are reflected in 
black conservative stances on certain political and social issues.  The 
remainder of this Part details how the core principles of abandoning black 
victimology, encouraging self-reliance and self-help, and focusing on 
lasting and permanent change reveal themselves in black conservative 
thought on issues of education and desegregation, affirmative action, and 
crime, subjects I address later in my analysis of Justice Thomas’s 
jurisprudence. 
 
 2.  Education and Desegregation 
 
 One of the focal points of black conservative thought on education 
is the failure of the public school system to educate black youth in a 
 
OF BLACK CONSERVATIVES IN AMERICA 24 (1997) (“[T]he social problems that are 
destroying the black community (breakdown of the family, crime, education, lack of 
economic initiative, poverty, and welfare) grew out of thirty years of a well-meaning 
Democrat-controlled Congress.  Despites these failures, Democrats have not given up 
their poor solutions. . . .  Of course, those Democrats do not live with the consequences.  
They don’t live in inner cities.  Their neighbors are not drug lords and trigger-happy 
gangsters.”). 
87 Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 72 (“I don’t care how 
educated you are, how good you are at what you do––you’ll never have the same contacts 
or opportunities, you’ll never be seen as equal to whites.”).  Cf. Hill, supra note 63, at 34 
(quoting Clarence Thomas, who asserted, “I don’t think this society has ever been color-
blind”). 
 88  See LOURY, supra note 45, at 35 (asserting that Blacks are mistaken in placing 
responsibility “on the shoulders of those who do not have an abiding interest in such 
matters”); cf. Eisenstadt, supra note 32, at xi (“Most black conservatives are anti-
Utopian, less interested in constructing an ideal society, than in getting by in the society 
in which they find themselves. . . .  Black conservatives have recognized the truth in this 
proposition, and they have often rejected the abstract plans to ‘remake the world’ on 
behalf of blacks.  One accepts the present with the conviction and hope that things will 
get better.”). 
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manner that allows them to compete, based on traditional criteria, with 
their white peers.  All around the country, black conservatives have 
expressed intense criticisms of the educational agenda and goals that have 
been set for black children in public schools and have articulated 
arguments for alternatives to resolving the disparities between the 
performances of black and white students in schools and on standardized 
tests.89
 Chief among these criticisms is a denouncement of the 
integrationist ideal that was advanced by the NAACP and civil rights 
activists during the late 1950s and 1960s.90  For today’s black 
conservatives, this ideal was damaging to the advancement of Blacks in 
education, not because integration itself was a harmful goal, but because 
too much emphasis was placed on that goal as opposed to the objective of 
actually improving the learning conditions of black children and the 
quality of their education.91
Indeed, in the midst of the Civil Rights Movement, some black 
conservatives, such as Robert Woodson, broke with the Movement on the 
issue of desegregation and forced busing, asserting that “[t]he issue was 
black empowerment, not integration, which should be an individual 
matter, not one of public policy.”92  Furthermore, to black conservatives, 
such as Woodson, the focus on integration not only withdrew attention 
from the poor quality of education that was available to individual black 
students, but it also taught Blacks that they should not want to live near 
each other or attend school together.93
 
89  See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, Dems, GOPers, and Blacks II, JEWISH WORLD REV., 
Oct. 2, 2000 (arguing that Blacks are “more likely to gain from vouchers that would 
enable them to pull their children out of failing public schools”), available at 
http://www.jewishworldreview.com. 
90  Some liberals have made similar criticisms, including Derrick Bell, whose new 
book Silent Covenants critiques civil rights leaders for their misguided approach in 
believing that integration alone would solve the problems of unequal education for black 
children.  See SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 
For Whom Does the Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005) (reviewing Silent Covenants). 
91  See WATTS, supra note 67, at 208 (declaring that “[a]ffirmative action isn’t the 
problem . . . .  Lousy education for black kids is the problem”). 
92  Hill, supra note 63, at 30. 
93  See id. DuBois also made this point in W.E. Burghardt DuBois, Does the Negro 
Need Separate Schools, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 330 (1935) (“As it is today, American 
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 As Malcolm X, who is often described as conservative by many 
black conservatives today, once expressed: 
 
I just can’t see where if white people can go to a white 
classroom and there are no Negroes present and it 
doesn’t affect the academic diet they’re receiving, then I 
don’t see where an all-black classroom can be affected 
by the absence of white children. . . .So, what the 
integrationists, in my opinion, are saying, when they say 
that whites and blacks must go to school together, is that 
the whites are so much superior that just their presence in 
a black classroom balances it out.94
 
In sum, for many black conservatives then and now, the fight was not for 
integration or against segregation that was by choice,95 but against 
segregation that was state-mandated. 96
 
Negroes almost universally disparage their own schools.  They look down upon them; 
they often treat the Negro teachers in them with contempt; they refuse to work for their 
adequate support; and they refuse to join public movements to increase their 
efficiency.”). 
94  MALCOLM X, BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS AND A 
LETTER 16-17 (G. Breitman ed. 1970). 
95  As several authors have noted, however, such ideology neglects the realities of 
residential segregation, much of which is influenced by discriminatory real estate 
practices.  See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, Clarence Thomas: A Distinctive Justice, 28 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 19 (1997).  Furthermore, even when people, especially 
minorities, have chosen to live in particular area for racial reasons, such decision may 
have been based primarily on a desire to escape the reality racism within one’s own 
neighborhood as opposed to a rejection of integration.  See ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A 
PRIVILEGED CLASS 188 (1993) (“The pain of [black] professionals . . . is more often than 
not rooted in feelings of exclusion. In attempting to escape that pain, some blacks end up, 
in effect, inviting increased isolation. When the successful black lawyer declares that he 
will ‘go to my own people for acceptance’ because he no longer expects approbation 
from whites, he is not only expressing solidarity with other members of his race, he is 
also conceding defeat. He is saying that he is giving up hope of ever being anything but a 
talented ‘nigger’ to many of his white colleagues, that he refuses to invest emotionally in 
those who will never quite see him as one of them, whatever his personal and 
professional attributes.”). 
96 In response to a question regarding how Proposition 54, a 2003 initiative to ban 
the collection of race data by the state, could negatively affect integration efforts in the 
public schools in California, black conservative Ward Connerly once answered, “I don’t 
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 Indeed, some black conservatives viewed the decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education,97 which ordered the end of all state-mandated 
segregation, as insulting.  For example, Zora Neale Hurston, who is most 
famous for her book Their Eyes Were Watching God, once exclaimed: 
 
The whole matter revolves around the self-respect of my 
people. How much satisfaction can I get from a court order 
for somebody to associate with me who does not wish me 
near them? I regard the ruling of the United States 
Supreme Court as insulting, rather than honoring my race. 
98
Others such as Ward Connerly have gone farther, once stating in response 
to a question about his opinion of Senator Trent Lott, “Supporting 
segregation need not be racist. One can believe in segregation and believe 
in equality of the races.”99  For the most part, however, black 
conservatives simply believe that, when the emphasis is placed on 
diversity in schools as opposed to strengthening the schools in 
predominantly black neighborhoods, it is black children who always lose 
out and gain nothing. 
 
3. Affirmative Action 
 
 Of all pressing social issues today, black conservatives have 
 
care whether they are segregated or not. . . kids need to be learning, and I place more 
value on these kids getting educated than I do on whether we have some racial balancing 
or not.”  Editorial, Initiative Could Hurt Integration, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2, 2003, at A16. 
The initiative, which Connerly drafted, was defeated by voters in a near 2-to-1 margin 
(with 5,071,565 votes (63.9%) against the initiative and 2,868,976 (36.1%) for the 
initiative) in the October gubernatorial-recall election that resulted in Arnold 
Schwarzenegger’s becoming Governor of California.   See Steve Miller, Affirmative 
Action Backers Push for Connerly’s Ouster, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003.   
97  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
98  JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS 
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY xxvii (2001); see also STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR 
CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 165 (“There is no magic that will make development 
happen.  We [Blacks] simply have to want more for ourselves, be willing to work for it, 
and not use our enemy––old or new––as an excuse not to pursue it.  It doesn’t really 
matter that Southern accents in Southern airports make me remember.  What’s important 
is that I can travel.”).  
99  Interview on Wolf Blitzer Reports (CNN broadcast Dec. 13, 2002).   
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received the most attention from the media and public on the debate 
regarding race-based affirmative action.100   For example, in 1996, Ward 
Connerly, a member of the University of California Board of Regents and 
President of the American Civil Rights Institute, drew national attention to 
black conservative thought when he successfully headed the California 
Civil Rights Initiative, also known as Proposition 209, an initiative that 
banned the consideration of race in education, employment, and 
contracting for all state institutions.101
 Although many black conservatives today agree that the 
discrimination that Blacks have faced and still face should be included in 
the discussion of how to address inequities in education, they disagree as 
to whether the short-term solution of race-based affirmative action is an 
 
100  By “affirmative action,” I refer to the act of extending preferential treatment to 
underrepresented racial minorities in hiring and recruitment.  See Anupam Chander, 
Minorities, Shareholders, and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 120 n.3 (2003) (defining 
affirmative action “as minority-mindfulness in decisionmaking resulting in . . . a 
preference”); West, supra note 26, at 614 (describing affirmative action as a “program or 
policy where race, national origin, or gender is taken into account”).   
101  The University of California-Berkeley Office of Student Research reports 
that Proposition 209 has resulted in severe drops in black, Chicano, Latino, and 
Native American enrollment in the University of California’s top schools and 
graduate schools.  According to the office, in the fall of 2003 first-year undergraduate 
class, only 211 (4.2%) black, 430 (8.5%) Chicano, 161 (3.2%) Latino, and 25 (0.5%) 
Native American students registered as first-years at the University of California-
Berkeley (out of 8,796 applicants).  See UC Berkeley Undergraduate Fact Sheet—Fall 
2003, available at 
http://osr4.berkeley.edu/Public/STUDENT.DATA/PUBLICATIONS/ 
UG/ugf03.html#table%207.  In the fall of 1996, before the end of affirmative action, 
324 (5.7%) black, 517 (10.3%) Chicano, 218, (4.3%) Latino, and 68 (1.4%) Native 
American students registered at as first years at the University of California-Berkeley. 
See Berkeley Undergraduate Fact Sheet-Fall 1996, available at 
http://osr4.berkeley.edu/Public/STUDENT.DATA/PUBLICATIONS/FACT.SHEET/f
act96.pdf; see also Adrien Katherine Wing, Race-Based Affirmative Action in 
American Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443, 446 (2001) (reporting that, after 
the passage of Proposition 209, “[b]lack enrollment [at UC-Berkeley] dropped 95 
percent, with just one black in the law class entering in 1997[,] Hispanic enrollment 
dropped 50 percent, and Native American 100 percent”); Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the 
Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: The Tension of Separatism and 
Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multicultural Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 863 
(1993) (noting that there has been a backlash against affirmative action since the 
1980s). 
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appropriate way to address these inequities.102  To them, much like the 
focus on an integrative ideal, affirmative action does not ultimately help 
Blacks, but works only to hinder them.103  The dominant black 
conservative view is that “racial preferences allow society to leapfrog 
over the difficult problem of developing blacks to parity with whites and 
into a cosmetic diversity that covers the blemish of disparity”104 when the 
real focus should be on a demand for parity between Blacks and 
Whites.105  In other words, according to black conservative ideology, 
racial diversity is not tantamount to racial development for black people in 
education106 because all it does is allow Whites to create a picture of the 
ideal of diversity on campus by recruiting black and brown faces without 
regard to their actual learning and progress in classes and on tests.107  To 
 
102 See, e.g., STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 5 (“Certainly no 
explanation of black difficulties would be remotely accurate were it to ignore racial 
victimization.  On the other hand, victimization does not in fact explain the entire fate of 
blacks in America, nor does it entirely explain their difficulties today.”). 
103  See STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 115 (emphasis 
added) (“But the essential problem with this form of affirmative action is the way it leaps 
over the hard business of developing a formerly oppressed people to the point where they 
can achieve proportionate representation on their own (given equal opportunity) and goes 
straight for the proportionate representation.  This may satisfy whites of their innocence 
and some blacks of their power, but it does very little to truly uplift blacks.”). 
104  Id. at 116; see also Hill, supra note 63, at 31 (quoting Glenn Loury as stating 
that “[i]t will sound paradoxical to many people that affirmative action is not in the 
interests of blacks” but “in the longer term, preferential treatment is inconsistent with the 
attainment of fully equal status in society as independent contributors respected for their 
contribution by their fellow citizens”).   
105 See STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 31 (“To have more college-
educated minorities [people readily accept the idea] we don’t need to work at instilling 
the principle of intellectual excellence, or at raising the standards in inner-city schools, or 
at making minority neighborhoods safe for children.  (In fact, we allow license and 
lowered standards to prevail in these areas.) . . . .  A group preference in college 
admissions is a simple and impersonal intervention by which we can manufacture a 
wonderfully “diverse” campus––even when black students average three hundred SAT 
points below whites and Asians, as has been the case at the University of California at 
Berkeley.”); STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 121–24 (arguing 
that “preferential treatment does not teach skills, or educate, or instill motivation”). 
106  STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 116. 
107  See STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 33; STEELE, CONTENT OF 
OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 147 (“Black students have not sufficiently helped 
themselves, and universities, despite all their concessions, have not really done much for 
blacks.  If both faced their anxieties, I think they would see the same things: academic 
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the black conservative, affirmative action only sets up “unprepared” 
minority students for failure.108
 In contending with affirmative action, Black conservatives also 
focus on what they refer to as the demoralizing effect of the policy on 
Blacks––the feeling of inferiority by black students about their ability to 
compete with their white peers.109  According to black conservatives, this 
effect, combined with the cultural myth of black inferiority, is devastating 
 
parity with all other groups should be the overriding mission of black students, and it 
should also be the first goal that universities have for their black students.  Blacks can 
only know they are as good as others when they are, in fact, as good––when their grades 
are higher and their dropout rate lower.  Nothing under the sun will substitute for this, 
and no amount of concessions will bring it about.”). 
108  See MCWHORTER, supra note 82, at 141 (“The Bakke decision has taught a 
generation of young Americans that black students are more important for their presence 
in promotional brochure photographs than for their scholastic qualifications. . . .  This 
ultimately perpetuates the very underperformance that has made the fig-leaf ‘diversity’ 
notion necessary.”); THOMAS SOWELL, A PERSONAL ODYSSEY 182–87 (2000) (describing 
his experiences as an economics professor at Cornell University where he witnessed 
black students with lower test scores struggle with their academic work).  Of course, such 
arguments lose their force if one challenges the legitimacy of traditional standards of 
merit, such as standardized tests that correlate with wealth, and not necessarily with 
performance.  See Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the 
Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 214-24 (2003) (detailing upper 
middle-class bias in admissions and asserting that “[q]uantative measures often reflect 
family resources and influence rather than a student’s resourcefulness or intelligence”); 
Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the 
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 969 (1996) (indicating that standardized tests do 
not identify qualities important for the education the test takers seek); see also Richard 
Lempert, David Chambers, & Terry Adams, Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice: 
The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395, 401-02, 459-63, 492-
503 (2000) (same). 
109  STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 116.  Many 
beneficiaries of affirmative action, however, do not suffer the same stigma as Thomas 
did.  As several scholars have argued, any stigma outweighs the negatives.  See Laura M. 
Padilla, Intersectionality and Positionality: Situating Women of Color in the Affirmative 
Action Dialogue, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 880 (1997) (“Furthermore, any stigma-
attached downside to affirmative action does not outweigh the upside of providing 
opportunities for women of color that would not otherwise exist.”).  Moreover, many 
supporters of affirmative note that Blacks have been stigmatized since the founding of 
this country.  See Eva Jefferson Patterson, Affirmative Action and the California Civil 
Wrongs Initiative, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 327, 334 (1997) (“‘Stigmatize [us], give 
[us] that degree.’ [It’s not] [a]s though if you don’t have the Berkeley degree you’re not 
stigmatized as a black person.”). 
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to black students110 because it encourages reliance on Whites as opposed 
to self-reliance. 
 Additionally, black conservatives believe that affirmative action 
creates a perverse incentive to remain a victim, especially to middle class 
and upper middle class Blacks, who are then presented with a motivation 
either to underperform or not to push themselves because of the fear of 
losing their “advantage” in the admissions game.111  Furthermore, they 
contend that affirmative action unfairly helps the black middle class,112 
whom they do view as not experiencing any serious disadvantage,113 and 
not helping poor Blacks, who have a stronger need for affirmative 
action.114  In sum, for the black conservative, the real focus should be on 
economic disadvantage.115
 
110  See id. at 134 (“So when a black student enters college, the myth of inferiority 
compounds the normal anxiousness over whether he or she will be good enough.”). 
111  Id. at 119. 
112 See STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 126-27 (noting that “[w]hen 
the University of California was forced to drop race-based affirmative action, a study was 
done to see if a needs-based policy would bring in a similar number of blacks” and 
discovered that “the top quartile of black American students–often from two-parent 
families with six-figure incomes and private school educations–is frequently not 
competitive with whites and Asians even from lower quartiles”). 
113 STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 142 (noting that “the 
real challenge is not simply to include a certain number of blacks, but to end 
discrimination against all blacks and to offer special help to those with talent who have 
also been economically deprived”); see WATTS, supra note 67, at 206 (arguing for class-
based affirmative action). 
114 See STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 139 (“Of course 
poor and working-class blacks do not get preferences . . . because preferences go almost 
exclusively to the wealthiest and best-educated blacks.”). 
115  See Armstrong Williams, Supreme Court Hands Down Affirmative Action 
Decision, June 23, 2003, available at http://www.townhall.com/columnists/ 
Armstrongwilliams/aw20030623.shtml (“These are the people affirmative action needs 
to be helping - those poor minority students who are conditioned to believe that they have 
no chance at achieving the American dream. By the time these kids reach high school it is 
too late for them to take advantage of affirmative action because they have already given 
up.”).  Such a position, however, ignores the fact that, when wealth is defined in terms 
broader than just income alone, including assets, prestige of job and education level 
required for job, savings, retirement, and so on, Blacks and Latinos are far from being in 
the same position as Whites.  See generally MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK 
WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL EQUALITY 100-110 (1995) 
(asserting that when factors other than income are included, black families are 
significantly worse off than white families with similar incomes); see also R. Richard 
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 Finally, black conservatives oppose affirmative action because 
they believe that it stigmatizes Blacks in the eyes of Whites by reinforcing 
stereotypes of Blacks as inferior and less intelligent than Whites.116  To 
them, the program simply feeds the flame as opposed to extinguishing 
it.117
 Underlying all of these views on affirmative action is the black 
conservative’s belief that white liberals support affirmative action while 
believing Blacks to be truly incompetent and then “sneer at the idea that 
affirmative action stigmatize[s] women and minorities as incompetent.”118 
 In the eyes of black conservatives, the liberal bias in favor of racial 
preferences is based on and continues to exist only because of an 
inference of black inferiority.  In essence, in black conservative thought, 
the hypocrisy of white liberals is in the idea that they would not ask their 
own child to accept the benefits of affirmative action in place of concrete 
improvement in test scores and grades.119  As former Professor Shelby 
 
Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College 
Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029, 167 (2001) (pointing out that “middle-class blacks 
hold dramatically less wealth than whites with comparable education and income” and 
that “[l]ow socioeconomic status whites, as measured by education and income, have a 
wealth-holding comparable to middle class blacks”). 
116 Id. at 120.  George Schuyler once expressed a similar argument in relation to his 
opposition of the NAACP’s boycott of white-owned stores in Harlem in 1934.  The 
boycott was based on the slogan “Don’t buy where you can’t work.”  In attacking the 
boycott, Schuyler asserted the following: 
 
The Negro, characteristically enough, is unprepared for it. . . .  An 
insistence upon employment on a racial basis alone will be re-echoed 
with avidity by jobless whites and professional Anglo-Saxons.  The 
color bar in industry hits the Negro hard enough without him laboring 
to make his lot worse. . . .   [T]he boycott ballyhooers are clearly 
asking us to cut off our heads to cure a cold. 
Williams, supra note 48, at 59 (quoting George Schuyler, To Boycott or Not to Boycott: A 
Deadly Boomerang, THE CRISIS, Sept. 1934, at 260). 
117   As Professor Shelby Steele has argued, “Much of the ‘subtle’ discrimination 
that blacks talk about is often (not always) discrimination against the stigma of 
questionable competence that affirmative action delivers to blacks.”  STEELE, CONTENT 
OF OUR CHARACTER, supra note 24, at 141. 
118  STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, supra note 24, at 5. 
119 See id. at 20 (“Would he [a white journalist] have encouraged his own children 
to overcome a deficit by looking for a preference?  Did he think a preference built esteem 
or undermined it?”). 
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Steele once mocked, “[T]he liberal who has high expectations for his or 
her own children often feels that he or she cannot ‘push the issue’ with 
blacks.”120 Moreover, black conservatives contend that such “preferences . 
. . give up on black excellence in order to preserve white excellence.”121  
After all, “[i]f black equality were truly the goal, wouldn’t policy focus on 
educational development before college?”122  In sum, black conservatives 
view affirmative action as not truly helping to resolve the problems that 
cause black underperformance in schools and on standardized tests, and 
only assuaging the guilt of liberal Whites.123
 
4. Crime 
 
 Like their white counterparts, black conservatives strongly 
advocate toughness on criminals and strict law abidance without 
significant regard to mitigating factors.124  Unlike their white counterparts, 
however, whose focus is on accountability and recognizing the harm to 
victims, black conservatives place a strong emphasis on punishing 
criminals not just because it protects victims, but specifically because they 
believe it protects black victims. 125  Moreover, for black conservatives, 
harsh punishment of criminals is critical to the advancement of Blacks not 
only because it would better protect Blacks, (who remain especially 
vulnerable to criminal wrongdoing and corruption because of a lack of 
financial resources and weak police protections),126 but also because it 
 
120  See id. at 34. 
121  See id. at 160; see also Hill, supra note 63, at 41 (quoting Thomas as asserting 
“[w]hite parents tell their kids to study hard and get into college, and black kids are told 
they don’t have to worry about their SAT scores”). 
122  See id.  at 33. 
123  See Richard Delgado, supra note 58 at 1548-49 (describing Steele’s description 
of racial programs, such as affirmative action, as programs that enable Whites to feel 
good about themselves while actually doing little for Blacks). 
124  See Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? “Gangsta” Culture, Clarence Thomas, and 
Afrocentric Academies, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 327 (2000) (discussing the response of 
some black conservatives to crime and policies on crime). 
125  Although not a self-identified conservative, Randall Kennedy has expressed 
views on criminal matters that are more in line with black conservatism.  See, e.g., 
Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1994) (arguing that there has been a failure to protect black 
communities). 
126  See Kennedy, supra note 125, at 1256. 
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would serve as a method for distancing “good” Blacks from the negative 
stereotypes that are used to support police brutality, racial discrimination 
in law enforcement, and racial profiling.127
This central tenet of black conservative thought on crime first began 
to emerge during the antebellum period when free Blacks, who tended to 
be more conservative,128 viewed their survival and the maintenance of 
their status (however low it was) as dependent upon distinguishing 
themselves from enslaved Blacks.129  This attitude even extended into the 
post-bellum period when there was no need for such distinctions to be 
made between free Blacks and slaves.  For example, these “politics of 
distinction”130 played themselves out in the Davis Bend Court, an old 
slave court in Mississippi.131  This slave court was created by Joseph 
Davis, a slave master who owned and ran a plantation on the banks of the 
Mississippi and later helped to found the Mississippi Bar Association. 
Called the “Hall of Justice,” the slave court was in session every Saturday 
with Davis, with a jury of slaves issuing judgments after hearing and 
receiving evidence at trial.132    In one session on the court after the 
 
127 Randall Kennedy, A Response To Professor Cole’s “Paradox of Race and 
Crime,” 83 GEO. L.J. 2573, 2574-75 (1995) (describing support of some black members 
of Congress for harsh sentences to deter crack usage); Glenn C. Loury, Listen to the 
Black Community, PUB. INT., Fall 1994, at 33, 35-36 (encouraging blacks to promote 
punishment of lawbreakers). 
128  Randolph, supra note 31, at 151. 
129  See generally Hanes Walton, Jr., Blacks and Conservative Political Movements, 
37 Q. REV. OF HIGHER ED. AMONG NEGROES (1969).  See also PETER J. RACHLEFF, 
BLACK LABOR IN THE SOUTH:  RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 1865–1890 (1984); MICHAEL B. 
CHESSON, RICHMOND AFTER THE WAR  (1981). 
130   This phrase was coined by Professor Regina Austin, who defined the phrase as 
highlighting “the difference that exists between the ‘better’ elements of and the 
stereotypical ‘lowlifes’ who richly merit the bad reputations the dominant society accords 
them.”  Regina Austin, The Black Community, Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of 
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1772 (1992).  Professor Austin opposed such 
distinctions in the black community. 
131  See Katherine Franke, Subjects of Freedom (unpublished manuscript at 72-73, 
on file with author) (citing Freedmen’s Court, Davis Bend, Record Court of Freedmen, 
Davis Bend, Miss., RG 105, Entry 2153, NA); see also JANET SHARP HERMANN, THE 
PURSUIT OF A DREAM 6, 62-64 (1981).   
132  See Franke, supra note 131 (unpublished manuscript at 60-62, on file with 
author) (citing VARINA HOWELL DAVIS, JEFFERSON DAVIS: EX-PRESIDENT OF THE 
CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, A MEMOIR 1, 49-50, 174 (1890)). Davis intervened 
“only to grant a pardon if he regarded the sentence as too severe.  Id. 
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emancipation of slaves, a “judge” of the Davis Bend Court of Freedom, a 
rare court of colored men which continued to render decisions on crimes 
committed by newly freed slaves,133 emphasized the “politics of 
distinction” while chastising a mother who had been charged with stealing 
a bag of corn: 
 
Now you listen, you.  You and your mother are a couple of 
low-down darkies, trying to get a living without work. 
You are the cause that respectable colored people are 
slandered, and called thieving and lazy niggers.134
 
Such politics of distinctions have continued today, as noted above, with 
black conservatives urging an emphasis on distinguishing law-breaking 
Blacks with those who are law-abiding.135
In addition to viewing a hard stance against crime as a means of 
distinguishing law-abiding Blacks from black criminals, black 
conservatives also regard such a stance as necessary for ensuring the 
protection of the persons who are often left out of debates concerning race 
and the criminal justice system: black victims of crime.136  As opposed to 
analyzing how some Blacks may turn to crime as a reaction to poverty and 
 
133  See id. (unpublished manuscript at 72, on file with author) On July 4, 1863, 
Admiral David Porter, commander of the Union fleet on the Mississippi, ordered that 
Davis Bend be made an independent colony for freed slaves. The former slaves who 
resided at Davis Bend when Davis was the slave master continued the court system.  The 
court system was formally established in January of 1865 and consisted of three judges, 
who were elected every three months, and who tried all the cases that were brought 
before them.  See id. (citing Freedmen’s Court, Davis Bend, Record Court of Freedmen, 
Davis Bend, Miss., RG 105, Entry 2153, NA). 
134  Id. (citing JOHN T. TROWBRIDGE, THE SOUTH: A TOUR OF ITS BATTLE-FIELDS 
AND RUINED CITIES, A JOURNEY THROUGH THE DESOLATED STATES, AND TALKS WITH 
THE PEOPLE 383 (1866)). 
135  Randolph, supra note 31, at 153 (quoting WILLARD B. GATEWOOD, 
ARISTOCRATS OF COLOR (1993)).  Basically, like Washington’s philosophy during the 
post-Reconstruction period, during the antebellum and post-bellum period, some of the 
black elite, who were primarily “conservative,” believed that “if it were not for the 
behavior of the masses, the better class of whites would extend to the black elite the full 
privileges of citizenship.”  See id. 
136  See Thomas Sowell, Easy Justice (August 12, 2003) (arguing that “[innocent 
victims of crime seem to disappear from the lofty vision and ringing rhetoric of those 
who worry that the punishment of criminals is ‘too severe’”), available at 
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/thomassowell/ts20030812.shtml. 
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institutionalized racism, black conservative ideology focuses on the black 
victim, noting how Blacks are much more vulnerable to violent and non-
violent crimes than Whites.137  To the black conservative, the fact that 
most poor Blacks never turn to crime and that Blacks are seven times 
more likely to be murdered, four times more likely to be raped, three times 
more likely to be robbed, and twice more likely to be assaulted than 
Whites dictates that Blacks be nothing but harsh on criminals.138  
 According to black conservative thought, the effects of such crime 
 
137  See Brian W. Jones, Two Visions of Black Leadership, in BLACK AND RIGHT:  
THE BOLD NEW VOICE OF BLACK CONSERVATIVES IN AMERICA 41 (1997) (criticizing 
liberal black leaders for concentrating procedural protections for the accused and 
rationalizing the “victimizer’s behavior with arguments about racism and economic 
determination”). 
138 See Thomas Sowell, “Friends” of Blacks:  Part II, JEWISH WORLD REV. (Sept. 
6, 2000), available at http://www.jewishworldreview.com.  At the same time, the fact 
that Blacks are more likely to be victims of crime than Whites does not necessarily mean 
that harsher punishment will benefit the community.  In fact, it could exacerbate the 
problem.  As Professor Davis Cole has argued: 
 
Even if one were willing, in the name of the “politics of distinction,” 
to write off the black lawbreakers, the impact extends to the black 
community at large. Incarceration of so many young black men 
contributes to the very problems that are so often pointed to as the 
source of higher crime rates in the black community. More than 30% 
of black families have incomes below the poverty level, as compared 
with 9% of white families.  Minorities’ median net worth is less than 
7% that of whites. Unemployment among African-Americans is about 
twice that among whites.  More than half of all African-American 
children are living only with their mothers, as compared with 14% of 
white children. By removing so many black men from the community 
and stigmatizing them forever with a criminal conviction, criminal law 
enforcement is likely to mean more single-parent families, less adult 
supervision of children, more unemployed and unemployable members 
of the community, more poverty, and in turn, more drugs, more crime, 
and more violence. This is not to minimize the burden that criminals 
themselves present to the community. It is simply to suggest that 
incarceration—especially on such a massive scale in a well-defined 
community—is far from an adequate solution, and may well 
exacerbate the problems associated with crack and crime. 
Davis Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy’s 
“Politics of Distinction,” 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2558 (1995) (also noting that “[b]lack 
citizens living in the inner city are disproportionately victimized by crime, but they are 
also disproportionately victimized by law enforcement”). 
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to the members of these communities are incredibly devastating, often 
leaving innocent, law-abiding black citizens as prisoners in their own 
homes and resulting in severe economic consequences, such as higher 
insurance rates, higher prices for goods in black communities with costly 
security devices, and the dearth of stores, banks, and other financial 
institutions in black communities.139  As black conservatives dictate, 
Blacks must demand that their communities be made safe and secure 
through the strict enforcement of laws that penalize criminals instead of 
coddling them. 
Indeed, black conservatives have linked this concept with their 
support of the death penalty, again emphasizing the “politics of 
distinction” by claiming that the “real victims” in capital cases are law-
abiding members of the black community, who are denied equal 
protection under the law of the death penalty because persons who kill 
Whites are significantly more likely than those who kill Blacks to receive 
the death penalty.140  Furthermore, in capital cases, black conservatives 
advocate not allowing jurors discretion in deciding the fate of such 
defendants on the ground that this discretion only allows racism to 
determine who receives a life sentence and who receives a death sentence. 
 To black conservatives, the only way to protect individual black 
 
139 See Sowell, supra note 136 (criticizing Justice Kennedy for his condemnation of 
mandatory sentencing laws and noting that “[i]f a day in prison can be pretty long, so can 
every day living in a high-crime neighborhood, where you have to wonder what is going 
to happen to your son or daughter on the way to or from school”); Hill, supra note 63, at 
37.  
Clarence Thomas once argued the following in an interview:   
 
The sections where the poorest people live aren’t really livable.  If 
people can’t go to school, or rear their families, or go to church 
without being mugged, how much progress can you expect in a 
community?  Would you do business in a community that looks like an 
armed camp, where the only people who inhabit the streets after dark 
are the criminals. . . .  If you want to encourage business in these areas 
then stopping crime has got to be at the top of the list. 
Quoted in Hill, supra note 63, at 37. 
140  See Randall Kennedy, McKleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the 
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1421-43 (1988).  In McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279 (1987), a study revealed that “even after taking account of 39 nonracial 
variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to 
receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks.”  Id. at 287. 
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defendants charged with murder is by eliminating such discretion so that 
all criminals are treated and judged the same.141 In essence, they oppose 
placing too much authority in the hands of individuals in criminal matters 
because, to their minds, in such instances, individual Blacks will always 
suffer because of racism, whether conscious or unconscious.142  In sum, 
for black conservatives, the emphasis should be placed on protecting law-
abiding Blacks through the “politics of distinction” and strict law 
enforcement.  Additionally, for black conservatives, black liberals’ 
support of discretion in considering mitigating social factors should be 
stopped because, contrary to what black liberals think, such discretion 
only harms black defendants by opening them to racism, instead of 
resulting in juror recognition of the effects of racism and life 
circumstances for each individual. 
 
II.  BIRTH OF A “NATIONALIST”:  HOW CLARENCE THOMAS BECAME 
BLACK AND RIGHT 
 
There is nothing you can do to get past black skin. 
 
— Clarence Thomas143
 
 The evolution of Clarence Thomas into a black conservative, or as 
 
141  Of course, such reasons ignore the racism that precedes a capital trial, including 
police targeting of black persons and the discretion of prosecutors in determining who 
will be charged with what crime, and if that charged crime should be a capital offense.  
See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 26-33 (1998) (discussing how racism, both unconscious and 
conscious, results in discriminatory treatment of Blacks by police and prosecutors); 
Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 1660, 1674-84 (1996) (same); Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and 
Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REV. 797, 830 (1990) (noting that “[p]rosecutors make subjective 
decisions, based on a complex variety of factors, about whether to seek the death 
penalty”); see also Cole, supra note 138, at 2566 (“Racial stereotypes are likely to 
influence the police officer’s decision about whom to watch or stop, the prosecutor’s 
decision about which charges to pursue, the judge’s decision about whether to set bail, 
the jury’s decision to convict, the judge’s sentence, and the parole board’s decision on 
early release.”). 
142  Such views are in line with black conservative views on other issues, such as 
affirmative action, which rest on the idea that the only way for Blacks to ensure fairness 
is to eliminate “subjective” decisionmaking from the process. 
143  Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 72. 
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some would argue, the ultimate cultural dissenter,144 provides one of the 
most interesting chronicles of racial identity development in United 
States. Sociologists and psychologists have long studied the construction 
of race in society and its impact on an individual’s identity.145  In 1994, 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant introduced racial formation theory, 
which refers to the “sociohistorical process by which racial categories are 
created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”146 Specifically, this 
theory provides that race is not a fixed term, but is instead an evolving set 
of social meanings that are formed and transformed under a constantly 
shifting society.147  In essence, supporters of this school argue that race is 
a social factor.148
 Prior to Omi and Winant’s work, several psychologists examined 
the means through which individuals socially develop their racial 
identity,149 in particular black identity.  William Cross, professor of 
psychology at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, was among the 
first to examine the psychological development of black identity in 1971.  
In so doing, Cross outlined a process he termed “nigrescence,” which is 
the pattern through which individuals become “Black” in terms of one’s 
manner of thinking about and evaluating oneself and one’s reference 
 
144  Sunder, supra note 30, at 497 n.6 (citing Maureen Dowd, Liberties; Black and 
White, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, at A31, in which Justice Clarence Thomas is quoted as 
saying “‘the war in which we are engaged is cultural, not civil’”); see also Smith & 
Walton, Jr., supra note 30, at 215 (stating that “[c]onservatives in black America are 
dissenters from the mainstream left/liberal ideological consensus that characterizes the 
community”). 
145 See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations 
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) (exploring 
theories of racial formation). 
146  MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994).
147   OMI & WINANT, supra note 146, at 55. 
148  See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 11 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 207, 210 (1996) (“Identity ascription may be performed by the 
self or by others.  And identity is always contextual.”); see also Frank Rudy Cooper, 
Cultural Context Matters:  Articulations, Identities and Terry’s Seesaw Effect, 71 
U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 355, 369-70 (2002) (same). 
149  See JANET E. HELMS, BLACK AND WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY:  THEORY, 
RESEARCH AND, PRACTICE 3 (Janet E. Helm ed. 1990) (stating that “the term ‘racial 
identity’ actually refers to a sense of group or collective identity based on one’s 
perception that he or she shares a common racial heritage with a particular racial group”).
 
 
 
40   
 
                                                          
group.150  Scholars, such as Janet Helms, professor of counseling 
psychology and director of The Institute for the Study and Promotion of 
Race and Culture at Boston College, have expounded upon Professor 
Cross’s theory of racial identity development.151  As Professor Helms 
explains in her book, Black and White Racial Identity:  Theory, Research 
and, Practice, the impact of racial identity on any particular individual is 
complex.  Within any racial group, “various kinds of racial identity can 
exist, and consequently, racial consciousness per se usually is not 
considered to be dichotomous, present, or absent, but rather is 
polytomous.”152
 Indeed, the rise in the number of black conservatives in today’s 
society displays exactly the varied nature of black racial identity and 
consciousness.  On a more specific note, the mere existence of Clarence 
Thomas, one of the most prominent members of the Black Right, reflects 
exactly how a person who strongly identifies as a black153 can cultivate 
values and beliefs in ways that differ from the vast majority of members in 
his or her racial group.154   
 In fact, despite Justice Thomas’s conservative views, which some 
have argued are antithetical to black identity,155 there is no doubt that his 
 
150   See WILLIAM CROSS, SHADES OF BLACK:  DIVERSITY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
IDENTITY (1991); William E. Cross, Jr. & Peony Fhagen-Smith, Patterns of African 
American Identity Development: A Life Span Perspective, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
RACIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT 243 (2001) (Charmaine L. Wiejeyesinghe & Bailey W. 
Jackson eds.) (noting that “nigrescence” means “‘to become black’”).  
151  Professor Janet Helms was among the first academics to study the development 
of white racial identity.  See generally HELMS, supra note 149.   
152  HELMS, supra note 149, at 7.  David Demo and Michael Hughes also expounded 
upon Cross’s work on black identity, arguing that black identity is a multidimensional 
concept that encompasses a wide array of feelings, including closeness to other Blacks 
and a commitment to African and African-American culture.”  David Demo & Michael 
Hughes, Socialization and Racial Identity Among Black Americans, 53 SOC. PYSCH. Q. 
364–74 (1990).    
153 Thomas, supra note 30, at 9 (asserting that “policies affecting black Americans 
had been an all-consuming interest of [his] since the age of sixteen”). 
154  Cf. WATTS, supra note 67, at 248 (asking “[w]hy can’t a black man or woman 
espouse a more conservative viewpoint . . . and still ‘reflect the African-American 
community’”). 
155  See, e.g., Jack E. White, Uncle Tom Justice, TIME, June 26, 1995, at 36 
(asserting that no “true” black person would hold Justice Thomas’s views); see also 
Smith, supra note 7, at 528 (claiming that some persons have argued that Justice Thomas 
is not a “real” black man). 
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life has been marred by racism, racial hierarchy, and economic inequality. 
 More important, it is clear, as Justice Thomas has expressed himself, that 
race and racism have played a significant role in shaping his persona.156  
A brief recounting of part of his life story demonstrates as much, in the 
particular the manner in which he arguably may have progressed through 
the stages of nigrescence, as developed by Professor Cross and other black 
scholars such as Professor Beverly Daniel Tatum.157  Professor Cross’s 
nigrescence model involves five stages of racial identity development:  (1) 
pre-encounter, (2) encounter, (3) immersion, (4) internalization, and (5) 
internalization-commitment.158   
 
156  Indeed, Justice Thomas himself has described the importance of racial 
experiences in the development of his ideology, noting that, at certain points, his 
“attitudes approached black nationalism” and citing leaders such as Malcolm X, Richard 
Wright, Frederick Douglass, and Booker T. Washington as some of his heroes.  See 
Clarence Thomas, Interview with Bill Kaufman, REASON ONLINE, available at 
www.reason.com/cthomasint.shtml.  
157  The nigrescence model has been criticized for various reasons, , including its 
tendency to simply the development of racial identity as a simple process of 
increasing racial identification and its identification of an emotionally health racial 
identity for Blacks as being one that centered around Afrocentrism.  See Camille Gear 
Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future 
of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1174-75 (2004).  Nevertheless, I briefly discuss 
this model because it is the most well-known of the racial identity development 
models. 
158 BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER 
IN THE CAFETERIA? AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE  76 (1997) (highlighting 
the five stages of nigrescence and extending it to cover a youth in their phases of racial 
identity development);  Cross & Fhagen-Smith, supra note 150, at 244  (same); see also 
Bailey W. Jackson III, Black Identity Development: Further Analysis and Elaboration, in 
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT 15-16 (2001) (Charmaine L. 
Wiejeyesinghe & Bailey W. Jackson eds.) (describing the stages of black identity 
development as being naïve or absence of social consciousness or identity; acceptance, 
meaning acceptance of the perceived worth of black people and black culture; resistance 
or the rejection of prevailing white culture’s description and valuing of black people; 
redefinition or the renaming, reaffirming, and reclaiming of one’s sense of blackness, 
black culture, and racial identity; and internalization, meaning the integration of redefined 
racial identity into aspects of one’s identity). 
During the first stage, the pre-encounter stage, the black individual views the world 
from a white frame of reference and internalizes many of the beliefs and values of the 
dominant white culture, including the idea that whiteness is superior.  In this stage, the 
black individual has not yet recognized the societal significance of his or her membership 
in a racial group.  See TATUM, supra note 158, at 76.  Under the nigrescence model, an 
individual graduates to the second stage, the encounter stage, when an event or series of 
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 As noted earlier, one could argue that Justice Thomas has gone 
through each of the stages of nigrescence throughout his life.  Thomas 
began his life poor and destitute in the segregated town of Pin Point, 
Georgia in 1949.  When Thomas was two years old, his father abandoned 
him, his brother, and his mother who was pregnant with her third child, a 
girl.   In 1954, the same year that Brown v. Board of Education159 was 
decided, Thomas started first grade at the segregated Haven Home School.  
 In 1955, because Thomas’s mother could no longer afford to raise 
and keep all of her children, Thomas and his brother went to live (without 
their sister) with their grandfather, Myers Anderson (“Anderson”), and 
their grandmother Christine Anderson in Savannah, Georgia.160  Although 
 
events causes that individual to acknowledge the personal impact of racism.  In this stage, 
the individual begins to struggle with the idea of what it means to be a member of a group 
targeted by racism. See TATUM, supra note 158, at 76; see also Cross & Fhagen-Smith, 
supra note 150, at 244 (describing this stage as depicting “the event or series of events 
that challenge and destabilize ongoing identity).   
During the third stage, the immersion stage, the black individual begins to unlearn 
the negative stereotypes about Blacks in the United States and starts to develop a positive 
sense of self. This development is often accompanied with anger from the individual 
regarding racism by Whites and a strong desire to surround oneself with symbols of racial 
identity.  During this stage, a black individual is engaged in self-discovery, actively seeks 
out knowledge about his or her own racial and cultural history, and unlearns many of the 
negative stereotypes that were internalized during the pre-encounter stage.  Eventually, 
the individual’s anger is subsided in the fourth stage of development, internalization, 
where the individual develops a sense of security about his or her own racial identity.  
See id.; see also Cross & Fhagen-Smith, supra note 150, at 244 (describing the stage as 
signaling “the habituation, stabilization, and finalization of the new sense of self”).  As 
this stage progresses, the individual begins to establish meaningful relationships across 
boundaries, including with Whites.  Finally, in the fifth stage, internalization-
commitment, which is described as being minimally distinct from the fourth stage, the 
black individual is anchored in a positive sense of racial identity. More importantly, he or 
she has discovered methods for transforming his or her “sense of identity into ongoing 
action expressing a sense of commitment to the concerns of Blacks as a group.” See 
TATUM, supra note 158, at 76; see also Cross & Fhagen-Smith, supra note 150, at 244 
(describing a person in the fifth stage as achieving “a strong Black identity at the 
personal level” and  then “join[ing] with others in the community for long-term struggles 
to solve Black problems and to research, protect, and propagate Black history and Black 
culture”). 
159  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
160  See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 30-31; see also Nomination of Clarence Thomas 
to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 108 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of 
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barely able to read and write himself, Anderson was a strong supporter of 
education and managed to earn enough money to send Thomas to an all-
black Catholic school.161
 It was in these Catholic schools and a Catholic seminary that 
Thomas arguably entered into the first two stages of nigrescence, the pre-
encounter and encounter stages.  When Thomas reached the tenth grade, 
he began to attend an all-white Catholic boarding school called St. John 
Vianney Minor Seminary and, for the first time, experienced “culture 
shock.”162  Thomas once described his first day at the all-white school, 
saying “When I walked in there and saw I was in a room with all these 
white kids, I just about died.”163   
 Despite having to adjust to a strange, all-white environment, 
Thomas excelled as a student and an athlete at St. John Vianney.164  His 
social successes at the school, however, were far more limited, primarily 
because of racism.  Thomas’s white classmates at St. John Vianney 
repeatedly teased him, at times telling him, “Smile, Clarence, so we can 
 
Clarence Thomas) (“Our mother only earned $20 every two weeks as a maid, not enough 
to take care of us. So she arranged for us to live with our grandparents later, in 1955. 
Imagine, if you will, two little boys with all their belongings in two grocery bags.”).  As 
Thomas has repeatedly stated, he gained the morals and values that have served as the 
foundation for his success in the Anderson household.  Although lacking formal 
education, Anderson, who, unlike many Blacks at that time, had built and owned his own 
house, was also a strong proponent of self-reliance.   See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 32; 
see also Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of Cotenant 
Possession Value Liability and a Call for Default Rule Reform, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 331, 
334 (1994) (noting that “it was remarkable that [her] grandmother had had any property 
at all; a divorced, Black woman who’d raised three daughters alone in the segregated 
South with not even a high school education”). 
161 Like his grandfather and grandmother, who raised Thomas in their home, Justice 
Thomas is now raising his great-nephew Mark.  Justice Thomas assumed custody over 
Mark after his father was convicted of drug charges in 1997.  See GREENYA, supra note 
5, at 16; Tony Mauro, Decade After Confirmation, Thomas Becoming a Force on High 
Court, FULTON CTY. DAILY REPORT, Aug. 20, 2001, at 1. 
162  Quoted in Alvin Wyman Walker, The Conundrum of Clarence Thomas:  An 
Attempt at a Psychodramatic Understanding, RACEANDHISTORY.COM, at 
www.raceandhistory.com/historicalviews/clarencethomas.htm. 
163  Quoted in Alvin Wyman Walker, The Conundrum of Clarence Thomas:  An 
Attempt at a Psychodramatic Understanding, RACEANDHISTORY.COM, at 
www.raceandhistory.com/historicalviews/clarencethomas.htm. 
164  Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 74. 
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see you.”165  For Thomas, who had been ridiculed as a child for his 
“nigger naps” and routinely called “America’s Blackest Child,”166 the 
taunts were painful.167  During his tenure at St. John Vianney, Thomas 
entered what he has described as a “self-hate” stage,168 going to great 
lengths to fit in with his white classmates and internalizing racism.169  At 
the same time, Thomas seemed to enter into what can be described as the 
second stage of nigrescence, encounter, where such series of taunts and 
racial events caused him to recognize fully the impact of racism.  Indeed, 
ultimately Thomas’s efforts to gain acceptance from his classmates would 
be of no avail, and Thomas would eventually come to believe that “there 
is nothing a black man can do to be accepted by whites.”170    
 At Immaculate Conception Seminary in Missouri, where Thomas 
enrolled after high school to become a priest, he continued through what 
could be defined as the encounter stage, struggling with the idea of what it 
means to be Black and thus a constant target of racism.  In fact, Thomas’s 
stay at the seminary, would be brief as result of this struggle with targeted 
racism, with Thomas leaving soon after hearing a white classmate and 
future priest declare the following about the shooting of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr.: “Good, I hope the son of a bitch dies.”171  According to Thomas, 
after overhearing this statement, he “knew [he] couldn’t stay in that so-
called Christian environment any longer.”172
 As Thomas pursued his education at Holy Cross College in 
 
165  See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 44. 
166  See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 74.  Since the 
antebellum period, there has been serious intraracial discrimination among Blacks based 
upon skin tone.  See generally MIDGE WILSON ET AL., THE COLOR COMPLEX  (1993); see 
also Trina Jones, Shades of Brown, The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1515-22 
(2000) (detailing the history of colorism within the black community). 
167  See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 74. 
168  Id. 
169  See id. 
170  Quoted in Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 74. 
171  GREENYA, supra note 5, at 48.  As a general matter, Thomas felt that the Church 
was ignoring critical issues of race.  As Thomas once explained of his departure from the 
seminary, “dogs were being sicced on blacks . . . and the church was focusing on what 
songs to play at services.”  Hill, supra note 63, at 28 (quotations omitted). 
172  GREENYA, supra note 5, at 48-49 (explaining that “[t]his was a man of God, 
mortally stricken by an assassin’s bullet, and one preparing for the priesthood had wished 
evil on him”).  As Thomas would explain many years later, the day Martin Luther King, 
Jr. was shot was a “demarcation between hope and hopelessness” for him.  Id. 
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Worcester, Massachusetts,173 he arguably moved into the third stage of 
nigrescence, immersion, where he began to unlearn negative stereotypes 
about Blacks, developed anger about racism by Whites, and surrounded 
himself with symbols of racial identity.174  Indeed, at Holy Cross, Thomas 
embraced Black Nationalism,175 helped to found the Black Student Union, 
and became involved with programs sponsored by the Black Panthers,176 
such as its free breakfast programs for black children. Thomas also led a 
walkout at Holy Cross over the issue of divestment from South Africa, 
which at that time had a system of apartheid.177   
 
173  Thomas attended Holy Cross with the assistance of a Martin Luther King 
Scholarship that was aimed at attracting more high-achieving black students to the 
college.  See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 54 (stating that in the late 1960s, Holy Cross 
“pushed to find and admit more black students under a relatively new policy known as 
affirmative action”). 
174  See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 74. 
175  Black Nationalism is a complex set of beliefs emphasizing the need for the 
cultural, political, and economic separation of African Americans from white society.  
The Black Nationalist movement, which can be traced back to Marcus Garvey’s 
Universal Negro Improvement Association of the 1920s, sought to acquire economic 
power and to infuse among Blacks a sense of community and group feeling.  As an 
alternative to being assimilated by the American nation, which is predominantly white, 
black nationalists sought to maintain and promote their separate identity as a people of 
black ancestry.  See Farrar, supra note 57, at 110-14. 
176  GREENYA, supra note 5, at 57.  The Black Panther Party was a radical, black 
political organization that was founded by Huey P. Newton in 1966 with friends, Bobby 
Seale and David Hilliard.  The Party outlined a Ten Point Platform and Program, which 
called for a redress of the longstanding grievances of the black masses in America, 
including full employment for all black people, overdue payment of forty acres and two 
mules, decent housing, decent education that teaches black children of their history, free 
health care, an end to police brutality, freedom of all blacks from government 
correctional facilities, and assurance of trials by a jury of actual peers for all Blacks.  See 
Cynthia Deitle Leonardatos, California’s Attempt to Disarm the Black Panthers, 36 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 956-60 (1999). 
 According to Thomas, he was so militant, “[He] thought George McGovern was a 
conservative.”  Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Supreme Discomfort, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 4, 2002, at 23.  Although Thomas considered himself liberal and a militant during 
his days at Holy Cross, he was the sole dissenter to a proposal for a black dormitory/hall 
on campus.   Thomas eventually decided to live in the black dormitory/hall, but brought 
his white roommate from the previous year to live with him.  GREENYA, supra note 5, at 
60 (noting that Thomas dissented in part “‘because he didn’t want to make it easy for 
whites to avoid him’”). 
177  Apartheid, which means “apartness,” is the name given to a policy of 
segregation by race in South Africa that began in 1948, but the policy itself extends back 
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 Just as Thomas had done in primary and secondary school, he 
excelled in his classes at Holy Cross.  In spite of his academic successes, 
however, Thomas was not a vocal participant in the classroom.  As 
Thomas would later explain, he did not voluntarily speak in the classroom 
in high school, college, and later law school because of the discomfort he 
felt as a result of his childhood speech.178 As Thomas explained, he had 
grown up in a rural area of the South where there remained a major 
influence of Gullah, a mixture of English and African language.179  As a 
consequence, while he learned to speak standard English, he would edit 
his speech and his words before speaking, which resulted in his doing 
more listening than speaking.180
 After graduating ninth in his class from Holy Cross, Thomas 
attended Yale Law School.  At Yale, Thomas’s militancy began to 
dwindle, and his opposition to affirmative action policies, particularly 
quotas, began to grow. 181  Thomas felt stigmatized by what he believed to 
 
to the beginning of white settlement in South Africa in 1652. After the primarily 
Afrikaner Nationalists came to power in 1948, the social custom of apartheid was 
systematized under law and remained in practice until 1994 . See NANCY L. CLARK & 
WILLIAM H. WORGER, SOUTH AFRICA: THE RISE AND FALL OF APARTHEID 3-6 (2004);  
see also Lisa R. Pruitt, No Black Names on the Letterhead? Efficient Discrimination and 
the South African Legal Profession, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 545 (2002) (describing certain 
after-effects of apartheid in the legal profession for black and colored lawyers).  In 1994, 
the first multiracial elections occurred in South Africa, with an electoral victory for the 
Africa National Congress.  See Adrien Katherine Wing, Book Review, Towards 
Democracy in a New South Africa, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 689, 691-92 (1995).  Prior to 
that, there were global efforts to force the abolition of apartheid in South Africa, 
including those directed toward divestment of South African securities.  See Joel C. 
Dobris, Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of “South African” Securities, 65 
NEB. L. REV. 209, (1986) (arguing that trustees should divest “to reach the goal of 
political, social, racial, and economic justice for all of South Africa” and that they could 
do so without violating their fiduciary duty to the trust). 
178  See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 20, 56 (“One reason for my being inconspicuous 
was that I had difficulty speaking proper English. . . .  I would think about the right way 
to phrase a question while I was trying to say it, and trip over myself.  Some people 
thought I had a stuttering problem.  So I remained quiet.”).  
179   See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 20, 56 (describing Thomas’s stated reasons for 
his silence on the bench); see also KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES 
OF CLARENCE THOMAS 3 (2004) (describing Gullah culture). 
180  See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 20, 56; see also Scott D. Gerber, “My Rookie 
Years Are Over” Clarence Thomas After Ten Years, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 343, 349-50 (2002). 
181  See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75 (detailing an 
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be his white classmates’ view that black law students at Yale were not 
there because of their academic qualifications, but merely to fulfill a 
quota.182  As Thomas later explained about his days at Yale, “You had to 
prove yourself every day because the presumption was that you were 
dumb and didn’t deserve to be there on merit.” 183  Indeed, Thomas felt so 
stigmatized by what he perceived as his classmates’ opinions that he 
avoided classes in civil rights and constitutional law, instead opting to 
take tax law, corporate, and antitrust law,184 to prove his abilities.185   
 
interview with Thomas, in which he described his feelings at Yale). 
182   See id. 
183  Quoted in GREENYA, supra note 5, at 68, 94 (stating that Thomas described his 
experience as being one in which “every time [he] walked into a law class at Yale it was 
like having a monkey jump down [his] back from the Gothic arches”).  Additionally, as 
Thomas saw it, at Yale, affirmative action primarily assisted only middle class blacks, not 
the masses.  According to Thomas, most of the Blacks who graduated from Yale were the 
children of black lawyers, doctors, and teachers.  See Williams, A Question of Fairness, 
supra note 56, at 75 (“Man, quotas are for the black middle class.  But look at what’s 
happening to the masses.  Those are my people.  They are just where they were before 
any of these policies.”); Neil A. Lewis, Thomas’s Journey on Path of Self-Help, N.Y. 
Times, July 6, 1991 (noting that at Yale, Thomas was “usually attired in bib overalls and 
a dark wool watch cap, as if to announce he was a man of the common folk”); see also 
GREENYA, supra note 5, at 68 (same). 
184  See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75 (noting that Thomas 
purposefully avoided civil rights classes).  As Professor Dorothy Brown has shown, 
however, even tax law is affected by race.  See Dorothy A. Brown, Racial Equality in the 
Twenty-First Century: What’s Tax Policy Got to Do with It?, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 759, 760-68 (1999) (analyzing how certain tax statutes have a disparate impact 
based on race).  The same holds true for corporate law.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Joo, A Trip 
Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”: Shareholder Voice and Management 
Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 738-48 (2003) (discussing the lack of diversity 
among corporate directors and the executive officers they appoint and how diversity 
would contribute to better management decision making and greater shareholder wealth). 
185  See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75 (describing 
Thomas’s comments that he shunned civil rights courses because he did not want to be 
viewed as a student who was admitted and must be coddled because he is black).  To this 
today, Justice Thomas holds on to this belief.  The Justice once advised a young black 
male from a housing project, who planned to attend Brown University, to avoid “classes 
and orientation on race relations.”  He explained to the youth, “What I look for in hiring 
my clerks–the cream of the crop–I look for the math and sciences, real classes, none of 
that Afro-American study stuff.  If they’d taken that stuff as an undergraduate, I don’t 
want them.”  Quoted in Calmore, supra note 21, at 212–13 (quoting David G. Savage, 
Justice Thomas Defined by His Roots, and Distance from Them–Though Jurist Hails 
from a Humble Background, He Refuses to Let His Experiences Influence His Court 
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 Upon his graduation from Yale, one of the country’s most elite law 
schools, in 1974, Thomas found himself jobless.  He had been rejected by 
every law firm in Atlanta.186  None of the law firms were hiring black law 
school graduates as attorneys, even if they graduated from Yale Law 
School.187  It was at this point that one could argue Thomas entered the 
fourth stage of nigrescence, internalization, where he began to develop a 
sense of security about his racial identity and began to establish 
meaningful relationships across racial boundaries, with perhaps the most 
important being one with John Danforth, a Yale alumnus and then the 
Republican Attorney General of Missouri, who hired Thomas to serve as 
counsel for the state department of revenue and the tax commission.188   
 In 1975, Thomas furthered his break with the black left as he 
discovered the work of Thomas Sowell, a black conservative 
economist.189  In 1980, Thomas would enter what seemed to be the last 
and final stage of nigrescence, internalization-commitment, after being 
invited by Sowell to the Fairmont Conference in San Francisco, 
California, a conference for black conservatives who were seeking “an 
alternative to the consistently leftist thinking of the civil rights leadership 
and the general black leadership.”190  At this conference, Thomas found 
his home, thereby beginning his entrenchment in the Republican Party and 
developing an ideology and course of action for addressing his concerns 
about the plight of individuals in the black community.191
 
Decisions, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1998, at A5). 
186 See Stephen Henderson, Clarence Thomas Urges UGA Law Graduates to 
Persevere, MACON TELEGRAPH, May 18, 2003, at 1; see also GREENYA, supra note 5, at 
70 (quoting Thomas as saying “‘Prospective employers dismissed our grades and 
diplomas . . . assuming we got both primarily because of preferential treatment”).  
According to Justice Thomas, he still possesses the rejection letters from law firms in 
Atlanta.  See id. 
187  See Henderson, supra note 186, at 1. 
188  See Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75. 
189  See Thomas, supra note 30, at 5.  
190  Id. 
191  Id.; GREENYA, supra note 5, at 89 (stating that “Sowell’s main thesis of black 
self-sufficiency and avoidance . . . of ‘victimization mentality’ resonated deeply within 
the still-young Clarence Thomas”).  Thomas described his experience at and after the 
conference as both uplifting and depressing.  He stated, “For those of us who had 
wandered in the desert of political and ideological alienation, we had found a home, we 
had found each other.  For me, this was also the beginning of public exposure that would 
change my life and raise my blood pressure and anxiety level.  After returning from San 
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 In 1981, Ronald Reagan appointed Thomas to serve as the 
assistant secretary for the Civil Rights Division in the Department of 
Education.192  According to Thomas, he “initially resisted and declined 
taking the position of assistant secretary for civil rights simply because 
[his] career was not in civil rights and [he] had no intention of moving 
into th[e] area.”193  Although Thomas was sure that his appointment was 
due to his race, he ultimately decided to accept the position upon 
persuasion from friends.194  According to Thomas, during his tenure as 
assistant secretary, he held “strategy meetings among blacks who were 
interested in approaching the problems of minorities and who were willing 
to admit error and redirect their energies in a positive way.”195
 After spending only ten months in the position at the Department 
of Education, Thomas was then promoted to become the Chair of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).196  The Reagan 
Administration’s failure to view Thomas as anything other than a black 
man, however, became clear upon the confirmation to a second term as 
Chairman of the EEOC.  At the confirmation, the then-Assistant Attorney 
General Brad Reynolds toasted Thomas, declaring that Thomas was “the 
epitome of the right kind of affirmative action working the right way.” 197
On July 11, 1989, the first President Bush nominated Clarence 
Thomas to the United States Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit.198  Less 
than two years later, on July 1, 1991, President Bush then nominated 
Judge Clarence Thomas to succeed Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
who had just resigned from the Supreme Court days before.199  Former 
 
Francisco, the Washington Post printed a major op-ed article about me and my views 
presented at the ‘Fairmont Conference.’  Essentially, the article listed my opposition to 
affirmative action as well as my concerns about welfare.  The resulting outcry was 
consistently negative.”  Thomas, supra note 30, at 6. 
192 See GREENYA, supra note 6, at 90. 
193  Thomas, supra note 30, at 6; see also Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra 
note 56, at 75.   
194  See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 90; see also ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, 
CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 186 (2001). 
195  Thomas, supra note 30, at 6. 
196  See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 90. 
197   Quoted in Merida & Fletcher, supra note 176, at 24; see also GREENYA, supra 
note 5, at 127. 
198 See GREENYA, supra note 5, at 149. 
199 See Evelyn Wilson, Comment, Comments On “An Open Letter to Justice 
Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague,” 20 S. U. L. REV. 141, 141 (1993). 
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President Bush asserted that Thomas was “the best qualified person for 
the job on the merits”200 behind snickers that Thomas’s lack of judicial 
experience and his law school record hardly made him qualified for the 
job.201
Although an overall majority of Blacks supported Clarence 
Thomas’s nomination to the Court,202 his nomination caused an uproar 
among some prominent feminist and minority civil rights groups,203 
 
200 Quoted in Justice Clarence Thomas, A Classic Example of an Affirmative Action 
Baby, J. BLACKS HIGHER. EDUC., Jan., 31, 1998, at 36; see also GREENYA, supra note 5, 
at 171 (stating that President Bush was supposed to refer to Judge Thomas as the “best 
man” for the job instead of the “best qualified”).  Many of Thomas’s critics contend that 
his appointment to the bench was the result of  “affirmative action.”  For example, at the 
time of Thomas’s appointment, Democratic Senator Joseph Biden stated, “Had Thomas 
been white, he never would have been nominated.  The only reason he is on the Court is 
because he is black.”  Id.; see also Edward Lazarus, Making Sense of Thomas’ Cross 
Burning Remarks and First Amendment Law (noting “that Thomas’s qualifications, 
compared to those of other potential candidates, were limited”), available at 
www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/26/findlaw.analysis.lazarus.thomas. 
201  See Maureen Dowd, Could Thomas Be Right?, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at 25 
(mocking that “Thomas was nominated by the first President Bush with the preposterous 
claim that he was the ‘best qualified’ man for the job”); Christopher Edley Jr., Doubting 
Thomas: Law, Politics and Hypocrisy, WASH. POST, July 7, 1991, at B1(arguing that 
Thomas professionally less distinguished than all the Justices except Kennedy and 
Souter).   
202  Polls showed that anywhere from 50% to 70% of Blacks supported Thomas’s 
nomination.  See Peggy Peterman, Most Blacks Glad Thomas Confirmed, Now Want Him 
to Change, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991, at 13A (“[M]ore [black people] were 
for Clarence Thomas than were against him, but it’s close. . . .  [A] sizable number of black 
people say they simply want an African-American on the U.S. Supreme Court. If it’s got to be 
a tarnished Clarence Thomas, so be it. That’s what happens when it takes so long for a group 
of people, such as African-Americans, to get recognition.”).  The reasons for supporting 
Thomas varied.  Some Blacks believed that Thomas would prove to be an advocate for civil 
rights while on the bench.  Others were more skeptical, such as Joseph Lowery of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a supporter who explained that he was willing 
to support Thomas during his confirmation hearings “because ‘[he] figured that if a white 
man named [Hugo] Black could learn to think colored, then a Negro named Tom might 
learn to think black.’” Jeffrey Rosen, Moving On, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29 & May 6, 1996, 
at 68. 
203 See Joyce A. Baugh & Christopher E. Smith, Doubting Thomas: Confirmation 
Veracity Meets Performance Reality, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 455, 467 (1996) (describing 
several feminist organizations that opposed Thomas).  Even in everyday public 
circumstances, Justice Thomas draws harsh criticisms from his challengers.  For instance, 
while standing in a public library with childhood friend Lester Johnson, a woman 
approached Justice Thomas and his company to say “I just wanted to see what a group of 
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especially after allegations of sexual harassment from Anita Hill, a black 
female graduate of Yale Law School graduate who had worked with 
Thomas at the Department of Education and the EEOC. 204  Hill claimed 
that Thomas sexually harassed her during her tenure in those departments. 
After Hill’s sexual harassment charge was leaked to the press, Congress 
presided over public hearings that questioned both Thomas and Hill about 
the charge.205   
In response to the challenges to his nomination and 
appointment,206 Thomas famously called the Thomas-Hill hearings a 
 
Uncle Toms look like.”  Merida & Fletcher, supra note 176, at 8.  Additionally, Leonard 
Small, a childhood friend of Justice Clarence Thomas, said of him, “People don’t 
understand why we call people Uncle Toms. . . .  But in the novel [Uncle Tom’s Cabin], 
Eliza ran from slavery and Uncle Tom stayed.  While we are trying to run for freedom, 
Clarence Thomas is not only staying, he’s telling.”  Id. at 27. 
Thomas was also heavily criticized for how he lambasted his sister in public.     
Thomas once said of his sister, “She gets mad when the mailman is late with her welfare 
check.”  Williams, A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75; see also GREENYA, 
supra note 5, at 17.  At the time, Thomas made these comments about his sister, she was 
not on welfare.  Thomas’s sister later explained why she had ever been on public 
assistance, stating that “[w]hen she was on welfare . . . she was not only taking care of 
her kids but had responsibility for her elderly aunt, who raised her, and an uncle.”  
Merida & Fletcher, supra note 176, at 28.  To her, her choice was simple–“[She] had a 
choice of taking care of these old people or keeping a job.”  See id. 
 204  See Scott D. Gerber, Justice Clarence Thomas: First Term, First Impressions, 
35 HOW. L.J. 115, 116 (1992).  According to a Washington Post article in 1992, “the 
public believed Anita Hill by a margin of 53 percent to 37 percent.”  JOHN C. DANFORTH, 
RESURRECTION 200 (1994) (citing Richard Morin, Harassment Consensus Grows; Poll 
Finds Greater Awareness of Misconduct, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1992, at A1). 
205   See Adrienne D. Davis and Stephanie Wildman, The Legacy of Doubt: 
Treatment of Race and Sex in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1367, 1369-
72 (1992) (noting that National Public Radio correspondent Nina Totenberg aired the 
complaint, which caused Congress to delay Thomas’s confirmation vote to hold hearings 
on Hill’s allegations). 
206  The Latino/a community is experiencing a similar debate regarding the 
nomination of Miguel Estrada to the United States D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Indeed, Estrada has been called “a Justice Clarence Thomas in the making, a young 
lawyer thrust toward the Supreme Court as a conservative ideologue no more 
representative of Hispanics than Thomas was of blacks.”  Frank Davies, Bush Court 
Nominee Raises Liberal Hackles – Critics Characterize Honduran-American as Far-
Right Ideologue Lacking In Experience, STAR LEDGER, Jan. 6, 2002, at 29.  Many liberals 
hope that “Latino groups will learn from the lessons of the Clarence Thomas nomination, 
eschew the misguided racialist solidarity that entrapped many African Americans, and do 
the right thing . . . [which is] oppos[e] the nomination of Miguel Estrada.”  Calmore, 
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“high-tech lynching for uppity blacks who in any way deign to think for 
themselves.”207  In so doing, he abandoned black conservatives’ rejection 
of what they call victimology and has been heavily criticized by many 
persons for claiming racism after chastising others for doing the same in 
the past.208  Despite Hill’s allegations of harassment and the extreme 
opposition to Thomas’s confirmation by prominent organizations on the 
left, Thomas was confirmed as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. 
His confirmation was by the narrowest margin in modern history, 52-
48.209   
 The enormous support that Thomas received from the first President 
 
supra note 21, at 211-12. 
 207  Hearings, supra note 160, at 157 (testimony of Clarence Thomas).  Thomas 
further claimed that the hearings regarding Hill’s allegations were “a message that you 
[meaning Blacks] kow-tow to an old order, this is what will happen to you, you will be 
lynched, destroyed, caricatured by a committee of the U.S. Senate, rather than hung from 
a tree.”  Hearings, supra note 160, at 157 (testimony of Clarence Thomas). 
208  See, e.g., Donna Britt, Those Fateful, Hateful Hearings, WASH. Post, Oct. 15, 
1991, at E01 (“What else do I hate?  The warp speed with which bootstrapper 
extraordinaire Clarence Thomas adopts the pose of black victim whenever it suits him.”); 
Brent Staples, Lynching, as Surreal Slogan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991 (“Judge Thomas 
has consistently played the race card. . . .  Clarence Thomas has always benefited from 
his race and victimization. It’s just that he has made his case slyly, in subtext, most 
recently with his sharecropper grandfather in the starring role. . . .  Who lynched whom? 
Judge Thomas’s appeal to that brutal imagery was at once his shrewdest and most 
deplorable tactic.”). Many individuals have criticized Thomas for “playing the race card” 
by claiming to be a victim of a “high-tech lynching” during his confirmation hearings, not 
only because Thomas sought to downplay his race in his professional life, but also 
because Thomas’s accuser was not a white, but a black, woman.  See Merida & Fletcher, 
supra note 176, at 11 (quoting five black law professors at University of North Carolina 
as stating “in a nation ‘in which African Americans are disproportionately poor, 
undereducated, imprisoned and politically compromised . . ., identity–racial identity–very 
clearly matters.  Were that not the case, Justice Thomas, for all his claims to the contrary, 
could not have declared himself the victim of a ‘high-tech lynching’ during the heated 
opposition to his appointment to the Supreme Court’”); see also Kendall Ford, Strange 
Fruit, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER:  ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE 
THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992), at 364 
 (noting the irony in Thomas claiming a lynching when the alleged victim was a black 
woman); Eleanor Clift, McLaughlin Group (October 12, 1991) (“Using racism when civil 
rights organizations oppose him, when his accuser is black, and when he himself has 
walked away from the civil rights movement and affirmative action is really intellectual 
dishonesty. . . .  [Anita Hill] has done nothing to suggest she has a credibility problem, 
whereas Clarence Thomas has done a lot to suggest that he can lie pretty easily.”). 
209  See FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 47.  
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Bush’s administration,210 as well as many prominent white Republican 
Congressmen and politicians,211 only worked to heighten suspicions 
among the black community.212  One of the most vocal critics of Thomas 
both before and after his nomination was the highly regarded Judge Leon 
Higginbotham, the late federal judge from the United States Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  In fact, after Thomas was seated on the Court, Judge 
Higginbotham published a letter to Justice Thomas in the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review that condemned the Justice for his critique of 
civil rights organizations and lawyers and urged Justice Thomas to use his 
new role to “assure equal justice under laws for all persons.”213   
 
210 George H.W. Bush and his administration had been heavily criticized for having 
“racist” politics.  For example, Bush was lambasted for utilizing a demonized image of 
Willie Horton in television advertisements during his campaign as a means of 
engendering fear in middle and upper class white Americans.  Willie Horton was a black 
criminal who, while on a work release program of the Dukakis governorship, raped and 
murdered a white woman.  See Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-coding” Racial 
Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. R. & L. 626-27 
(2000) (describing how former President Bush used Willie Horton to appeal to Whites’ 
racism and fear of black male criminals). 
211 In defense of Justice Thomas, Republican Senator Danforth, a friend and former 
supervisor, asserted, “What Clarence is all about . . . is that in this country you should 
have the freedom to think what you want to think, whether you’re black, white, or 
anything else.”  David Gergen, The Brief on Clarence Thomas, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, July 15, 1991.  Additionally, David Duke, a “former” white supremacist openly 
declared support for Thomas’s nomination.  Likewise, Strom Thurmond, a once staunch 
segregationist, became one of Thomas’s strongest supporters.  See Hearings, supra note 
160, at 22-25 (testimony of Clarence Thomas). 
212 See Smith, supra note 81, at 11 (stating “there is something wrong when white 
men rally around a black man.  Why would all these white senators rally around this 
black man?  After all, this is America.”).   
213   A. Leon Higginbotham, An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a 
Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005, 1028 (1992).  But see Wilson, 
supra note 199, at 145–47 (defending Justice Thomas’s right to vote conservatively and 
“make his contribution in his own way”).   
During his confirmation hearings, Clarence Thomas asserted that he recognized the 
sacrifices that many civil rights activists had made for him, stating:  
So many others gave their lives, their blood, their talents. But for 
them I would not be here. Justice Marshall, whose seat I have been 
nominated to fill, is one of those who had the courage and the intellect. He 
is one of the great architects of the legal battles to open doors that seemed 
so hopelessly and permanently sealed and to knock down barriers that 
seemed so insurmountable to those of us in the Pin Point, Georgias of the 
world.  
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In contrast to the white conservative community, which has 
consistently praised Justice Thomas as one of the brightest judicial 
figures, much of the black community has largely ignored or ridiculed the 
Justice.214  Numerous protests and challenges to Justice Thomas’s 
appearance at several events indicate that it is unlikely that any wholesale 
approval of the Justice from the much of black community will occur in 
the near future.215   
 
The civil rights movement, Reverend Martin Luther King and the 
SCLC, Roy Wilkins and the NAACP, Whitney Young and the Urban 
League, Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Dorothy Hite, they changed 
society and made it reach out and affirmatively help. I have benefited 
greatly from their efforts. But for them there would have been no road to 
travel.  
Hearings, supra note 160, at 109 (testimony of Clarence Thomas)). 
214   Calmore, supra note 21, at 180.  For example, for the past seven years, Ebony 
Magazine has not listed Justice Thomas as one of the 100 most influential African-
Americans.  Thomas has been consistently ridiculed within the black and liberal 
communities.  For example, Emerge Magazine twice parodied the Justice on its cover.  In 
the first cartoon, Thomas was wearing an Aunt Jemina-style headscarf.  In the second 
cartoon, Thomas was pictured as a lawn jockey standing in front of the Supreme Court.  
Inside the pages of the magazine, there was drawing of Clarence Thomas shining the 
shoes of Justice Scalia.  See George E. Curry & Trevor W. Coleman, Uncle Thomas:  
Lawn Jockey of the Far Right, EMERGE, Nov. 1996, at 38. 
215  Most recently,  on February 28, 2002, five black law professors at the University 
of North Carolina boycotted Justice Thomas’s visit to the law school.    These law 
professors have been named “The Law School Five.”  Along with their boycott, the five 
professors issued a statement.  It reads in part: 
 On Wednesday, March 6, 2002, Clarence Thomas, Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, will visit the 
University of North Carolina School of Law. Plans for his visit include 
a breakfast with students, lunch and coffee with the faculty, visits to 
selected classes, and an afternoon appearance at the Carolina Club. 
And while many law students, faculty, staff, and alumni are expected 
to participate in the day's events, we the law school’s five African-
American faculty members will not join them. Although it has been 
reported in the local press that the law school is “delighted” to have 
Justice Thomas visit, we emphatically do not share that delight. 
 For many people who hold legitimate expectations for racial 
equality and social justice, Justice Thomas personifies the cruel irony 
of the fireboat burning and sinking. For some--certainly, for us--his 
visit adds insult to injury. We note, parenthetically, that Justice 
Thomas follows the recent visits of Justices Scalia and O’Connor. 
Thus, within the last few years the law school will have brought to the 
 
 
 
      55  
 
                                                                                                                                          
Thomas’s own reaction to the protests against his appearances 
exhibits his hurt at being shunned and rejected by the black community.  
In 1998, Justice Thomas spoke at the annual convention of the National 
Bar Association, the largest organization of black attorneys and judges, 
after much protest and debate.216  In his speech to the members of the 
 
campus three of the five justices who have voted consistently to turn 
back the clock on racial progress. 
 We live, today, in a United States that increasingly calls on 
African Americans to disavow the salience of race in American life, to 
claim that identity doesn’t matter, and that race consciousness in any 
and every form is pernicious, even when it seeks to rectify racial 
wrongs. But in a United States in which African Americans are 
disproportionately poor, undereducated, imprisoned, and politically 
compromised, identity--racial identity--very clearly matters. Were that 
not the case, Justice Thomas, for all his claims to the contrary, could 
not have declared himself the victim of a “high-tech lynching” during 
the heated opposition to his appointment to the Supreme Court. 
 Accordingly, Justice Thomas is not just another Supreme 
Court justice with whom we disagree. Rather, as a justice, he not only 
engages in acts that harm other African Americans like himself, but 
also gives aid, comfort, and racial legitimacy to acts and doctrines of 
others that harm African Americans unlike himself--that is, those who 
have not yet reaped the benefits of civil rights laws, including 
affirmative action, and who have not yet received the benefits of the 
white-conservative sponsorships that now empower him. . . . 
Calmore, supra note 21, at 225 (Appendix). 
 216 See Richard Willing, Black Jurist Conference Begins with Controversy, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 25, 1998, at 7A. Numerous members of the National Bar Association 
complained and protested after its Chairman publicly announced the invitation for Justice 
Thomas to speak at the organization’s annual convention. Id. Judge A. Leon 
Higginbotham was among those who tried to have Thomas disinvited to the meeting.  In 
a letter circulated before the convention, he wrote, “It makes no more sense to invite 
Clarence Thomas than it would have for the National Bar Association to invite George 
Wallace for dinner the day after he stood in the schoolhouse door and shouted 
‘Segregation today and segregation forever.’” Quoted in Mona Charen, Rejection Is Price 
Thomas Pays for Keeping Integrity, FT. WORTH TELEGRAM, Aug. 2, 1998, at 4.   Despite 
this strong protest, several prominent black legal figures, came to Justice Thomas’s aid, 
most notably Judge Damon Keith, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit.  In 
fact, Judge Keith defended the invitation that was extended to the Justice, and the 
invitation was not withdrawn.   Indeed, Justice Thomas refused to cancel his appearance 
at the convention.  See Vern Smith & Ellis Cose, The Obligations of Race, NEWSWEEK, 
Aug. 10, 1998, at 53. 
 The National Bar Association’s annual conference and the University of North 
Carolina have not been the only places where an appearance by Clarence Thomas has 
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National Bar Association, Justice Thomas defended his right to “think for 
himself.”217  In his highly charged speech, he asserted: 
 
It pains me deeply–more deeply than any of you can 
imagine–to be perceived by so many members of my race 
as doing them harm, all the sacrifice, all the long hours of 
preparation were to help, not hurt. . . . I have come here 
today not in anger or to anger, though my mere presence 
has been sufficient, obviously to anger some, nor have I 
come to defend my views, but rather to assert my right to 
think for myself, to refuse to have my ideas assigned to 
me, as though I was an intellectual slave.218
 
Clearly, Justice Thomas identifies strongly as a black man and believes 
that his ideologies are best suited to aid Blacks,219 but thus far, he has 
failed to meet the challenge convincing others that he is not a puppet of 
“forces hostile to his own people.”220
 
 
been boycotted by members of the black community.  For example, in 1996, school 
officials at a predominantly black middle school in Landover, Maryland revoked an 
invitation for Justice Thomas to speak at the school’s eighth grade graduation.   Parents 
and children successfully rallied to get Justice Thomas reinvited as a speaker. See Jackie 
Cissell, Justice Clarence Thomas:  He’s Not Going Away, No Matter How Hard His 
Critics Pray, NEW VISIONS COMMENT., at 1.  Likewise, two black board members of the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii resigned after the organization invited Justice 
Thomas to speak in a debate on affirmative action.  See Merida & Fletcher, supra note 
176, at 11.  One of the black board members, Eric Ferrer, proclaimed that inviting Justice 
Thomas would be like “inviting Hitler to come speak on the rights of Jews.”  Id. at 11; 
Calmore, supra note 21, at 180. 
217  Clarence Thomas, I Am a Man, a Black Man, an American, July 29, 1998, 
available at http://douglassarchives.org/thom_b30.htm 
218  Id. 
 219  It is clear from his words that Justice Thomas is hurt by his ostracism from the 
black community.  Essayist Debra Dickerson said the following about the Justice after 
she engaged in long conversations with him about the difficulties that black Republicans 
face:  “I  think he would clearly love his relationship with the black community to be 
different . . .  There is a wistfulness there.  You can’t be outside of the fold and not feel it. 
. . .  He is the lowest of the low in sort of official blackdom.  It’s unfair, and it’s got to 
hurt.”  Quoted in Merida & Fletcher, supra note 176, at 11. 
220   Hill, supra note 63, at 28. 
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III.  BLACK ROBE, BLACK VOICE 
 
Although many Blacks and Whites refuse to see Justice Thomas as 
anything other than an “Uncle Tom,”221 his jurisprudence on certain 
issues, regardless of whether one views his ideologies as beneficial to 
black people, speaks volumes as to whether he is a “slave” of any white 
conservative, including Justice Scalia.  In particular, when considered in 
light of the philosophies that have developed into black conservative 
thought, which focuses on the effects of certain policies and programs on 
black people as opposed to mere principles of formal equality, one can 
readily see that Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence on issues, such as 
education and desegregation, affirmative action, and crime, are rooted in 
black conservative ideology. This Part evaluates and analyzes selected 
Supreme Court opinions and explicates how Justice Thomas embraces 
various strands of black conservative thought (as distinct from white 
conservative ideology) in his opinions. 
 
A. Education/Desegregation 
 
I am the only one at this table who attended a segregated school.  And 
the problem with segregation was not that we didn’t have white people 
in our class.  The problem was that we didn’t have equal facilities.  We 
didn’t have heating, we didn’t have books, and we had rickety chairs.  
All society owed us was equal resources and an equal opportunity to 
make something of ourselves. 
 
–Clarence Thomas, in 1995 at the Justices’ 
conference in which Missouri v. Jenkins 
was discussed222
 
As noted earlier, a significant component of black conservative 
thought on education is its critique of the strategy that was employed by 
civil rights activists in their efforts to improve the lot of black children in 
public schools.223  For many black conservatives (and even to some black 
 
221  Justice Thomas is not the only person to be labeled a traitor to the race.  Many 
other black conservatives, including J.C. Watts, Colin Powell, Condoleeza Rice, and 
Shelby Steele “have been labeled expedients, Uncle Toms, oreos, [and] sell-outs.”  See 
WATTS, supra note 67, at 3. 
222  Quoted in Rosen, supra note 202, at 66. 
223  See supra Part I(B)(2). 
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liberals today),224 this strategy focused far too much on an integrative 
ideal, and not enough on improving the actual educational opportunities 
and resources available to black children.225   
More importantly, this idea that the past civil rights strategy 
improperly relied on the belief that integration in itself was the solution to 
educational inequalities is one that Justice Thomas has expressed 
repeatedly, both on and off the bench.   For example, even before Thomas 
sat on the Court, he articulated these very same criticisms, stating: 
 
There were grand opportunities for them to focus on the 
proper education of minority kids, the kids who are getting 
the worst education, and instead they’re talking about 
integration. God–I went to segregated schools. You can 
really learn how to read off those books, even if white 
folks aren’t there. I think segregation is bad, I think it’s 
wrong, it’s immoral. I’d fight against it with every breath 
in my body, but you don’t need to sit next to a white 
person to learn how to read and write. The NAACP needs 
to say that.226
Additionally, in response to a question by Senator Specter during his 
confirmation hearings on September 16, 1991, Thomas asserted: 
The concern that a number of us raise with respect to just 
as individuals in this society, as individuals who have 
watched the changes in our country, was simply that if we 
could demonstrate that the educational opportunities were 
 
224  See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr, Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice:  
Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401 (1993).  
Derrick Bell, professor of law at New York University School of Law, has even asserted 
that he would have dissented from Brown, arguing that the Court should have enforced 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which established the concept of separate but 
equal.  
225  See Hill, supra note 63, at 30. 
226 Quoted in Bill Kauffman, Clarence Thomas, available at 
http://reason.com/cthomasint.shtml; see also GREENYA, supra note 5, at 33 (noting 
that Thomas stated that the nuns in the all-black school he attended gave “the same 
tests the white schools took” and that “[t]hey refused to let [Thomas and his 
classmates] buy into the notion that [they] could never do well, despite all the 
stereotypes of inferiority around [them]”). 
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improving for minorities, then whether it is busing or any 
other technique, then use it, but make sure that we are 
helping these young kids. That was totally out of the legal 
context. That just simply would have been a preference 
that I expressed as a citizen.227
 As a Supreme Court Justice, Thomas received his first opportunity 
to insert these principles into his jurisprudence in United States v.  
Fordice.228  In Fordice, a lawsuit was filed against the State of 
Mississippi, alleging that despite the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board 
of Education,229 the state had continued its policy of de jure segregation in 
its public university system by maintaining five almost completely white 
universities and three almost exclusively black universities.  In filing this 
lawsuit, the plaintiffs referenced the state’s history of discrimination in its 
public university system.230  In particular, the plaintiffs specified that the 
University of Mississippi had only admitted its first black student in 1962, 
which was eight years after the first decision in Brown, and even then only 
under court order.231  Additionally, they explained that, although, in 1973, 
the state had devised a plan (one that was rejected by the United States 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) to disestablish the de jure 
segregated university system, the state had refused to fund the plan until 
1978, five years later, and even then with only half the amount 
requested.232  Finally, they concluded that, by the mid-1980s, more than 
ninety-nine percent of Mississippi’s white students were enrolled at the 
five almost completely white universities, and seventy-one percent of the 
state’s black students were enrolled at the three almost exclusively black 
universities.233
 In deciding whether the State of Mississippi had met its 
 
227 Hearings, supra note 160, at 489 (testimony of Thomas). 
228 505 U.S. 717 (1992). 
229 See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).   In Brown I, the Supreme Court held that state-
mandated segregation in public educational institutions was unconstitutional, and in 
Brown II, the Supreme Court ordered an end to segregated public education “with all 
deliberate speed.” 
230  See id. at 723-25. 
231 See Meredith v. Fair, 306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962). 
232  See id. at 722-23. 
233  See id. at 724-25. 
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affirmative duty to dismantle its prior dual university system, the Court 
first noted that a state does not satisfy “its constitutional obligations until 
it eradicates policies and practices traceable to its prior de jure dual 
system that continue to foster segregation.”234  The Court then held that 
the fact that college attendance is by choice in the higher education 
context is not sufficient in itself to show that a state has abandoned its 
dual, race-based system.235  “If policies traceable to the de jure system are 
still in force and have discriminatory effects, those policies too must be 
reformed to the extent practicable and consistent with sound educational 
practices.”236   The Court further held that, had the Fifth Circuit applied 
the correct standard to the plaintiffs’ claims, it may have concluded that 
Mississippi’s policies regarding admissions standards, program 
duplication in the black and white institutions, and mission assignments, 
although race neutral, substantially restricted students’ choices of which 
institution to enter based on race and remanded the case.237   
Justice Thomas authored a concurrence in Fordice, agreeing with 
the majority’s ruling that a state does not satisfy its “obligation to 
dismantle a dual system of higher education merely by adopting race-
neutral policies” and the standard that the majority had established for 
evaluating desegregation in the higher education context.238  In so doing, 
Justice Thomas began his concurrence with a quote from W.E.B. DuBois, 
who had once argued that all-black schools could be more conducive to 
advancing the learning of black children than integrated schools.239  
 
234  Id. at 728. 
235  Id. at 729. 
236  Id. 
237  Id. at 732–43. 
238  Id. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
239  See id. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also W.E. Burghardt DuBois, Does 
the Negro Need Separate Schools, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328 (1935). Justice Thomas’s 
reference to DuBois is ironic, given DuBois’s strong opposition to Washington.  It is also 
ironic because DuBois’s argument, as clarified later, rested on the idea that Blacks should 
rally behind separate schools as a practical matter because of Whites’ hostility to Blacks. 
 See id. at 330 (arguing that there must be separate schools “because of an attitude on the 
part of white people which is not going materially to change in our time”).  In this sense, 
the segregation was not by choice, but by concession; it is segregation by individual 
choice that Justice Thomas does not contest and bases his jurisprudence on 
desegregation.  See supra Part I; see also Sheryll Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs 
and the State of Integration: A Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 729, 730, 733-34 (2001) (maintaining that, for some of the black 
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Noting DuBois’s statement that  “‘[w]e must rally to the defense of our 
schools,’”240 Thomas explained that he wrote a separate concurrence to 
emphasize that the standard applied in Fordice did not compel the 
elimination of racial balance within the system as required in the grade-
school context and thus would not necessitate the “destruction of 
historically black colleges nor the severing of those institutions from their 
distinctive histories and traditions.”241   
Although Justice Thomas agreed that a court could assume 
discriminatory intent from policies adopted during the de jure era to 
produce segregative effects and that continued to produce such effects, he 
stressed the majority’s holding that these policies must be reformed and 
analyzed in accordance with sound educational practices.242  In so doing, 
Justice Thomas focused on historically black colleges and universities, 
noting their value in and of themselves despite the racist reasons behind 
the creation and development of many such colleges and universities.243  
Furthermore, Justice Thomas expressed concern that, if courts foreclosed 
the possibility that there were sound educational justifications for 
maintaining historically black colleges and universities, such schools, 
which had maintained a significant value as a learning ground for 
numerous black leaders and allowed for the upward mobility of many 
Blacks, would be destroyed, ultimately depriving young black students of 
an opportunity to attend college.244  Again, as his fellow black 
conservatives have expressed over time, Justice Thomas expressed worry 
that black students would lose out on an important educational benefit 
simply for the sake of integration alone.245   As Justice Thomas noted, 
 
middle-class, the decision to live in an all-black neighborhood is an “acceptance of defeat 
in trying to fully enter the American mainstream” based on a desire to escape racism by 
Whites in their own homes and neighborhoods). 
240  Fordice, 505 U.S. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting W.E.B. DuBois, 
Schools, 13 THE CRISIS 111, 112 (1917)). 
241  Id. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
242  See id. at 745-48 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
243  See id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Mark Tushnet, Clarence 
Thomas’s Black Nationalism, 47 HOW. L.J. 323, 337-38 (2004) (noting that Justice 
Thomas “praises predominantly black institutions as valuable in themselves). 
244 See id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Scott Gerber, Justice 
Clarence Thomas and the Jurisprudence of Race, 25 S.U. L. REV. 43 (1997) 
(analyzing Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Fordice). 
245  See id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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historically black colleges and universities are “a symbol of the highest 
attainments of black culture,” and “it would be ironic, to say the least, if 
the institutions that sustained blacks during segregation were themselves 
destroyed in an effort to combat its vestiges.” 246   
Moreover, Justice Thomas’s focus in his concurrence was highly 
different from that of Justice Scalia, who concurred in part and dissented 
in part.247  While Justice Scalia agreed that Mississippi was required under 
the Constitution to remove discriminatory barriers at its public universities 
and colleges, that this requirement did not mandate equal funding between 
the historically white and historically black institutions, and that 
Mississippi’s admissions requirements needed to be reviewed, he chose to 
focus his energies on the ambiguities in the majority’s standard for 
evaluating the efficacy of a state’s efforts to diseatablish de jure 
segregation.248  Specifically, he criticized and rejected the majority’s test 
as ambiguous and unattainable.249  Although Justice Scalia agreed with 
Justice Thomas that the standards that applied to evaluating a formerly de 
jure system in the grade school context did not apply in the higher 
education context, Justice Scalia questioned what the majority meant by 
requiring that the state’s prior de jure system must be eliminated to the 
extent practicable and consistent with educational practices.250  For Justice 
Scalia, the former de jure states had only one duty: “to eliminate 
discriminatory obstacles to admission.”251  Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice 
Scalia joined in the majority only in so far as it held that Mississippi failed 
to meet its burden to show that it had eliminated intentional 
 
246  Id. at 748-49 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON 
HIGHER EDUCATION, FROM ISOLATION TO MAINSTREAM:  PROBLEMS OF THE COLLEGES 
FOUNDED FOR NEGROES 11 (1971)) (“The colleges founded for Negroes are both a source 
of pride to blacks who have attended them and a source of hope to black families who 
want the benefits of higher learning for their children.  They have exercised leadership in 
developing educational opportunities for young blacks at all levels of instruction, and, 
especially in the South, they are still regarded as key institutions for enhancing the 
general quality of the lives of black Americans.”). 
247  See id. at 749 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
248  Id. at 749–55 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
249  See id. at 750-53 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
250  Id. at 752–53 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
251  Fordice, 505 U.S. at 755 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Establishment of neutral admission standards, not the eradication of all ‘policies 
traceable to the de jure system . . . having discriminatory effects’ is what Hawkins is 
about.”) (citations omitted). 
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discriminatory admission standards.  To Justice Scalia, it was the 
unattainable and vague standards that proved most troublesome,252 and not 
necessarily the continued survival of “a symbol of the highest attainments 
of black culture.”253
 Three years after Fordice, Justice Thomas sat on another case, 
Missouri v. Jenkins,254 which addressed another state’s attempts to remedy 
previously mandated segregation by law––this time, the State of Missouri. 
In that case, the State of Missouri challenged the district court’s orders 
requiring the state to fund salary increases for instructional and non-
instructional staff within the Kansas City, Missouri, School District and to 
continue to fund remedial quality education programs because student 
achievement levels were still at or below national norms at all grade 
levels.255  The salary increases and the remedial quality education 
programs were part of a larger, proposed plan to convert the district’s 
public schools into magnet schools that “would draw non-minority 
students from private schools who have abandoned or avoided [the school 
district], and draw in additional non-minority students from the 
suburbs.”256
 In ruling on the State of Missouri’s challenge to the district court’s 
remedial orders for the school district, the Supreme Court, in an opinion 
 
252  Justice Scalia concluded:  
What I do predict is a number of years of litigation-driven 
confusion and destabilization in the university systems of all the 
formerly de jure States, that will benefit neither blacks nor whites, 
neither predominantly black institutions nor predominately white 
ones. Nothing good will come of this judicially ordained turmoil, 
except the public recognition that any court that would knowingly 
impose it must hate segregation. We must find some other way of 
making that point. 
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 762 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
253  Justice Scalia did comment, however, on how the Fordice decision could 
negatively impact historically black colleges and universities.  For example, Justice 
Scalia interpreted the decision as preventing the adoption of any policy to provide equal 
funding to both black and white institutions because “equal funding, like program 
duplication, facilitates continued segregation–enabling students to attend schools where 
their own race predominates without paying a penalty in the quality of their education.”  
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 759 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
254  515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
255  See id. at 73. 
256 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 77. 
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authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the challenged orders were 
beyond the remedial authority of the district court.257  Specifically, in 
reviewing the authority by which the district could approve salary 
increases for instructional and non-instructional staff, the Court asserted 
that a proper analysis of the case would rest on whether the remedy “[wa]s 
necessarily designed . . . to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct 
to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such 
conduct.”258  The Court then held that the order approving across-the-
board salary increases was beyond the scope of the district court because 
it was grounded in an effort to “‘improv[e] the desegregative 
attractiveness’” of the school district, rather than to eliminate racially 
identifiable schools within the district.259  In addition, the Court 
determined that the district court’s order requiring the State to continue to 
fund remedial quality education programs was not an appropriate test for 
deciding whether the dual school system had achieved partial unitary 
status because it was grounded in an effort to improve student 
achievement levels to meet national norms, as opposed to focusing on 
“whether the reduction in achievement by minority students attributable to 
prior de jure segregation ha[d] been remedied to the extent practicable.”260 
 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the district court to 
determine if, consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion, the district 
court’s supervision should be withdrawn.261
As in Fordice, Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion to 
emphasize “a few thoughts with respect to the overall course of [the] 
litigation.”262  Obviously referring to the district plan to create a magnet 
school district that would attract white students and suburban students 
back to the district, Justice Thomas blasted the district court with the 
black conservative concept that a focus on integration unnecessarily 
withdraws attention from the quality of education that black children are 
receiving in schools in their own neighborhoods.  He wrote:  
 
 
257  See id. at 90-93. 
258 Id. at 89. 
259 Id. at 91–93, 98-100. 
260 Id. at 101. 
261  See id. at 102. 
262 Id. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing 
to assume that anything that is predominately black must 
be inferior.  Instead of focusing on remedying the harm 
done to those black schoolchildren injured by segregation, 
the District Court here sought to convert the Kansas City, 
Missouri, School District (KCMSD) into a “magnet 
district” that would reverse the “white flight” caused by 
desegregation.263
 
For Justice Thomas, he found the very idea of focusing on the creation of 
a school district that would attract Whites offensive because he believed 
that that idea rested on the notion that the school would automatically 
improve or be made better because its white population had returned.264  
Like his conservative counterparts, Justice Thomas’s main issue 
was black empowerment, not integration for integration’s sake. 265  As 
Justice Thomas expressed in his concurrence: 
 
Racial isolation itself is not a harm; only state-enforced 
segregation is.  After all, if separation is a harm, and if 
integration therefore is the only way that blacks can 
receive a proper education, then there must be something 
 
263 Id. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Brown, supra note 124, at 312–13 
(“Justice Thomas criticizes the focus on integration as a route to educational equality and 
encourages the black community to look within itself:  in other words, to exploit 
resources innovatively that presently exist in the black community.”). 
264 Id. at 114, 119 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that such ideas rest on an 
assumption of black inferiority). 
265 See id. at 121–22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Given that desegregation has not 
produced the predicted leaps forward in black educational achievement, there is no 
reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when surrounded when 
surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an integrated 
environment.”).  Cf. Michael A. Middleton, Brown v. Board:  Revisited, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
19, 21 (1995) (commenting that the author was bothered by the idea that the problem of 
addressing “damaging effects of segregation . . . can be corrected by the simple expedient 
of appropriately mixing Black and White bodies”).  But see Jose Felipe Anderson, 
Perspectives on Missouri v. Jenkins:  Abandoning the Unfinished Business of Public 
School Desegregation “With All Deliberate Speed,” 39 HOW. L.J. 693, 695 (1996) 
(arguing that we “must pursue integration even while acknowledging recent failures that 
have led some to call for the abandonment of techniques designed to integrate public 
schools”). 
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inferior about blacks.  Under this theory, segregation 
injures blacks because blacks, when left on their own, 
cannot achieve.266
  
Indeed, Justice Thomas took his argument one step further, again 
arguing as he did in Fordice, that predominantly black schools (despite 
their origins in state-enforced segregation) are often well-suited to provide 
education and direction to young black children for a variety of reasons.267 
 In particular, Thomas explained that, “[b]ecause of their distinctive 
histories and traditions, black schools can function as the center and 
symbol of black communities, and provide examples of independent black 
leadership, success, and achievement.”268  In sum, much like his fellow 
black conservatives, Justice Thomas was pointing to a symbol of African-
American history to show Blacks had repeatedly overcome segregation 
and other similar obstacles to educate themselves.  Only this time, as 
Thomas was contending, the legal obstacle of Jim Crow had been 
removed.   
In fact, Thomas’s concurrence in Jenkins has even been used by 
one author to support an Afrocentric curriculum that “articulates a vision 
of black culture which meets the intersubjective needs of black youth.”269 
 Much like Thomas and his black conservative cohorts, this author 
maintained that blacks should turn inward and construct creative remedies 
to utilize the resources within the community to advance academic 
achievement among black children.270
 
266 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 122 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also 
GREENYA, supra note 5, at 48 (“Thomas wants to know in every instance what 
integration means for blacks.  If it means losing the alternative of going to their own 
schools, running their own businesses, then he doesn’t like it.  He has too many scars 
from episodes in which, in the name of integration, he was the only black.”). 
267 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121-22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[Historically black 
schools] can be both a source of pride to blacks who have attended them and a source of 
hope to black families who want the benefits of . . . learning for their children.”). 
268  Id. at 122 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Brown, supra note 124, at 319 
(“Essentially, black educators took institutions that were scorned and resource-deprived, 
and turned them into thriving centers of academic excellence.  Moreover, these schools 
provide benefits that go far beyond the academic enrichment of individual students; often 
they accrue to the larger black community.”). 
269  Brown, supra note 124, at 314. 
270  See id. 
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Indeed, in Zellman v. Simmons-Harris,271 the case in which the 
Supreme Court held that a voucher program in Ohio did not violate the 
Establishment Clause,272 Justice Thomas himself expressed this concept 
of “turning inward,” starting with a quote by Frederick Douglass:  
“Education . . . means emancipation.  It means light and liberty.  It means 
the uplifting of the soul of man into the glorious light of truth, the light by 
which men can only be made free.”273  In so doing, Thomas highlighted 
that “failing urban public schools disproportionately affect minority 
children most in need of educational opportunity.”274  He also contended 
that just as Blacks had supported and fought for public education during 
Reconstruction, they now advocated school choice and voucher programs 
because it offered them a hope and means to educate properly their 
children despite struggling and failing communities.275  In essence, like 
his black fellow conservatives, he viewed these programs as vital because 
they gave minority parents a means of placing the reins back in their own 
hands––to rely on themselves and their choices for their children’s 
education. 
 
 
271 Zellman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002). 
272  For a discussion of constitutional questions raised under the religion clauses, see 
Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Vouchers, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 119 (2000) (discussing the need for careful constitutional limits on public funding 
of religious institutions). 
273  Id. at 2480 (Thomas, J., concurring). (quoting The Blessings of Liberty and 
Education: An Address Delivered in Manassas, Virginia, on 3 September 1894, in 5 THE 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 623 (J. Blassingame & J. McKivigan eds. 1992)). 
274  Id. at 2483 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
275  Zellman, 122 S. Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At the time of 
Reconstruction, blacks considered public education ‘a matter of personal liberation and a 
necessary function of a free society.’  Today, however, the promise of public school 
education has failed poor inner-city blacks. While in theory providing education to 
everyone, the quality of public schools varies significantly across districts. Just as blacks 
supported public education during Reconstruction, many blacks and other minorities now 
support school choice programs because they provide the greatest educational 
opportunities for their children in struggling communities.”); see also id. n.7 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“Minority and low-income parents express the greatest support for parental 
choice and are most interested in placing their children in private schools. ‘[T]he appeal 
of private schools is especially strong among parents who are low in income, minority, 
and live in low-performing districts:  precisely the parents who are the most 
disadvantaged under the current system.’) (citing T. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC 164 (2001)). 
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B. Affirmative Action 
 
[Clarence] Thomas’s critics may snigger that he is sitting comfortably 
in one of the most powerful seats in government, trying to tell 
everyone else to make it on merit. But this attitude only proves 
Thomas right. 
 
    –Robyn Blumer276
 
Justice Thomas’s stance on opposing affirmative action has 
received enormous press not only because it seems, to many, to be hostile 
to black interests but also because it looks as if Justice Thomas is rejecting 
his personal history.277  A number of Thomas’s critics condemn him for 
drawing up the ladder of affirmative action after he has climbed it.278  In 
response, Justice Thomas has asserted that his critics’ words only support 
his views on affirmative action, demonstrating how affirmative action 
negatively impacts those who have worked hard to achieve on their own 
by tagging them as beneficiaries of race-based preferences.279
 
276  Robyn Blumer, Thomas Opposes Affirmative Action Because of Experience, 
THE SALT LAKE TRIB., July 4, 2003, at  A13. 
277  See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master’s Tool to Dismantle His House: 
Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 1-5, on file with author) (describing how many 
commentators feel that Justice Thomas has pulled up the ladder of affirmative action after 
climbing it).  Justice Thomas denies ever being a beneficiary of affirmative action.  In an 
interview in the late 1980’s, Thomas once asserted, “This thing about how they let me 
into Yale – that kind of stuff offends me.  All they did was stop stopping us.”  Williams, 
A Question of Fairness, supra note 56, at 75.  Abraham Goldstein, Dean of Yale Law 
School from 1970 to 1975, and James Thomas, who was an admissions officer for Yale 
Law School when Clarence Thomas applied in 1971, assert otherwise.  For example, 
Dean Goldstein stated, He had “no doubt  . . . that in some measure Clarence was 
preferred because of his background.”  See Justice Clarence Thomas; A Classic Example 
of an Affirmative Action Baby, J. BLACKS HIGHER. EDUC., Jan., 31, 1998, at 35. 
278  See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Where Would Thomas Be Without Affirmative 
Action, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 26, 2003, at B7 (asserting that Thomas 
“could not make a powerful legal argument against racial preferences, given the fact 
that he got into Yale Law School and got picked for the Supreme Court thanks to his 
race”). 
279  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2362 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (affirmative action unfairly stigmatizes 
Blacks who would have been admitted based on “merit” alone and tars them as 
“undeserving”). 
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This alleged negative impact of affirmative action, however, is not 
the only element of Justice Thomas’s philosophy on that subject.  
Imbedded in Justice Thomas’s opposition to affirmative action are four 
other central ideas:  (1) that the approval and support of affirmative action 
by Whites is not void of self-interest, but is merely “window dressing” 
that is not designed to address true inequalities; (2) that affirmative action 
is actually harmful to Blacks because it causes low self-esteem among 
Blacks; (3) that affirmative action is harmful because it does not actually 
foster equality for Blacks, but instead reinforces a self-defeating sense of 
victimization; and (4) that affirmative action fails to assist the vast 
majority of poor black people, instead mostly assisting the black middle 
class and upper middle class. 280   
Thus, unlike white conservative ideology, which posits that 
affirmative action is unfair because it results in “reverse” discrimination 
against Whites, Justice Thomas’s philosophy and jurisprudence on 
affirmative action concentrates on what he views as its poisonous impact 
on the lives and psyche of Black people.  
The first affirmative action case from Justice Thomas’s tenure on 
the Supreme Court was Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.281  In that 
case, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the government’s practice of 
giving general contractors on government projects the financial incentive 
of additional compensation to hire subcontractors certified as small 
businesses controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged 
 
280 See generally Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350-62; see also Williams, Fairness, supra 
note 56, at 74; cf. Seth N. Asumah & Valencia Perkins, Black Conservatism and the 
Social Problems in Black America, J. BLACK STUDIES, at 64 (2000) (noting that “Black 
conservatives add a self-esteem portion to their position [on affirmative action], claiming 
that affirmative action destroys the self-image of Black people” and that Black 
conservatives “believe the pride of achievement is diluted because many Whites maintain 
that beneficiaries of affirmative action receive jobs, promotions, and school admissions 
without being qualified”); ”); STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION BABY (1992) (“The best black syndrome creates in those of us who have 
benefited from racial preferences  a peculiar contradiction.  We are told over and over 
that we were the best black people in our profession.  And we are flattered. . . .  But to 
professionals who have worked hard to succeed, flattery of this kind carries an unstable 
insult, for we yearn to be called what our achievements often deserve:  simply the best-no 
qualifiers needed.”).  Stephen Carter does not identify as a black conservative.  See id. at 
7 (“[M]y views on many matters are sufficiently to the left that I do not imagine the 
conservative movement would want me.”). 
281 515 U.S. 204 (1995). 
 
 
 
70   
 
                                                          
individuals” violated the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.282   The majority, with whom Thomas 
concurred, held that all racial classifications imposed by a federal, state, 
or local governmental actor, whether benign or not, must be analyzed by a 
reviewing court under strict scrutiny, meaning that all racial 
classifications imposed by a governmental actor have to serve a 
compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to further 
that interest.283   
Justice Scalia filed an opinion that concurred in part and concurred 
in the judgment of the majority’s opinion.284  He wrote that the 
“government can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on 
the basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the 
opposite direction.”285   Justice Scalia stressed that such a concept was 
foreign to the Constitution, which focuses on the individual.286
In writing his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas gave just a 
small taste of how his jurisprudence on affirmative action aligns with 
black conservative thought and differs from Justice Scalia’s.287   Like 
many of his fellow black conservatives, Justice Thomas did not focus on 
the harm that affirmative action causes to “innocent” white individuals, 
but instead expressed his views regarding what he deemed to be 
affirmative action’s harmful impact on minorities.  First, he noted his 
belief that there was a racial paternalism underlying the dissent’s view 
that distinctions could be made under the constitution “between laws 
designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis 
of race.”288  Then, he iterated his belief that affirmative action could be 
nothing other than harmful to Blacks and other minorities, stating that 
“there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended 
 
282  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205.  “Socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals” included “Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian 
Pacific Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual found to be 
disadvantaged by the [Small Business] Administration pursuant to section 8(a) of the 
Small Business Act.”  Id. at 205 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§637(d)(2), (3)). 
283  Id. at 227-30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
284  See id. at 227 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
285  Id. at 227-30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989)). 
286  See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
287  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
288  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of 
discrimination.”289  Finally, Justice Thomas moved on to identify what he 
believes to be the stigmatizing effects of the program on minorities, 
stating: 
 
So-called “benign” discrimination teaches many [Whites] 
that because of chronic and apparently immutable 
handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without 
their patronizing indulgence.  Inevitably such programs 
engender attitudes of superiority, or alternatively, provoke 
resentment among those who believe that they have been 
wronged by the government’s use of race.  [T]he programs 
stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause 
them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that 
they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”290
 
It would be nearly ten years before Justice Thomas would receive 
another occasion to incorporate core principles of black conservative 
thought into his jurisprudence on affirmative action.  That time would 
come with the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari on two cases from the 
Sixth Circuit concerning affirmative action at the University of Michigan, 
one in the undergraduate program for Literature, Science, and Arts 
program and the other in the law school. 
  The cases, Gratz v. Bollinger291 and Grutter v. Bollinger,292 ended 
a debate over the legality of affirmative action that had transpired since 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,293 the Supreme Court’s 
 
289  Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added) (stating that “there is a moral and constitutional 
equivalence between laws designed to subjugate race and those that distribute benefits on 
the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality” and that [g]overnment 
cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the 
law”). 
290 Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  Cf. WATTS, supra note 
67, at 206 (asserting that race-based solutions “feed on the notion that membership in a 
certain race is a handicap, a sure cause of underperformance”). 
291  123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003). 
292  123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
293  438 U.S. 265 (1978).  In Bakke, the Supreme Court reviewed a racial set-aside 
program that reserved 16 out of 100 seats in a medical school class for members of 
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decision on the affirmative action program at the University of California-
Davis Medical School in 1977.294   In Gratz, two white students who 
applied for and were denied admission to the University of Michigan’s 
College of Literature, Science, and Arts as residents of Michigan filed a 
lawsuit, claiming that the university’s use of racial preferences in 
undergraduate admissions violated their rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.295  In reviewing the case, the 
Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, concluded that the college’s admissions 
policy, which automatically distributed twenty points to every single 
underrepresented minority applicant solely because of race, was not 
narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in racial diversity that was 
claimed to justify its program and therefore was unconstitutional.296  
Justice Thomas joined the majority and wrote a concurrence that was void 
of any explicitly “raced” thought.297
 His dissent in the second opinion Grutter, however, was different. 
 It was bursting with many core ideas of black conservative ideology.  In 
Grutter, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of the State of Michigan who 
had applied for and was denied admission to the University of Michigan 
Law School, filed a lawsuit, alleging like the plaintiffs in Gratz, that the 
law school had violated her constitutional rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.298  Specifically, she alleged that “her application was 
rejected because the Law School uses race as a ‘predominant’ factor, 
giving applicants who belong to certain minority groups ‘a significantly 
greater chance of admission than students with similar credentials from 
disfavored racial groups.’”299  She further argued that the law school had 
 
certain minority groups.    As the Supreme Court noted in Grutter, “The only holding for 
the Court in Bakke was that ‘a State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be 
served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration 
of race and ethnic origin.”  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2236 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320). 
294  Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, CONST. 
COMM. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 1-2, on file with author) (“The latest pair of 
cases announced a truce of sorts in affirmative action hostilities.”). 
295 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2417. 
296 Id. at 2427–28. 
297 Id. at 2433 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting only one further observation, which 
was that the college’s policy did not suffer from the constitutional defect of distinctions 
among underrepresented minority applicants because it did not a racial preference to 
members of some underrepresented minority groups). 
298  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332–33. 
299  Id. at 2333 (quoting Appendix 33–34). 
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no compelling interest for such use of race.300
 In describing its admissions process, the law school provided 
evidence to show that, while it maintained records on the racial and ethnic 
composition of the class, it never required the admission of a certain 
percentage of minority law students.301  Instead, it individually reviewed 
each application with race as a plus factor.302  Furthermore, the law school 
showed that it worked only to ensure a “critical mass” of underrepresented 
minority students at the school “such that underrepresented minority 
students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race” and such 
that classroom discussion and the educational experience outside of the 
classroom could be enhanced by diverse backgrounds and perspectives.303 
 The law school also presented evidence that demonstrated that the 
elimination of its current admissions policies would have an extremely 
negative impact on the number of minorities admitted to the law school.304
In Grutter, in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice O’Connor, the 
Court held that the law school has a compelling state interest in attaining a 
diverse student body305 and that the law school’s use of race in its 
admissions process was narrowly tailored to further that compelling 
interest of diversity and the educational benefits that flow from having a 
diverse student body, such as cross-racial understanding, the tearing down 
of stereotypes, and the preparation of students for working in an 
increasingly diverse workforce.306  In holding that the law school had a 
compelling state interest in diversity, the Supreme Court asserted that it 
deferred to the law school’s judgment that diversity was essential to its 
educational mission and concluded that “‘good faith’ on the part of a 
university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”307  In 
determining that the law school’s admissions policies were narrowly 
tailored to that interest, the Court declared that the law school’s policies 
ensured a highly individualized review of each applicant and gave serious 
consideration to the myriad of ways that an applicant could contribute to 
 
300  See id. 
301  See id. at 2333. 
302  See id. at 2333-34. 
303  Id. 
304  Id. at 2334. 
305  Id. at 2339. 
306  Id. at 2338–42 
307  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339. 
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the diversity of the school in that review.308  Finally, the Court rejected the 
suggestion that the law school simply lower its admissions standards, 
stating that such remedy would make the law school a very different 
institution and would force the law school to sacrifice an essential 
component of its educational mission.309
In response to the majority opinion, Justice Thomas wrote an 
equally long dissent that was rooted in black conservative ideology on 
affirmative action.310  Indeed, Justice Thomas began his dissent with a 
quote from Frederick Douglass, a former slave and an abolitionist, in a 
speech in 1865.311  Emphasizing the black conservative principle of self-
reliance and black empowerment, Thomas began his dissent as follows:  
“Like Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American 
 
308  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343.  
309  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2345 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  The Court also set a “time limit” on the use of race-conscious policies, noting that 
it expects “that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be 
necessary to further the interest approved today.”  Id. at 2347.  See generally Kevin R. 
Johnson, supra note 294 (exploring the meaning of the 25-year time limit, the Court’s 
authority to set such a time limit, and the practicality of such a time limit). 
310  See Cass Sunstein, Affirmative Action in Higher Education:  Why Grutter Was 
Correctly Decided, J. BLACK HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 31, 2003 (asserting that Justice Thomas 
abandoned his commitment to originalism and called “for an extraordinary exercise in 
judicial activism” in Grutter in light of the fact that “[a] great deal of historical work 
suggest that affirmative action was accepted by those who ratified the equal protection 
clause”). 
311 Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  The quote was as follows: 
[I]n regard to the colored people, there is always more that is 
benevolent, I perceive, than just, manifested towards us. What I ask for 
the negro is not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply 
justice. The American people have always been anxious to know what 
they shall do with us .... I have had but one answer from the beginning. 
Do nothing with us! Your doing with us has already played the 
mischief with us. Do nothing with us! If the apples will not remain on 
the tree of their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the core, if 
they are early ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! ... And if the 
negro cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also. All I ask is, give 
him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let him alone! ... [Y]our 
interference is doing him positive injury.  
Id.  (quoting What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston, 
Massachusetts, on 26 January 1865, reprinted in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 
59, 68 (J. Blassingame & J. McKivigan eds.1991)). 
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life without the meddling of university administrators.”312  Then, as many 
other black conservatives have argued, Justice Thomas maintained that the 
use of the affirmative action only impairs minority students and that only 
self-sufficiency can remedy the disparities that encourage the use of race-
conscious admissions.  To Justice Thomas, the law school had taken the 
easy way out of resolving the educational inequalities between Whites and 
the underrepresented minorities that were the targets of its program.313  
Then, much like he did in Fordice and Jenkins, Justice Thomas inquired 
whether the educational advancement of black students was superior in 
more homogenous schools, noting that there is “growing evidence that 
racial . . . heterogeneity actually impairs learning among black students” 
and citing studies that found that black students who attended historically 
black colleges reported higher academic achievement than those who 
attended predominantly white colleges.314  In fact, citing Thomas Sowell, 
a well-known black conservative and a mentor of his, Justice Thomas 
maintained in his dissent that race-conscious admissions policies like that 
used by the law school harm, rather than help, minority students because 
they allow insufficiently prepared students to study in elite institutions 
where they will fail.315  Moreover, like black conservatives such as Shelby 
Steele and John McWhorter advise, Justice Thomas argued that current 
race-conscious admissions policies only “help to fulfill the bigot’s 
prophecy about black underperformance” by creating an incentive for 
Blacks to embrace black victimology.316  Specifically, he maintained that 
“there is no incentive for the black applicant to continue to prepare for the 
LSAT once he is reasonably assured of achieving the requisite score,”317 
 
312  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
313  See id. at 2362-63 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
314  Id. at 2358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
Flowers & Pascarella, Cognitive Effects of College Racial Composition on African 
American Students After 3 Years of College, 40 J. OF C. STUDENT DEV. 669, 674 (1999) 
and Allen, The Color of Success: African-American College Student Outcomes at 
Predominantly White and Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities, 62 HARV. 
EDUC. REV. 26, 35 (1992)). 
315  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citing THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE 176–77 (1994)). 
316  Id. at 2365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
317  Id. at 2365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. 
n.16 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I use the LSAT as an 
example, but the same incentive structure is in place for any admissions criteria, 
 
 
 
76   
 
                                                                                                                                          
meaning the score above which nearly all Blacks were guaranteed 
admission.  On the other hand, for Whites, those who “aspir[e] to 
admission at the Law School have every incentive to improve their score 
to levels above that range.”318  In sum, Justice Thomas asked, as do other 
black conservatives, what is the benefit of diversity to Blacks, thereby 
suggesting that the “real” benefit of diversity as constructed in current 
affirmative action programs was for Whites only.319
Additionally, throughout his dissent, Thomas, like other black 
conservatives, repeatedly questioned the true interests and motives of the 
law school (the Whites who control the university), arguing that the law 
school’s interest was purely “aesthetic”––with the law school solely 
desiring a “certain appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in 
its classrooms to the color of the students sitting in them.”320  Consistent 
with this distrust of white interests in black conservative ideology, Justice 
Thomas then openly wondered why, if the law school so valued diversity, 
it refused to lower its admissions standards, despite the fact that it would 
change the nature and status of the law school.321  Justice Thomas wrote 
that the law school’s “reluctance to do [so] suggests that the educational 
benefits [from diversity] it alleges are not so significant.”322 Continuing 
with his suspicion of the law school’s real interest, Justice Thomas turned 
to the law school use of the Law School Admissions Test (“LSAT”) in its 
admissions procedures.  He wrote that: 
 
including undergraduate grades, on which minorities are consistently admitted at 
thresholds significantly lower than whites.”). 
318  Id. at 2364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
319 See, e.g., STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED, note 24, at 136 (“A law professor says, 
‘I want blacks in my classroom when I teach constitutional law.  The diversity of opinion 
helps us better understand the Constitution.’  But are blacks human beings or teaching 
tools?  Is it good for human beings to be made to play this role, to be brought in, often in 
defiance of standards, because their color is presumed to carry a point of view that 
diversifies classroom content?”). 
320  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2352 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
321  See id. at 2353 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
322  Id. at 2353 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In other 
words, the Law School seeks to improve marginally the education it offers without 
sacrificing too much of its exclusivity and elite status.”); see also id. at 2356 (“With the 
adoption of different admissions methods, such as accepting all students who meet 
minimum qualifications, the Law School could achieve its vision of the racially aesthetic 
student body without the use of racial discrimination.”) (citation omitted). 
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no modern law school can claim ignorance of the poor 
performance of blacks, relatively speaking, on the . . . 
LSAT. . . .  Nevertheless, law schools continue to use the 
test and then attempt to ‘correct’ for black 
underperformance by using racial discrimination in 
admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic student body.323   
 
This, Justice Thomas suggested, simply showed that the law school was 
merely interested in window dressing, and not the actual advancement of 
black students.324  In his eyes, the law school only cares if its “class looks 
right, even if it does not perform right.”325  As his fellow black 
conservatives have often expressed, Justice Thomas finally implied that 
persons who govern schools such as the University of Michigan Law 
School were only advocating for minorities what they would not advocate 
for their own children.  He asserted that “aestheticists will never address 
the real problems facing ‘underrepresented minorities,’ instead continuing 
their social experiments on other people’s children.”326
 Lastly, Justice Thomas incessantly referred to what he and other 
 
323 Id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
324  Id. at 2362-65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
325 Id. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
326 Id. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  To support 
this argument, Justice Thomas proposes the following: 
For example, there is no recognition by the Law School in this case 
that even with their racial discrimination in place, black men are 
“underrepresented” at the Law School. Why does the Law School not 
also discriminate in favor of black men over black women, given this 
underrepresentation? The answer is, again, that all the Law School 
cares about is its own image among know-it-all elites, not solving real 
problems like the crisis of black male underperformance. 
Id. n.11(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Tobias Barrington 
Wolff & Robert Paul Wolff, The Pimple on Adonis’s Nose: A Dialogue on the Concept of 
Merit in the Affirmative Action Debate, 56 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2005) 
(highlighting how current admissions plans help those who need the assistance least); cf. 
Robert W. Hillman, The Hidden Costs of Lawyer Mobility: Of Law Firms, Law Schools, 
and the Education of Lawyers, 91 KY. L.J. 299, 310 (2002-2003) (highlighting how the 
rising costs of law school education affect low-income students).  But see Cheryl Harris, 
Book Review, Mining in Hard Ground, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2487, 2537-38 (2003) 
(discussing how middle class Blacks experience disadvantages based on wealth 
inequality relative to Whites). 
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black conservatives regard as the demoralizing effect of affirmative action 
on minorities.  Again, as in Adarand, Justice Thomas contended that 
affirmative action unfairly stigmatizes Blacks who would have been 
admitted based on “merit” alone and tars them as “undeserving.”327  In the 
end, he asked, “Who can differentiate between those who belong and 
those who do not”––a question that has repeatedly been asked about 
Thomas throughout his career and, which given his life experiences at 
Yale Law School and in his career, obviously drives in part his views on 
affirmative action.328     
 
C. Crime 
 
Look at these young brothers dying in the street—the drive-by 
shootings, the violence.  If dogs were being struck down at the same 
rate and in the same way, and left bleeding in the gutter, there would 
be a society of blue-haired women to save our canine friends.  But 
these are young black men bleeding in the gutter, and no one seems to 
give a damn. 
 
 –Clarence Thomas329
 
 
327  Id. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Beyond the 
harm the Law School’s racial discrimination visits upon its test subjects, no social science 
has disproved the notion that this discrimination ‘engender[s] attitudes of superiority or, 
alternatively, provoke[s] resentment among those who believe that they have been 
wronged by the government’s use of race.’”); id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. 204, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment)); id. (“Who can differentiate between those who 
belong and those who do not? The majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School 
because of discrimination, and because of this policy all are tarred as undeserving. This 
problem of stigma does not depend on determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are 
actually the ‘beneficiaries’ of racial discrimination. When blacks take positions in the 
highest places of government, industry, or academia, it is an open question today whether 
their skin color played a part in their advancement.  The question itself is the stigma—
because either racial discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be 
deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it did not, in which case asking the question itself 
unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed without discrimination.”). 
 328  See Williams, supra note 56, at 74. 
329  Quoted in Jeffrey Rosen, supra note 202, at 67; see also Thomas, supra note 30, 
at 13 (“We should be at least as incensed about the totalitarianism of drug traffickers and 
criminals in poor neighborhoods as we were about totalitarianism in Eastern bloc 
countries”). 
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In the area of criminal law, Justice Thomas has earned a reputation 
as a hard and unforgiving Justice, with many wondering what he meant 
when testified before the Senate that he would often watch busloads of 
prisoners from his window and say to himself, “[T]here but by the Grace 
of God, go I.”330  To many, nothing about his criminal jurisprudence 
reflects any empathy for criminals.  As noted above, however, a core 
principle of black conservative thought on crime is its advocacy for the 
severe punishment of criminals and the protection of victims, especially 
poor black victims whom black conservatives view as being prisoners in 
their own homes due to the rapidly deteriorating conditions of their streets 
and neighborhoods.331
Although Justice Thomas has been provided with little opportunity 
 
330  See, e.g., Calmore, supra note 21, at 208; Note, Lasting Stigma, supra note 21, 
at 1331 (“Thomas concluded that his story of professional success in the face of 
significant obstacles would enable him ‘to stand in the shoes of . . . people across a broad 
spectrum’ of American society.   He spoke of the view from his office, which allowed 
him to see the busloads of criminal defendants being brought to the courthouse:  ‘And 
you look out, and you say to yourself, and I say to myself almost every day, But for the 
grace of God there go I.’ Yet in his first Term on the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas 
issued a dissent in Hudson v. McMillian in which he argued that an inmate’s beating by 
two prison guards, a beating that bruised the inmate’s face, loosened his teeth, and 
cracked his dental plate, did not fall within the Eighth Amendment’s stricture against 
cruel and unusual punishments.  The dissent sparked scathing criticism and prompted one 
editorial to label Justice Thomas the ‘[y]oungest, [c]ruelest Justice.’”); Eric. L. Muller, 
Where, But For The Grace of God, Goes He?  The Search For Empathy in the Criminal 
Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 15 CONST. COMM. 225, 225–26 (1998) (“Once Judge 
Thomas became Justice Thomas, this compassionate image tarnished quickly. Empathy 
was difficult to discern in his dissent in Hudson v. McMillan, one of his very early 
opinions.”); Smith, supra note 95, at 26 (noting that “[o]ne searches in vain, however, for 
clear evidence in Thomas’s opinions that he has brought his empathic understanding of 
social reality to the Supreme Court”). 
When asked at his Senate Confirmation Hearings whether victims should play a 
greater role in the criminal justice system, Justice Thomas responded: 
My concern would be . . . that we don’t jeopardize the rights of the 
victim.  Of course, we would like to make sure that the victims are 
involved in the process, but we should be very careful, in my view, 
that we don’t somehow undermine the validity of the process; that an 
individual who is a criminal defendant is in some way harmed by 
that.” 
Hearings, supra note 160, at 133 (testimony of Clarence Thomas) (emphasis 
added). 
331  See supra Part I(B)(4). 
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to present these exact principles in his jurisprudence, he did express these 
very concepts in Chicago v. Morales.332  In Morales, at issue was a 
Chicago ordinance that required any police officer to issue an order to 
disperse to any person whom he or she reasonably believed to be a 
criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or 
more persons.333  The ordinance had been criticized by many as giving the 
police a free license to target and harass young men of color for simply 
standing on the corner.334  In reviewing the claim that this ordinance 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court struck down the ordinance on the ground that it was 
unconstitutionally vague in failing to establish minimal guidelines for 
enforcement.335  
Not surprisingly, Justice Thomas dissented from the majority, in a 
writing that was replete with black conservatism.  Indeed, as in many of 
his other opinions, he echoed many of the principles that have been 
expressed by black conservatives, such as Thomas Sowell, asserting that 
“gangs fill the daily lives of many of our poorest and most vulnerable 
citizens with a terror that the Court does not give sufficient consideration, 
often relegating them to the status of prisoners in their own homes.”336  
Throughout his dissent, Justice Thomas articulated the black conservative 
principle on criminal law that promotes a focus on the victim as opposed 
to the criminal perpetrator.337  He also emphasized the “politics of 
distinction,” noting how the majority sacrificed good, law-abiding citizens 
who made up the vast majority of the community, for the sake of 
protecting the “imagined rights” of a few lawbreakers.338  He argued: 
 
332  527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
333  See id. at 45-46. 
334  Tony Mauro, Decade After Confirmation, Thomas Becoming a Force on High 
Court, FULTON CTY. DAILY REPORT, Aug. 20, 2001, at 1 (stating that ordinance was 
viewed as a tool for police to target Blacks). 
335  Morales, 527 U.S. at 60-64 (“It applies to everyone in the city who may remain 
in one place with one suspected gang member as long as their purpose is not apparent to 
an officer observing them. Friends, relatives, teachers, counselors, or even total strangers 
might unwittingly engage in forbidden loitering if they happen to engage in idle 
conversation with a gang member.”) 
336  Id. at 99 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
337  See Mauro, supra 334, at 1 (referring to a comment that Thomas “is eloquently 
on the side of low-income, law-abiding citizens, not on the side of the criminals”). 
338  Morales, 527 U.S. at 115 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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As one resident described: “There is only about one or two 
percent of the people in the city causing the problems 
maybe, but it’s keeping ninety eight percent of us in our 
houses and off the streets and afraid to shop.” By focusing 
exclusively on the imagined rights of two percent, the 
Court has denied our most vulnerable citizens the very 
thing that Justice Stevens elevates above all else––freedom 
of movement.” 339  
 
Additionally, Justice Thomas expressed black conservatives’ 
distrust of Whites, specifically hinting that the majority had only furthered 
the victimization of this society’s most vulnerable citizens (whom black 
conservatives consistently argue are poor Blacks) and that those in the 
majority made a decision for these citizens that it would not make for their 
own communities.340  He wrote: 
 
Today the Court focuses extensively on the “rights” of 
gang members and their companions.  It can safely do so--
- people who will have to live with the consequences do 
not live in our neighborhoods. Rather, people who will 
suffer from our lofty pronouncements are people like Ms. 
Susan Mary Jackson; people who have seen their 
neighborhoods literally destroyed by gangs and violence 
and drugs.  They are good, decent people who must 
struggle to overcome their desperate situation, against all 
odds, in order to raise their families, earn a living and 
remain good citizens.341   
 
 
339 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Sowell, supra note 136 (arguing that 
“Justice Kennedy [who criticized merciless prison sentences] may feel ‘secure’ where he 
lives and works . . . [b]ut the ‘equal protection of the laws’ under the 14th Amendment 
applies also to those who live in less elite circumstances”) (emphasis added); cf. 
GREENYA, supra note 5, at 27 (quoting Thomas as saying “I don’t understand why those 
of us who say we are so passionate about little kids can’t see that they can’t grow up in 
these environments” – environments where they are assaulted when they go to school or 
are in fear for their lives). 
340 Morales, 527 U.S. at 115 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
341  Morales, 527 U.S. at 115 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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In fact, in his dissent, Thomas gave voice to the many concerned, 
law-abiding citizens for whom he argued the ordinance protected.  He 
quoted several of the citizens who supported the ordinance, such as 
eighty-eight year old Susan Mary Jackson, who testified to the following 
before the Chicago City Council on the problems of gang loitering: 
 
We used to have a nice neighborhood. We don’t have it 
anymore . . . .  I am scared to go out in the daytime. . . . 
[Y]ou can’t pass because they are standing.  I am afraid to 
go to the store. I don’t go to the store because I am afraid. 
At my age if they look at me real hard, I be ready to 
holler.342
 
For Justice Thomas, the victims’ right to demand a safe neighborhood 
deserved equal, if not more, weight than the “imagined” rights of persons 
who break the law by refusing a policeman’s orders to disperse.343  
 Additionally, Justice Thomas has incorporated black conservative 
principles regarding the need to eliminate discretion among jurors in his 
jurisprudence on capital cases.  For example, in Graham v. Collins,344 the 
Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the three special issues 
the sentencing jury was required to answer prevented the jury from 
considering mitigating evidence of his youth, unstable family background, 
and positive character traits on the ground that such a holding would 
require the announcement of a new rule in violation of the principles of 
another case.345 There, Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in 
which he took advantage of the opportunity to address concerns left by 
Furman v. Georgia.346  Noting that “[t]he unquestionable importance of 
race in Furman is reflected in the fact that three of the original four 
petitioners in the Furman cases were represented by the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,”347 Justice Thomas highlighted the 
dangers of leaving sentencing up to irrational juror considerations, such as 
 
342 Id. at 101(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
343  See id. at 115 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
344 506 U.S. 461 (1993). 
345  See id. at 467-68. 
346  408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
347  Id. at 481 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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class or race animus.348 He then proclaimed, “One would think . . . that by 
eliminating explicit jury discretion and treating all defendants equally, a 
mandatory death penalty scheme was a perfectly reasonable legislative 
response to the concerns expressed in Furman [v. Georgia].”349  In so 
doing, he brought to light the black conservative principle that defendants 
are only protected against discriminatory sentencing in capital cases if no 
discretion is left with the jury.350  In sum, as Justice Thomas had done in 
cases concerning education and desegregation and affirmative action, 
Justice Thomas has expressed core principles of black conservative 
thought in his opinions.  Based on what he has written over the last 
thirteen years as a Supreme Court Justice, Thomas is likely to continue to 
write and develop a “raced” jurisprudence on certain issues. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 
348   See id. at 481-85 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
349  Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas supports mandatory death 
sentences because he believes they will help to eliminate racial prejudices and 
capriciousness in capital sentencing.  See Smith, supra note 95, at 19 (citing Paul M. 
Barrett, On The Right: Thomas Is Emerging as Strong Conservative Out to Prove 
Himself, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1993, at A1). 
350  Somewhat consistent with these views is Justice Thomas’s positions in cases 
involving egregious prosecutorial misconduct.  For example, in United States v. Williams, 
504 U.S. 36 (1992), Justice Thomas split with Justice Scalia, who wrote a majority 
opinion holding that a district court may not dismiss an otherwise valid indictment on the 
ground that the government failed to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence to the 
grand jury.  Instead, Justice Thomas joined with Justice Stevens in his dissent, who 
argued that if a prosecutor withheld evidence that would plainly preclude a finding of 
probable cause, a district court should be able to dismiss the indictment.  Id. at 68-70 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  Likewise, in Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118, 121 S. Ct. 
873 (2001), the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari, from a case in 
which the Third Circuit had held that recovery of damages was barred for a wrongfully 
convicted defendant where child witnesses had been improperly coerced by the 
prosecution and the defendant’s due process rights were violated by the use of such 
testimony at trial.  See id. at 873.  In that case, Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in a denial 
of a petition for writ of certiorari, explaining his opinion that the Third Circuit’s view and 
Court’s failure to hear the case left “left victims of egregious prosecutorial misconduct 
without a remedy.”  Id. at 874; see also Margaret Johns, Reconsidering Absolute 
Prosecutorial Immunity (manuscript on file with author) (arguing that absolute 
prosecutorial immunity denies civil remedies to innocent people who have been 
wrongfully convicted of crimes as a result of prosecutorial misconduct). 
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What does Justice Clarence Thomas’s life and jurisprudence teach 
us about race and the impact of racial identity?  The lessons are many.   
First, Justice Thomas’s story tells us that race is an inescapable 
part of a person’s identity, whether one is conservative or liberal or a 
racial minority or non-minority.351  Moreover, it demonstrates to us that 
race impacts and manifests itself in one’s identity in different ways, 
depending on that individual’s personal biography and perceptions of 
reality.352  For example, what is evident in Justice Thomas’s life and work 
is that he, like many of his black counterparts, is conservative precisely 
because he is black.  Much like black liberals whose life experiences have 
shaped their reactions to issues such as affirmative action in a way that 
makes them liberal,353 Justice Thomas’s experiences with race have led 
him to adopt ideologies that are strictly based on self-reliance without 
government interference in a way that makes him conservative.  In fact, 
much of Justice Thomas’s beliefs and ideologies are rooted in the 
philosophies of his grandfather Myers Anderson, who raised him.354  It 
was Anderson, who, although polite, “never, ever trusted” Whites or 
buckra;355 taught Thomas “that government, like many other things in the 
segregated South, was for whites only;”356 and instilled in Thomas that he 
 
351  See  Haney Lopez, supra note 145, at 29 (arguing that race is a powerful social 
phenomena); cf. Chris F. Denove & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Jury Selection: An 
Empirical Investigation of Demographic Bias, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 285, 293-94, 298 
(1995) (noting, based on their demographic study of tort cases, that “[r]ace emerges from 
the data as the single most important factor in predicting juror orientation”). 
352  See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 11 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 207, 210 (1996) (asserting that “identity is a complex interplay 
between what [one] chooses[s] and what is forced upon” him or her); Angela P. Harris, 
Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 774 (1994) 
(“‘Race’ is real, and pervasive: our very perceptions of the world, some theorists argue, 
are filtered through a screen of ‘race.’”); see also Smith, supra note 7, at 18 (analyzing 
how Justice Thomas “incorporates his own views of social reality” into cases). 
353 See Deborah C. Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action 
Debate, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1668, 1713 (1997) (arguing, for example, that “affirmative 
action has become to the African-American community what abortion rights have 
become for the feminist community—the constitutive issue, the program because of 
which we find ourselves a part of the debate rather than disempowered outsiders”). 
354  See supra Part II. 
355  FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 63 (noting how Anderson discussed Whites in 
“coded language his slave ancestors used to describe their owners,” such as “buckra, a 
West African word for ‘demon’”). 
356  FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 63. 
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“could not depend on white people for help.”357  Even though some of 
Thomas’s experiences, unlike his grandfather’s, led him to accept that 
some whites could be helpful and encouraging, such as the white nuns 
who taught Thomas in Catholic school,358 central to Justice Thomas’s 
views about the route to racial equality is his belief that black people can 
and should depend only upon themselves in part because the government 
itself is often the tool used to create two separate, but unequal worlds for 
groups.  As the Justice once declared, “I lived under two sets of books. . . . 
 I’m not going back to two sets of books again.”359  Indeed, a critical 
component of black conservatism itself is the notion that Blacks should 
not support programs such as affirmative action or policies that provide 
leniency for criminal defendants because they fail truly to address the 
problems of the black community and serve only the purpose of assuaging 
the guilty consciences of white liberals.360  In other words, black 
conservatives’ support of colorblindness rests—oddly enough—entirely 
on their blackness, or more specifically, their belief that their blackness is 
the very reason they cannot rely on social welfare, government assistance, 
or benign policies such as affirmative action. 
On that same note, Justice Thomas’s life and jurisprudence reveals 
exactly how devastating racism can be and how an individual’s thoughts, 
beliefs, and even jurisprudence, regardless of claims of colorblindness and 
neutrality, are shaped by experiences with race and racism, both subtle 
and obvious, 361 or, in the case of persons with white-skin privilege, either 
their lack of experience with racism or their relationships with people who 
 
357  FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 64 (“No white bank lent Anderson the money he 
needed to start his business or build his own home.”). 
358  FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 66 (describing how the nuns at Thomas’s Catholic 
school made their students, all of whom were black, feel differently about Whites). 
359  Quoted in FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 72 (quotations omitted). 
360  See Tushnet, Black Nationalism, supra note 243, at 330 (describing how Justice 
Thomas’s views on education “are infused with scorn for policies supported by elites that 
assuage their consciences by seeming to address . . . problems [plaguing the black 
community] without doing so and that allow elites to maintain essentially undisturbed 
institutions with which they are familiar and from which they benefit”). 
361  See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious 
Pedagogy in Legal Education, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 33, 35 n.4 (1994) 
(noting that “Blacks are likely to be somewhat aware that law has played a role in 
maintaining racial privilege” and that “Whites, although aware that racial subordination is 
a problem, are unlikely to view racism as a constant or central feature of American life”). 
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are deeply affected by it.362  Regardless of how one describes Justice 
Thomas’s jurisprudence, it is clear that the Justice is deeply influenced by 
his life experiences when deciding questions that directly implicate 
race.363  For example, one scholar Professor Scott Gerber, who argues that 
Justice Thomas conceives of civil rights as a individual rather than a 
group concern,364 has maintained that Thomas changes his approach in 
deciding “race” cases by shifting from a conservative originalist approach 
on civil liberties and federalism cases365 to one of a liberal originalist366 
on civil rights cases.367   
Indeed, the influence of race and racial identity was most recently 
and prominently witnessed during oral arguments and in Justice Thomas’s 
dissent in Virginia v. Black,368 a case concerning the constitutionality of a 
Virginia statute that made it “unlawful for any person or persons with the 
intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to 
be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public 
place.”369  In that case, Justice Thomas broke with his long-standing 
 
362  Cf. Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall:  The Influence of a Raconteur, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217–20 (1992) (“Like most of my counterparts who grew up in 
the Southwest in the 1930s and 1940s, I had not been personally exposed to racial 
tensions before Brown. . . .  But as I listened that day to Justice Marshall talk eloquently 
to the media about the social stigmas and lost opportunities suffered by African American 
children in state-imposed segregated school, my awareness of race-based disparities 
deepened. I did not, could not, know it then, but the man who would, as a lawyer and 
jurist, captivate the nation would also, as colleague and friend, profoundly influence me. . 
. .  Occasionally, at Conference meetings, I still catch myself looking expectantly for his 
raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just once more, another story that 
would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the world.”). 
363 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 277 (manuscript at 39-47, on file with author) 
(detailing how Justice Thomas, much like Justice Marshall, brings his experiences as a 
black man to the bench). 
364  See GERBER, supra note 3, at 50. 
365  A conservative originalist approach  focuses on the framers’ intentions in 
deciding constitutional questions.  See id. at 193. 
366  A liberal originalist approach “appeals to the ideal of equality at the heart of the 
Declaration of Independence.”  Id. at 193. 
367  See id. at 193; see also Jagan Nicholas Ranjan, Book Review, The Politicization 
of Clarence Thomas, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2084, 2093 (2003) (maintaining that “Justice 
Thomas’s jurisprudence on race departs from the originalism that undergirds most of his 
jurisprudence”). 
368  123 S. Ct. 1536 (2002). 
369  VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–423 (Michie 1996). 
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practice of remaining silent during oral arguments370 to speak “in a voice 
of color in analyzing the harm caused by cross burning.”371  Justice 
Thomas’s exchange with the attorney from the Department of Justice, who 
was arguing in favor of the constitutionality of the Virginia statute, was as 
follows: 
 
QUESTION: Mr. Dreeben, aren’t you understating the––
the effects of––of the burning cross? This statute was 
passed in what year? 
 
MR. DREEBEN: 1952 originally. 
 
QUESTION: Now, it’s my understanding that we had 
almost 100 years of lynching and activity in the South by 
the Knights of Camellia and––and the Ku Klux Klan, and 
this was a reign of terror and the cross was a symbol of 
that reign of terror. Was—isn’t that significantly greater 
than intimidation or a threat? 
 
MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think they’re coextensive, Justice 
Thomas, because it is— 
 
QUESTION: Well, my fear is, Mr. Dreeben, that you’re 
actually understating the symbolism on––of and the effect 
of the cross, the burning cross. I––I indicated, I think, in 
the Ohio case that the cross was not a religious symbol and 
that it has––it was intended to have a virulent effect. And 
I––I think that what you’re attempting to do is to fit this 
into our jurisprudence rather than stating more clearly 
what the cross was intended to accomplish and, indeed, 
that it is unlike any symbol in our society. 
 
370   Dahlia Lithwick, Personal Truths and Legal Fictions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2002, at A35 (noting that Justice Thomas “speaks only four or fives times a year, less 
often than most of his colleagues speak during an average morning”).  
371  Guy-Uriel Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the 
Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 29-34) (arguing 
that Virginia v. Black represents a complete course reversal with respect to the Court’s 
approach to the constitutionality of anti-cross burning statutes). 
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MR. DREEBEN: Well, I don’t mean to understate it, and I 
entirely agree with Your Honor’s description of how the 
cross has been used as an instrument of intimidation 
against minorities in this country. That has justified 14 
States in treating it as a distinctive— 
 
QUESTION: Well, it’s—it’s actually more than 
minorities. There’s certain groups.  And I––I just––my fear 
is that the--there was no other purpose to the cross. There 
was no communication of a particular message. It was 
intended to cause fear— 
 
MR. DREEBEN: It— 
 
QUESTION: ––and to terrorize a population.372 
 
As this colloquy demonstrates, for Justice Thomas, the burning of a cross 
with the intent to intimidate contained no expressive value but rather was 
conduct not subject to a First Amendment analysis, because its history and 
use in society had left it with no other cultural meaning but “lawlessness” 
and a “well-grounded fear of physical violence” for its victims.373  It was 
Justice Thomas’s race and experiences with racism as a black man 
growing up in the segregated South that shaped his view of a burning 
cross, and in turn, helped to shape those of his colleagues on the bench.374  
 
372 Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2002) 
(No. 01-1107). 
373   Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1564 (“‘After the mother saw the burning cross, she was 
crying on her knees in the living room. [She] felt feelings of frustration and intimidation 
and feared for her husband’s life. She testified what the burning cross symbolized to her 
as a black American:  ‘murder, hanging, rape, lynching. Just about anything bad that you 
can name. It is the worst thing that can happen to a person’  Mr. Heisser told the 
probation officer that at the time of the occurrence, if the family did not leave, he 
believed someone would return to commit murder. . . .  Seven months after the incident, 
the family still lived in fear. . . . This is a reaction reasonably to be anticipated from this 
criminal conduct.’”). 
374   See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 277 (manuscript at 44-47, on file with the 
author) (discussing the impact of Justice Thomas’s statements during oral arguments).  In 
the end, the majority in Black rejected Justice Thomas’s position that there was no need 
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 Moreover, it is this same influence of race that separates Justice 
Thomas’s jurisprudence from that of Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas’s 
alleged “puppeteer.”375  Although Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas both 
adhere to principles of formal equality, Justice Thomas’s support of the 
principle has a clearly raced component to it in that it, much like his 
conservatism in general, stems from his blackness—from his view that 
Blacks can be protected only if they are treated exactly the same as 
opposed to Justice Scalia’s view that all individuals should be treated 
exactly the same for reasons of evenhandedness alone.  For example, 
Justice Thomas’s analysis of a need for colorblind admissions in his 
dissent in Grutter was vastly different from that of Justice Scalia in the 
decision.376  While Justice Scalia’s dissent centered on what he believed 
 
to analyze the Virginia statute under any First Amendment tests because cross burning 
constituted conduct, not expression.  Id. at 1547-49.  But while the majority rejected 
Justice Thomas’s analysis on the statute and held that the prima facie provision within the 
cross burning statute was facially unconstitutional, it did hold that the state could outlaw 
cross burning that was carried out with the intent to intimidate because the practice was a 
“particularly virulent form of intimidation.” Id. at 1549.  Indeed, many have argued that 
Justice Thomas’s words during oral argument were critical to shaping the majority’s 
analysis of the case, which was, in many ways, contrary to the approach adopted by the 
Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), where the Court held that the 
banning of certain symbolic conduct, including cross burning, when done with 
knowledge that it would arouse “anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion or gender” was unconstitutional.  See RAV, 505 U.S. at 380; 
see also Charles, supra note 371, at 41-44 (arguing that other members of the court 
deferred to Justice Thomas’s concept regarding the harms of cross-burning “[b]ecause 
Justice Thomas––an African-American colleague, a conservative, raised in the south, a 
victim of racism––possesses epistemic authority and commands epistemic deference”); 
Lithwick, supra note 370, at A35 (“But with his personal narrative, Justice Thomas 
changed the terms of the legal debate.  After he spoke, members of the court took turns 
characterizing burning crosses as uniquely threatening symbolic speech. . . .”); see also 
Edward Lazarus, Making Sense of Thomas’ Cross Burning Remarks and First 
Amendment Law (acknowledging that “the power of Thomas’s verbal assault on cross 
burning, its authenticity and historical irrefutability derived directly from his identity and 
perspective as the Court’s only African-American justice.”), available in 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/26/findlaw.analysis.lazarus.Thomas. 
375  See FOSKETT, supra note 179, at 2 (“Liberal pundits like to say that the Court’s 
black justice simply obeys Justice Antonin Scalia, as if, Thomas joked, ‘he was suddenly 
my master up here.’”). 
376  It also highly differed from that of Justice Rehnquist, whose dissent focused on 
the notion of “critical mass,” contending that the law school’s program is nothing more 
than an effort to achieve racial balancing.  See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2368 (Rehnquist, J., 
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to be inherent unfairness to non-minority individuals who did not receive 
racial preferences377 and what he argued was the law school’s 
inappropriate use of racial discrimination “to convey generic lessons in 
socialization and good citizenship”378 Justice Thomas’s dissent focused 
primarily on what he perceived as affirmative action’s damaging effects to 
individual Blacks, including what he referred to as resulting stigma by 
Whites who perceive affirmative action beneficiaries as inferior and 
affirmative action’s unintended validation of traditional standards of 
merit, in particular the LSAT, that work to disproportionately exclude 
certain minorities.379  In fact, it was Justice Scalia who joined all parts of 
Justice Thomas’s dissent and concurrence, specifically highlighting the 
part of Justice Thomas’s dissent that questioned the University of 
Michigan’s use of traditional standards of merit to maintain its elite status, 
an offshoot of a critique that critical race scholars have consistently made 
in the past.380  Like Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia was convinced “that 
the allegedly “compelling state interest” at issue here is not the 
incremental “educational benefit” that emanates from the fabled “critical 
mass” of minority students, but rather Michigan’s interest in maintaining a 
 
dissenting) (“But the correlation between the percentage of the Law School’s pool of 
applicants who are members of the three minority groups and the percentage of the 
admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far too precise to be 
dismissed as merely the result of the school paying ‘some attention to [the] numbers.’  As 
the tables below show, from 1995 through 2000 the percentage of admitted applicants 
who were members of these minority groups closely tracked the percentage of individuals 
in the school’s applicant pool who were from the same groups.”). 
377  See id. at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis 
added) (sarcastically asserting that “[t]he nonminority individuals who are deprived of a 
legal education, a civil service job, or any job at all by reason of their skin color will 
surely understand”);  see also Chander, supra note 100, at 120 n.292 (highlighting that 
“Justice Scalia’s reference to the ‘nonminority individual’ is incorrect”, as “affirmative 
action programs often exclude some racial minority groups—principally Asians—from 
their benefits”). 
378  Id. at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
379  See id. at 2350-65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
380  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Official Elitism of Institutional Self Interest? 10 
Reasons Why U.C. Davis Should Abandon the LSAT (And Why Other Good Law Schools 
Should Follow Suit), 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593, 600-13 (2001) (explaining how 
standardized tests, such as the LSAT, are not good predictors of performance and highly 
correlate with wealth); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Tenth Chronicle: Merit and 
Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711,1730-42 (1995) (deconstructing the myth of 
objective merit and how it disadvantages minorities). 
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“prestige” law school whose normal admissions standards 
disproportionately exclude blacks and other minorities.”381
Second, criticisms of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence as lacking all 
independent thought, even in the face of clearly raced and distinct 
jurisprudence on certain issues, demonstrate the intensity of the stereotype 
of black incompetence and dependency.382  Why view Justice Thomas’s 
voting record as evidence that he is a slave to Justice Scalia and not view 
Justice Ginsburg’s voting record as evidence that she is a clone of Justice 
Souter or Justice Souter’s voting record as evidence that he is a clone of 
Justice Stevens or even Justice O’Connor’s voting record as evidence that 
she is a clone?383  Given the actual numbers regarding the voting 
relationships between judges, the only answer can be race, or more so, the 
stereotype of black dependency and inferiority.384  After all, the most 
recent statistics of the Justices’ voting relationships indicate that the 
aforementioned pair of Justices have agreed in full on a greater percentage 
of cases than Justices Thomas and Scalia, with Justice Ginsburg agreeing 
in full with Justice Souter 85% of the time, Justice Souter agreeing with 
Justice Stevens 77% of the time, and Justice O’Connor agreeing in full 
with Chief Justice Rehnquist 79% of the time while Justice Thomas and 
Justice Scalia agreed in full only 73% of the time.385   
Justice Thomas (or one of his black conservative counterparts) 
might argue that this difference in perceptions of pairs of judges is, in 
part, due to the ill use of affirmative action and the damaging effect that 
affirmative action has on Whites’ views regarding the competency of 
minorities and women.  As Justice Thomas remarked in Adarand, “These 
programs stamp minorities with the badge of inferiority.”386  Indeed, as 
some scholars have noted, Justice Thomas’s reference to this claimed 
 
381  Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
382  See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
1259, 1292-93 (2000) (discussing how black workers have the extra burden of 
overcoming the stereotype of laziness and intellectual incompetence in the workplace); 
see also Emily Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination 
Principle through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 PITT. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005). 
383  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
384  See GERBER, supra note 3, at 32 (acknowledging how Justice Thomas’s race has 
certainly played a part in how he has been assessed). 
385  Full Voting Relationships by Seniority (2003) (on file with author). 
386 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241. 
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effect of affirmative action was almost personal in Grutter.387
Justice Thomas’s argument about the stigma caused by affirmative 
action, however, has less force when viewed along with similar criticisms 
of Justice Marshall, whose life, politics, and jurisprudence stand in stark 
contrast to Justice Thomas’s.388  The manner in which Justice Marshall 
was regarded as “intellectually inferior” cannot be attributed to 
affirmative action, but instead to the stigma that automatically attaches to 
Blacks in our society.389  Unlike for Justice Thomas,390 there is absolutely 
nothing to indicate that Justice Marshall was ever a beneficiary of 
affirmative action. To begin, affirmative action clearly did not exist when 
Marshall was applying to law school.  Moreover, Justice Marshall 
attended a then all-black law school, Howard University School of Law, 
where he graduated first in his class.391  Additionally, Justice Marshall’s 
record as an attorney was unlike most other Justices of the Supreme 
Court, having won case after case before the Court prior to his 
appointment.  Had Justice Marshall done nothing more than win his 
twenty-nine cases before joining the Supreme Court, one simply could not 
deny that he was an intellectual force in the legal arena.  Yet, he has still 
been the subject of the same disparaging comments regarding alleged 
                                                           
387 See Guinier, supra note 108, at 181 (guessing that Justice Thomas perhaps had a 
personal axe to grind in Grutter); Maureen Dowd, Could Thomas Be Right?, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 25, 2003, at 25 (Justice Thomas’s dissent in Grutter is a clinical study of a man who 
has been drive barking mad by the beneficial treatment he has received.  It’s poignant 
really.  It drives him crazy that people think he is where he is because of his race, but he 
is where he is because of his race.”). 
388 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 277 (manuscript at 47-52, on file with author) 
(describing the differences in Justice Marshall’s and Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence on 
issues of crime and affirmative action); see also Note, Lasting Stigma, supra note 21, at 
1334–36 (arguing that Justice Thomas’s conservative jurisprudence is in part due to his 
attempts to distinguish himself from Justice Marshall).   
389  See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 277 (manuscript at 61-63, on file with author) 
(describing the stigma caused by white supremacist beliefs upon which this country was 
founded); cf. Guinier, supra note 108, at 186-87, 190 (describing how racism is linked to 
stigma and helps to explain “why legacy preferences, which account for a larger 
percentage of admissions at selective colleges than do racial or ethnic factor, do not 
generate the same ‘stigma’”). 
390  See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 277 (manuscript at 1-9, on file with author) 
(discussing how Justice Thomas may be considered a beneficiary of affirmative action); 
Justice Clarence Thomas, A Classic Example of an Affirmative Action Baby, J. BLACKS 
HIGHER. EDUC., Jan., 31, 1998, at 35 (same). 
391  See supra note 12. 
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dependency on another Justice and a lack of intellectual power.392  When 
denigrations of Justices Marshall and Thomas are viewed side by side, it 
becomes clear that stigma of black incompetence and inferiority existed 
long before affirmative action and that this stigma is likely to attach to the 
story of any black justice for a long time to come.  
Most of all, what Justice Thomas’s story may teaches us is that the 
black community’s (or even more broadly, the liberal community’s) 
conception of blackness or “black voice” is far too limited.393  The fact 
that a black individual holds views in stark contrast with those of the 
majority of black community (or even those that are perceived as harmful 
to the black community) does not make his or her views or voice any less 
“black” (so long as there is expressed concern for the black community) 
or make his or her concern for black people any less sincere.394  In fact, 
Justice Thomas’s voice is “raced” in a way that exhibits significant 
concern for black people.  For example, his vehement support for school 
choice (as opposed to integration), his opposition to leniency for criminal 
defendants, and his stance on affirmative action are all deeply grounded in 
such concern, in particular, a concern that current policies are simply 
band-aid solutions to festering problems in the black community, such as 
 
392  In a sense, the lesson from Justice Thomas’s life can be likened to the one 
learned by Chantel Mitchell in JUST ANOTHER GIRL ON THE I.R.T. (Miramax Films 1993), 
the movie for which the title of this Article was inspired.  In the movie, Chantel, the 
smartest girl in her school who sees herself as different, ultimately becomes pregnant and 
has her plans derailed.  For Chantel, the lesson is difficult:  put one’s self in the shoes of 
many less fortunate girls––pregnant, unmarried, broke and without a high school 
education––and see how smart one is.  This movie shows us that no matter how smart a 
person is or how different he or she views himself or herself, he or she is still vulnerable 
in this world without some means of protection. 
393  See Kennedy, supra 12 (manuscript at 14-22, on file with author) (discussing 
the use of terms such as “sellout” in defining acceptable boundaries in the black 
community). 
394  See Kennedy, supra 12 (manuscript at 18-26, on file with author) (explaining 
the dangers of misidentifying so-called traitors to the race); see also Ranjan, supra note 
367, at 2093 (describing Thomas as “a black man who cares about his race”).  But see 
GERBER, supra note 3, at 18-19 (quotations omitted) (describing one writer as stating that 
“Thomas and his supporters are not politically black and have no right . . . to change the 
political standard”); George Curry, Editor’s Note: We Were Too Kind,” EMERGE, Nov. 
1996 (“[O]ur latest depiction [of Justice Thomas on the cover as a lawn jockey] is too 
compassionate for a person who has done so much to turn back the back the clock on 
civil rights, all the way back to the pre-Civil War lawn jockey days”). 
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failing schools and black on black crime.395   
Indeed, as I was researching and learning about black conservative 
ideology, I found myself (surprisingly) nodding in agreement with some 
of its concepts and understandings about the issues facing the black 
community, even though I disagreed with the ultimate route proposed for 
addressing these problems.  Perhaps, this is Justice Thomas’s most 
significant lesson for us all, with his seemingly contradictory “black 
nationalist” and “Reagan conservative” views:396 not only that the voice 
of the black conservative can be “raced” in a way that the voice of the 
white conservative is not,397 but that the rift between the black 
conservative and black liberal is not so wide after all.398  Perhaps, black 
 
395  See Tushnet, Black Nationalism, supra note 243, at 330 (describing how Justice 
Thomas’s opinions on education and Blacks “are concerned with ensuring that public 
policy address real problems in education for African-Americans: failing inner-city 
schools, the relative underperformance of black males, and the like). 
396 See Tushnet, Black Nationalism, supra note 243, at 335-39 (describing the 
tensions between Justice Thomas’s seeming black nationalist views and his devotion to 
individualism). 
397  See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Space Traders, in DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE 
BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 166-68 (1992).  Professor Bell 
makes this point in clear in his portrayal of the black conservative economist Gleason 
Golightly in Space Traders when Golightly states to his white conservative counterparts, 
who are willing to trade in black Americans in exchange for an enormous wealth of gold 
and fuel: 
 
I have supported this administration’s policies that have led to the 
repeal of some civil rights laws, to invalidation of most affirmative 
action programs, and to severe reduction in appropriations for public 
assistance. To put it mildly, the positions of mine that have received a 
great deal of media attention, have not been well received in African-
American communities. Even so, I have been willing to be a ‘good 
soldier’ for the Party even though I am condemned as an Uncle Tom 
by my people. I sincerely believe that black people needed to stand up 
on their own feet, free of special protection provided by civil rights 
laws, the suffocating burden of welfare checks, and the stigmatizing 
influence of affirmative action programs. In helping you undermine 
these policies, I realized that your reasons for doing so differed from 
mine. And yet I went along. 
Id.  at 166-67 (emphasis added). 
398  See Richard Delgado, supra note 58 at 1548-49 (arguing that, in some instances, 
black critiques from the left and the right converge and those interested in civil rights 
should take note when such convergence occurs). 
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conservatives and black liberals would both benefit from listening to each 
other and taking the other group’s concerns seriously.399  After all, in spite 
of everything, Justice Thomas appears to be just another brother on the 
Supreme Court. 
 
399  See Kennedy, supra 12 (manuscript at 25, on file with author) (contending that 
“monitoring of dissident black opinion imposes a loss of valuable information and 
insight”); see also Bridgeman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 3, 15, on file with author) (“I 
wonder if we do not duplicate some of the patterns of silencing and marginalization that 
we ourselves constantly struggle against when we refuse to take seriously those within 
our communities who view the world differently.”). 
 
